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The traditional American rule of employment at wil l  proceeds 
from the assumption that employment is a consensual relation. 
Therefore, absent an employment contract of specified length, 
employees may be fired or may quit their jobs at any time for any 
reason or no reason, without legal liability on either side. This rule 
and its concomitant rejection of any general cause of action for 
wrongful discharge serve important social objectives, s uch as the 
maintenance of a free and efficient flow of human resources and the 
avoidance of frictional expense when an employer fires an 
unproductive or disloyal employee. However, the legal rights 
conferred by the at-will rule are also subject to abuse, particularly by 
employers.1 Louisiana employees have been coerced to do acts that 
I. The argument made in this article-that general principles of good faith and 
adherence to promises should govern employment contracts-applies to both sets of parties 
to such contracts. Such principles should apply to both at-will employees who quit their 
jobs and employers who fire their at-will employees. However, while the logic cuts in both 
directions, this article will focus only on employers' abuses of the at-will doctrine. The 
reasons for this limited focus are twofold. 
First, while the legal relations between employers and employees may be symmetrical, 
in the real world, power relations usually are not. Of course, employees with rare skills or 
expertise may have the economic clout to secure fixed-term employment contracts for 
themselves or protect themselves through unionization or some other way. In  any event, the 
substantial cost to an employer of hiring and training a similarly skilled replacement usually 
creates an effective economic disincentive against bad faith termination. However, many 
employees do not have such skills, and most workers who lack irreplaceable skills come 
within the ambit of employment at will. As Louisiana courts have occasionally 
acknowledged, most at-will employees depend o n  their jobs far more than their employers 
depend on them; thus, at-will employees are more likely to suffer from the abusive use of the 
rights conferred by that doctrine. See, e.g., Moore v. McDermott, Inc., 494 So. 2d 1159, 
1161(La.1986) (quoting Wiley v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 430 So. 2d 1016 , 1019 (La. Ct. App. 
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are illegal or against public policy.2 Louisiana employers have relied 
on the rule to avoid legal obligations, for example, by discharging an 
employee shortly before pension or other benefits vest,3 or by 
3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 431 So. 2d 1055 (La. 1983)). Consequently, use (and abuse) of 
the at-will doctrine by employers may be fairly said to pose the more exigent legal issues. 
Second, the jurisprudence seems to indicate that employees are far more likely to feel 
that they have been victimized by their employers' exercise of the right to terminate their 
relation at will, than are employers to feel harmed by an employee's exercise of his right to 
depart. Except in the context of covenants not to compete or similar claims of unfair 
competition, cases involving employer complaints about an employee voluntarily leaving 
ei:iiployment are far too few to provide much grist for the critical mill. 
Nonetheless, in an a ppropriate case, one in which an employee's decision to resign 
might impose hardships on an employer similar to those normally imposed on terminated 
employees, the logic of the arguments proposed here would apply with equal force. The 
principles set forth in this article certainly apply and bind the employee as surely as they 
bind the employer. 
2. See, e.g., Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706, 707-08 (La. Ct. App. 4th 
Cir.) (finding cause of action for wrongful discharge where employee was fired because he 
refused to participate in illegal acts), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 379 (La. 1982). 
The rigidity of the current Louisiana version of employment at will has also been relied 
on by at least one court to weaken the antidiscrimination protections that would otherwise 
be available to employees in Louisiana. See Bradley v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 559 So. 2d 46, 
47-48 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (distinguishing between federal and Louisiana laws against 
gender discrimination in the workplace), writ denied, 566 So. 2d 397 (La. 1990). The issue 
arises in the context of so-called "mixed motive" cases, where some evidence exists both to 
show that the challenged employer action was motivated by discriminatory reasons and also 
to show that it was motivated by legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. Id. at 48. Even as 
restrictively interpreted in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), federal law 
provided that an employee who made a prima facie case that she was discriminated against 
because of her race or sex would prevail unless the defendant showed that the same result 
would have occurred anyway, based on nondiscriminatory reasons alone. Id. at 246. In 
Bradley, the court held that Louisiana's statute prohibiting employment discrimination, LA. 
R.S. 23: 1006, should be read in conjunction with article 2747, and therefore interpreted 
differently than federal law. 559 So. 2d at 47-48. Because article 2747 requires no 
statement of reasons for termination, the court interpreted the state antidiscrimination statute 
as not requiring defendants in mixed-motive cases to prove that the same result would have 
been reached regardless of discrimination. 
3. See, e.g., Walther v. National Tea, 848 F.2d 518, 519-20 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that firing an at-will employee in order to prevent the vesting of pension benefits did not 
constitute an "abuse of rights" under Louisiana law); Hill v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 8 F. Supp. 
80, 81 (W.D. La. 1933) (holding that a claim that an employer discharged an employee to 
avoid paying pension benefits stated no cause of action, despite employer's promise to 
employ worker "until such time as he retired on a full pension"). Cf Williams v. Touro 
Infirmary, 578 So. 2d 1006, IOIO (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (holding that at-will 
employees who alleged that their employer fired them to avoid paying accrued retirement 
benefits did not state a cause of action, but noting that claims of employer's bad motive 
might suffice to disprove possible "qualified immunity" defense to employees' related 
slander claim). 
Note, however, that this particular problem-employers terminating employees to 
avoid paying retirement benefits-has been rendered largely moot by federal ERISA 
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retaliating against employees or their families when employees assert 
legally protected r ights and privileges.4 Because of the breadth of 
the at-will doctrine in Louisiana, workers who have relied on what 
appeared to be commitments by the employer that the employee 
would be employed "permanently" or "for life,"5 that the employee 
would be fired only for cause,6 that certain procedures would be 
legislation, 29 U.S.C. § §  1001-1371(Supp. 1995). See, e.g., Frost v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 635 So. 2d 706, 709 (La. Ct. App. !st Cir.), writ denied, 640 So. 2d 1353 (La. 1994). 
4. See, e.g., Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Serv., Inc., 501 F.2d I 04 (5th Cir. 
1974) (finding no cause of action under state law for at-will employee who was fired in 
retaliation for exercising legal right to file complaint to the Wage and Hour Division of the 
United States Department of Labor); Portie v. Devall Towing & Boat Serv., Inc., 634 So. 2d 
1324, 1328 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994) (finding no cause of action when employer retaliated 
against employee who filed seaman's claim by firing the injured worker's brother); Woodson 
v. Alarm Protection Servs., Inc., 531 So. 2d 542, 544 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.) (finding no 
cause of action when worker was fired because her husband received workers' 
compensation benefits), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 358 (La. 1988); Ballaron v. Equitable 
Shipyards, Inc., 521 So. 2d 481, 483 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (holding employer had not 
committed an abuse of rights when it fired employees who took an employer-mandated lie 
detector test, but refused to sign a consent form waiving all legal rights against t h e  company 
administering those tests). 
5. See, e.g., Hill, 8 F. Supp. at 80 (finding no cause of action for employee who was 
fired despite written contract promising lifetime e mployment, even though contract was 
entered into in return for employee's release of a pre-existing liability claim against 
employer); Pechon v. National Serv., Inc., 100 So. 2d 213, 218 (La. 1958) (finding 
employee had no cause of action despite giving up a "high and responsible" position with 
the F.B.I. in the expectation that he would be employed for life); Page v. New Orleans Pub. 
Serv., Inc., 167 So. 99, 100 (La. 1936) (holding that employee who gave up a lucrative 
position in California and traveled to Louisiana in order to assist employer during a strike in 
reliance on a promise of "lifetime employment" had no cause of action when h e  was fired 
without cause); Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas, 139 So. 760, 761 (La. 1932) (finding no cause 
of action for employee fired in apparent violation of contract stating that contract of 
employment was to continue as a long as defendant company was operating); Baynard v. 
The Guardian Life Ins. Co., 399 So. 2d 1200, 1203 (La. Ct. App. !st Cir. 1981) ( stating that 
"even if [plaintiff's employment] contract were expressly for life, it could still be terminated 
at any time by Guardian, as a matter of law."); Griffith v. Sollay Found. Drilling, Inc., 373 
So. 2d 979, 982 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (holding employee who moved from Atlanta in 
reliance on promise of "permanent" employment had no cause of action); Sirrunons v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 3 l l  So. 2d 28, 31 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1975) (holding that 
employer's promise not to fire employee without good cause was not enforceable and was 
binding only if supported by "special consideration"). The Hill case was noted and 
criticized in Note, Recent Jurisprudence, 9 TuL. L. REV. 444 (1935) [hereinafter Recent 
Jurisprudence]. 
6. See, e.g., Senac v. L. M. Berry Co., 299 So. 2d 433, 434 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 
1974) (finding no cause of action for employee who alleged she was induced to leave 
another job in reliance on employer's promise that she would not be fired except for cause). 
Cf Morgan v. Avondale Shipyards, 376 So. 2d 516, 517 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1979) 
(holding statement in "Employees Guide" that employee would be fired inunediately for 
certain offenses did not constitute any promise not to fire for other offenses). 
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followed before dismissal,7 or that the employee would receive 
certain benefits8 or future rewards,9 have all found their reliance to  
be  misplaced. 
In recent decades, the principle of at-will termination has been 
significantly eroded by numerous federal statutes that prohibit 
discrimination against private employees because of their membership 
in certain protected groups, '0 or prohibit retaliation against employees 
7. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Tulane Univ., 909 F.2d 124, 1 26 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
employee does not have a contractual right to enforce the grievance procedures specifically 
set forth in the Tulane employee handbook); Mix v. University of New Orleans, 609 So. 2d 
958, 960-61 (La. 1993) (holding that employer's failure to  follow its own published 
grievance procedures raised no cause of action for tenninated employee); Marson v. 
Northwestern State Univ., 607 So. 2d 1 093, 1096 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (announcing 
virtually per se rule that procedures set out in employee handbook are not binding on the 
employer); Keller v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 597 So. 2d 1113, 1115-17 (La. 
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1 992) (holding graded levels of discipline set out in employer's "personnel 
manual" do not constitute an enforceable contract); Thebner v. Xerox Corp., 480 So. 2d 
454, 457 (La. Ct. App. 3 d  Cir. 1985) (concluding that statements in employer's personnel 
policy manual did not constitute part of the contract between the parties, and violation of 
those policies by employer gave rise to no claim for damages), writ denied, 484 So. 2d 139 
(La. 1986); Terrebonne v. Louisiana Ass'n of Educators, 444 So. 2d 206, 210 (La. Ct. App. 
I st Cir. 1983) (holding employer not bound by letter, sent to employee before hiring and on 
which employee allegedly relied, which contained statement that no employee would be 
fired without a "due process" hearing), writ denied, 445 So. 2d 1232 (La. 1984); Williams v. 
Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So. 2d 637, 638 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1 982) (concluding at-will 
employee stated no cause of action where she alleged that she was fired wi1hout receiving 
the three prior warnings required by the employer's personnel policy). 
8. See, e.g. , Wall v. Tulane Univ., 499 So. 2d 3 75, 376 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.), writ 
denied, 500 So. 2d 427 (La. 1987). In Wall, an employee sued to enforce tuition waiver 
benefits described in Tulane's "Staff Handbook." The court held that because the employee 
was at will, Tulane was free to tenninate his employment or modify Ihc benefits of that 
employment at any time. Id. at 376. 
9. See, e.g. , O'Neal v. Chris Steak House, Inc., 525 So. 2d 325 (La. Ct. App. 1st 
Cir. 1988). In O'Nea/, an at-will employee hired according to a contract which provided 
that he would be given stock in the business at a future date, was fired before that date. Id. 
at 326. The court held that since the plaintiff was employed without a specific term. he 
could be fired at will. Id. at 3 28.  The court further concluded that the obligation to transfer 
the stock was subject to a suspensive condition, which firing made impossible, and was thus 
void. Id.; see also Dunbar v. Williams, 554 So. 2d 56, (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (noting 
that while "some states protect minority shareholders in closely held corporations from 
tennination without cause," Louisiana does not); Copeland v. Gordon Jewelry Corp .. 288 
So. 2d 404. 407-09 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (finding no cause of action for employee who was 
fired. apparently without cause, twenty-one days before accrual of stock option rights). writ 
denied, 290 So. 2d 911 (La. 1974). 
I 0. See, e.g .. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2000h. 
(West I 988 & Supp. V 1995 )  (prohibiting, inter alia. tennination because of an employee ·s 
race, color, religion, national origin or gender); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1 988) (prohibiting discrimination against employees 
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who engage in certain protected activities.11 However, such a 
piecemeal approach, even as supplemented by various states, is 
incapable of comprehensively addressing the basic issues of workplace 
faimess.12 For these reasons, courts in most states have begun to 
because they are over forty years of age); The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1 2 1 01 (West 1988 & Supp. IV 1995) (prohibiting discrimination against otherwise 
qualified employees because of their disabilities); The Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1 986, 8 U.S.C. § l 324b(a) (West 1988 & Supp. IV 1995) (prohibiting discrimination 
against legal aliens because of that individual's alien status). 
1 1 .  See, e.g. , The Federal Jury System Improvement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (West 
1 988) (outlawing discharge of employees because of service on federal juries); The National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (West 1 988) (outlawing, among other things, 
discharge of employees because of their union activity); The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (West 1 988) (outlawing discharge of employees because they instituted 
or testified in proceedings brought under the Act); The Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (West 1988 & Supp. IV 1995) (outlawing, among 
other things, discharge of employees for exercising any right granted by that Act); The 
Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2002(3) (West 1988) (outlawing, inter 
alia, discharge of employees because they refuse to take or fail a lie detector test); The 
Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (West 1 988) (outlawing discharge of 
employees who exercise or assert rights granted by that statute). 
12. The underlying policy arguments for and against substantial judicial 
modification of the traditional rule of employment a t  will continues to be the subject of 
debate among scholars. See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common-law of Employment 
Termination, 66 N.C. L. REv. 63 1 ( 1988) (advocating substantial modification of the rule); 
see also Lawrence E. Blades, Employmellt At Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the 
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1435 (1967) (same); 
Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the 
Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679 ( 1 994) (defending the rule); Note, 
Protecting At-will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in 
Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 18 16, 1824 ( 1980) (suggesting substantial modifications to 
the rule). Analysis of these competing arguments is beyond the scope of this article. For 
present purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that few, if any, commentators would argue 
that particular abusive uses of the rights granted by the at-will doctrine are in themselves 
social goods. 
Assuming this is so, the second question is whether the judiciary should exercise an 
independent role in policing abuses of the at-will rule, or whether that task should instead be 
left to the legislature. W hile the legislature's role is important-indeed, primary-that does 
not mean that judges have no useful role to play. Cases show that legislatures can seldom 
fully anticipate, or express in general laws, all circumstances in which the right to terminate 
employment can be exercised in an abusive fashion. For example, the Louisiana legislature 
enacted LA. R. S. 23: 1 36 1  in order to prohibit employers from retaliating against employees 
who file workers' compensation claims. However, the legislature did not anticipate that 
employers might attempt to circumvent the law and intimidate compensation claimants by 
threatening the jobs of the claimants' relatives or spouses. Yet such abuses have taken place. 
See, e.g., Portie v. Devall Towing & Boat Serv., Inc., 634 So. 2d 1324, 1325 (La. Ct. App. 
3d Cir. 1994); Woodson v. Alarm Protection Serv., Inc., 531 So. 2d 542, 544 (La. Ct. App. 
5th Cir.), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 358 (La. 1988). It seems apparent that the only way to 
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modify the at-will doctrine, seeking legal principles that would 
preserve its general utility while limiting the potential for abuse. 
Typically, these courts have recognized one or more proposed 
exceptions to the doctrine of employ ment at will, exceptions rooted 
variously in concepts of public policy, 13 contract, 14 or tort.15 
prevent abuses in the myriad of novel circumstances that arise in the workplace is to pennit 
judges to apply general principles, such as the duty of good faith, on a case-by-case basis. 
13. This "public policy" exception to the at-will rule sounds in tort. It was first 
recognized by the California appellate courts in Petennann v. Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 2 7  
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959), in which the employer fired a n  employee because h e  refused t o  
c ommit perjury on behalf of h i s  employer. Subsequent cases found terminations violative o f  
public policy in a wide variety of circumstances. See, e.g., Tameny v .  Atlantic Richfield Co., 
610 P.2d 1330, 1331 (Cal. 1980) (employee refused to participate in employer's conspiracy 
to violate antitrust statutes); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 426 (Ind. 
1973) (employee fired because he exercised a statutory right by filing a workers 
compensation claim); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Co., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn. 1987) 
(employee refused to violate Clean Air Act by pumping leaded gasoline into a car requiring 
unleaded gasoline); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (married 
employee refused employer's sexual advances); Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225, 
227-28 (S.D. 1988) (employee fired for refusing to participate in supervisor's scheme to 
steal from the company). For a thorough review of the development and present contours of 
this exception, see Wll.LIAM J. HOl.LOWAY, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND 
REMEDIES 133-98 (2d ed. 1993). For a comprehensive listing of cases, see KENNETH J. 
McCULLOCH, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 1 40.021 (1994); Michael A. DiSabatino,  
Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Employer May Discharge At-Will Employee for 
Any Reason, 12 A.L.R. 4th 544, 555-58 (1982 & Supp. 1994) 
14. There are two types of contract-based exceptions. The first group are those 
based on a finding that tennination violated a representation made by the employer-that 
the employee could retain her job "pennanently," that she would not be fired without some 
legitimate reason, that certain procedural steps would precede termination, or the like. 
Enforceable promises of this sort have been found embodied in a wide variety of written 
sources, including but not limited to, handbooks and other similar policy statements 
distributed by employers to employees. See, e.g., Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 724 
P.2d 110, 115-16 (Haw. 1986) (holding employer breached contract by failing to follow 
procedures set forth in employee handbook before firing at-will employee); Woolley v. 
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J.) (same as Kinoshita), modified, 499 
A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); Lukoski v. Sandia Indian Management Co., 748 P.2d 507, 509 (N.M. 
1988) (same); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Nev. 1987) (enforcing 
employer's statements that, if employee performed adequately, he would be kept on "until 
retirement" or "as long as economically possible"). Oral communications containing similar 
representations have also been found to constitute enforceable promises. See, e.g .. Foley v. 
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 401-02 (Cal. 1988) (upholding trial court finding that 
discharge violated oral promise that employee would not be fired without good cause); Shah 
v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Ky. 1983) (same); Kestenbaum 
v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280, 288-89 (N.M.) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109 ( 1989). 
The second type of contract-based exception is rooted in the "implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing" that is traditionally read into all contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONT RACTS§ 205 (1981). Courts in several states have relied on such an implied covenant 
to provide recovery to employees fired solely in order to prevent them from obtaining earned 
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Louisiana has followed the national trend toward modification of 
the at-will doctrine only to a limited degree. To be sure, Louisiana has 
enacted several specific constitutional and statutory exceptions to 
employment at will, including civil service protection for certain 
public employees, 16 antidiscrimination provisions broadly paralleling 
federal law,17 laws that prohibit retaliation against employees who 
exercise certain legal rights,18 and statutes which prohibit firings based 
benefits, or where the firing otherwise violates public policy. See, e.g., Reed v. Municipality 
o f  Anchorage, 782 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Alaska 1989) (holding that the firing of 
"whistleblower" who reported workplace safety violations violated the implied covenant); 
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N .E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1971) (holding 
discharge of an at-will salesman solely to avoid paying earned bonuses violated implied 
covenant). 
For analysis of both types of contract-based claims, see generally HOLLOWAY, supra 
note 13, at 3-77, 95-104. The cases are collected at McCULLOCH, supra note 13, 'll 40.011; 
and DiSabatino, supra note 13, §§ 6-14, at 560-81. The cases which specifically relate to 
the enforceability of statements made in employee handbooks and the like are collected in 
Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Right to Discharge Allegedly "At-Will" Employee as Affected by 
Employer's Promulgation of Employment Policies as to Discharge, 33 A.LR. 4th 120 
(1984 & Supp. 1994). 
15. Courts in some states have recognized that the circumstances in which an at-will 
employee is fired may give rise to a claim in tort. Where those circumstances have been 
sufficiently egregious, courts have allowed plaintiffs to assert claims based on a number of 
tort theories, including intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. See, e.g., 
King v. Brooks, 788 P.2d 707, 711 (Alaska 1990) (intentional infliction of emotional 
distress); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1344 (Colo. 1988) (defamation); 
Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (Mass. 1976) (same); Cagle v. Bums 
& Roe, Inc., 726 P.2d 434, 437 (Wash. 1986) (same); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 887 (Minn. 1986) (same). For an analysis of 
both types of tort-based claims, see generally HOLLOWAY, supra note 13, at 230-41, 244-75. 
C ases are collected in McCULLOCH, supra note 13, 'I! 40.031. 
16. See LA. CONST. art. x. 
17. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT ANN. §§ 23:971, 23:1006, 46:2251, 51:2231(West 1985 
& Supp. 1995) (prohibiting discrimination because of an em ployee's race, color, national 
origin, religion, gender, age, or handicap). But see Bradley v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 559 So. 
2d 46, 47-48 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (relying on Louisiana's rigid doctrine of employment at 
will to distinguish between federal and state antidiscrimination laws), writ denied, 566 So. 
2d 397 (La. 1990). 
18. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:964 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) (prohibiting 
employers from discharging employees who give testimony in investigations by the state 
Department of Labor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1361 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) 
(prohibiting discrimination against employees because they filed claims for workers' 
compensation benefits); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1691 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) 
( prohibiting discrimination against employees because they filed claims for unemployment 
compensation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) (prohibiting 
retaliation against an employee who "[d]iscloses or threatens to disclose, to a supervisor or 
public body" employer actions believed to be in violation of environmental law; or who 
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on an eclectic list of employee characteristics or activities.19 Louisiana 
courts have occasionally assisted employees who were fired in an 
abusive way, either by broadly interpreting certain statutory exceptions 
"[p]rovides infonnation to, or testifies before any public body conducting an investigation, 
hearing or inquiry into" environmental violations). 
Louisiana courts have granted remedies to at-will employees discharged in violation of 
some of these statutory prohibitions. See, e.g., Ducote v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 471 So. 2d 
704, 707 (La. 1985); Moss v. Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc., 617 So. 2d 959, 
961 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (broadly construing LA. R.S. 23: 1361 to apply to employee who 
filed claim under federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act), writ denied, 
620 So. 2d 845 (La.), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 469 (1993); Bartlett v. Reese, 569 So. 2d 
195, 202 (La. Ct. App. !st C ir. 1990) (upholding claim of employee fired in retaliation for 
reporting what he perceived t o  be an environmental violation), writ denied, 572 So. 2d 22 
(La. 1991 ); Guye v. International Paper Co., 488 So. 2d 1108,  1109-11 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 
1986) (upholding trial court finding that employee was fired in violation of LA. R.S. 
23:1361); Wiley v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 430 So. 2d 10 16, 1018-20 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 
1982) (tracing the social history leading to the enactment of LA. R.S. § 23: 1361 and 
awarding damages to federal employee who was fired in retaliation for having filed claim 
under the Federal Employer Liability Act). However, some of these statutes have been 
interpreted more narrowly. See, e.g., Fontenot v. Manpower, Educ. & Training, Inc., 594 
So. 2d 998, 1000 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (narrowly interpreting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 23: 1691 to impose only criminal liability on employers who discriminate against 
employees who assert rights to social security, and holding the employee does not have a 
civil cause of action for damages). 
19. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:731 (West 1985) (limiting an employer's 
right to terminate an employee whose wages have been garnished); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 23:961-62 (West 1985) (prohibiting discrimination against employees because of their 
political opinions or activities); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:963 (West 1985) (prohibiting 
employers from retaliating against employees who refuse to deal with particular vendors); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23 :965 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) (prohibiting employers from 
discharging employees called to serve on juries); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:966 (West 1985 
& Supp. 1995) (limiting the right of employers to discharge or otherwise discriminate 
against employees who smoke tobacco); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:981-87 (West 1992) 
(prohibiting employers from discharging employees who refuse to join unions); LA. REv. 
STAT. ANN.§ 23:1001(West 1985) (prohibiting discrimination against employees who have 
the sick.le cell trait); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40: 1299.31 (West 1992) (prohibiting 
discrimination against medical personnel who refuse to participate in abortions). 
Louisiana courts have at least occasionally proved willing to broadly enforce these 
statutes, awarding damages to employees fired in violation of their tenns. See, e.g., Davis v. 
Louisiana Computing Corp., 394 So. 2d 678, 679-80 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (awarding 
d amages for violation of LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 23:961), writ denied, 400 So. 2d 668 (La. 
1981 ). But see Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc., 521 So. 2d 481, 483 (La. Ct. App. 4th 
C ir. 1988) (narrowly interpreting LA. R.S. 23:963 as applying only where employers coerce 
"employees to purchase goods or services from persons or companies designated by the 
employer."). Note also that the result in Davis may have turned on the particular language 
of§ 961, which specifically provides that nothing within the statute precludes an_ 
employee 
from maintaining an action for damages. Statutes without such language may be interpreted 
differently. 
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to the at-will doctrine20 or by finding causes of action against parties 
other than employers when employees are wrongfully discharged.21 
However, these statutes and decisions together cover only a small 
portion of employee dismissals. 
In Louisiana, the majority of employee dismissals not covered by 
these piecemeal statutes and narrow decisions are instead covered by 
an expansive interpretation of employers' rights over at-will 
20. See, e.g., Cheramie v. J. Wayne Plaisance, Inc., 595 So. 2d 619, 622 (La. 1992) 
(broadly construing a prior version of LA. R.S. 30:2027, which protected an employee from 
retaliation when that employee "reports or complains" of possible environmental violations; 
court gave a cause of action to an employee who was fired because he refused to perform 
certain work which he thought would harm a protected nesting site for brown pelicans); 
Wiley, 430 So. 2d at 1021 (broadly construing LA. R.S. 23: 1361 to protect from discharge a 
railroad employee who had brought a claim against his employer under the Federal 
Employer Liability Act). 
21. See, e.g., Neel v. Citrus Lands of Louisiana, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1299, 1301 (La. Ct. 
App. 4th Cir. 1993) (holding at-will employee of mineral lessee who lost his job when lessor 
barred him from the land stated a claim against the lessor for intentional interference with 
contractual relations); Nehrenz v. Dunn, 593 So. 2d 915, 917 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1992) 
(concluding that an at-will employee had a cause of action against a drug testing laboratory 
which negligently tested a sample from that employee, causing that employee to lose his 
job); Elliott v. Laboratory Specialists, Inc., 588 So. 2d I 75, I 76 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1991) 
(same), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 415 (La. 1992); Lewis v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 588 So. 2d 
167, 170 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (same), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 411 (La. 1992). 
However, this generosity has not been consistent. Because of the absolute nature of the 
at-will doctrine in Louisiana, other courts have held that at-will employees have no legally 
protected interest in retaining their jobs, and thus no claim against third parties who cause 
the loss of those jobs. See, e.g., Durand v. McGaw, 635 So. 2d 409, 412-13 (La. Ct. App. 
4th Cir.) (holding at-will employee fired in response to complaints had no cause of action 
against third party for either intentional or negligent interference with contractual relations), 
writ denied, 640 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1994); Herbert v. Placid Refining Co., 564 So. 2d 371, 
373-74 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (finding at-will employee who lost job as a result of a 
negligently performed and erroneous drug test has no cause of action against drug testing lab 
for negligence or negligent interference with contractual rights); Ballaron, 521 So. 2d 484 
(finding that discharged employee stated no claim against polygrapher, despite polygrapher's 
violation of regulatory statutes). 
Louisiana courts have also indicated-at least in principle-a willingness to follow 
their common-law counterparts by recognizing the theoretical possibility that an employee 
without a fixed term of employment may not be fired without cause if he or she has given 
the employer "special consideration" (going beyond mere performance of the job) in return 
for the employer's promise not to fire that employee. However, courts have seldom actually 
found such special consideration in fact. See, e.g., Smith v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 163 So. 
2d 124, 126 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (indicating that release of a workers' compensation 
claim for personal injuries sustained on the job would constitute sufficient "special 
consideration" to support an employer's agreement to hire an employee "for life," but that 
such a contract was void as against public policy under then-Civil Code article I 67, which 
limited employment contracts to a maximum of five years); see also Hill v. Missouri Pac. 
Ry., 8 F. Supp. 80, 81 (W.D. La. 1933). 
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employ ees. To date, all attempts to persuade Louisiana courts to adopt 
a ny of the increasingly common jurisprudential exceptions have failed. 
Thus, Louisiana remains one of the dwindling minority of states that 
continues to refuse to recognize any cause of action for wrongful 
discharge or any nonstatutory exception to the doctrine of employment 
at will, no matter how e gregious the circumstances.22 
The rea son most often articulated by Louisiana courts for their 
refusal to modify the expansive interpretation of employ ers' rights has 
been what the courts have seen as the entrenchment of the concept in 
the Louisiana Civil Code, particularly in Civil Code article 2747, a nd 
22. Louisiana courts are quite clear about the absolute nature of the version of 
employment at will in effect. See, e.g., Mix v. University of New Orleans, 609 So. 2d 958, 
964 (La. Ct.  App. 4th Cir. 1 992) (stating that "[t]he reasons for termination need not be 
accurate, fair or reasonable," and further, that "[t]he question of why Mix was terminated is 
i rrelevant and consequently raises no genuine issue of material fact"); Gil v. Metal Serv. 
Corp. ,  4 1 2  So. 2d 706, 708 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) (recognizing that many states have held 
that an employee has a cause of action if tenninated for refusal to perfonn an illegal act, but 
nevertheless holding that Louisiana law provides no equivalent protection), writ denied, 4 1 4  
S o .  2 d  379 (La. 1982). 
Those same Louisiana courts have also, on occasion, denied that Louisiana Jaw is 
different from the law of its sister states with respect to employment at will. See, e.g. , Mix, 
609 So. 2d at 961 n. J (referring to "several excellent, well-reasoned cases from around the 
country" in order "to refute the contention that Louisiana policy is somehow aberrational or 
anachronistic"). If by this the courts mean that other states have retained some concept of 
employment at will as a basic rule of employment relations, they are absolutely correct. If, 
however, they mean that other states have continued to interpret and apply that doctrine in 
the same absolutist style as Louisiana, they are clearly wrong. Most other states have 
adopted one or more judicial exceptions to the strict rule of employment at will. See 
generally MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 524 ( I  994) (discussing the history 
of the at-will rule). Rothstein has stated the following: 
During [the 1 970s and 1 980s] three major 'exceptions' to the at-will doctrine 
emerged: ( I )  breach of an express or implied promise, including representations 
made in employee handbooks; (2) wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy; and (3) breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Almost every state accepts at least one of these causes of action. 
Id. ; see also HOl.LOWAY, supra note 13,  at 135 n. 1 35 (listing forty-one states and the District 
of Columbia as having recognized a nonstatutory cause of action for retaliatory discharge in 
violation of public policy, and noting that Louisiana was one of only five states that had, as 
of 1 993, still refused to do so); DiSabatino, supra note 1 3 ,  §§ 3 [a) & 4[a) (listing fourteen 
states that have implied a contract-based cause of action when termination of an at-will 
employee violates public policy, and twenty-seven states that have implied a tort-based 
cause of action in such circumstances); Kruk, supra note 1 4, § 4[a) (listing thirty-four states 
that have found representations made in employee handbooks regarding the grounds o r  
procedures fo r  dismissal t o  be enforceable). 
A thorough state-by-state analysis of what exceptions have been recognized in 
particular jurisdictions can be found at 9A Indiv. Emp. R. Man. 505 (BNA) (1994). 
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the courts' professed unwillingness to deviate from that Code.23 But 
this reliance on the Civil Code to justify an absolutist approach to 
employment at will is not without irony. One of the most basic 
principles of the Civil Code is the o verarching principle of good 
faith.24 The absolutist view of employment at will-as a unique 
exception to ordinary rules governing obligations under the Code, an 
exception that would permit an employer to fire an at-wil l  employee 
for any reason not specifically proscribed by statute, no matter how 
unfair or abusive-is neither required by the language of the Louisiana 
Civil Code nor compatible with its overall spirit. On the contrary, 
careful review of the historical record reveals that the broad reading of 
employers' rights now prevalent in Louisiana was not developed from 
any codal source, but rather erroneously interpolated from common­
law sources. That late and unnecessary interpolation should be 
discarded in favor of an analysis of employment contracts that is more 
compatible with the Civil Code's treatment of all other forms of 
commercial obligations. 
It may well be that the Louisiana Civil Code articles deal ing with 
employment should be comprehensively revised and expanded, so that 
the Code conforms with the reality of employment relations today. 
But it is the thesis of this article that until such a revision occurs, 
Louisiana courts can and should interpret employment contracts 
according to the same principles that govern all other commercial 
23. Louisiana Civil Code article 2747 provides the following: 
ARTICLE 2747. A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant attached to his 
person or family, without assigning any reason for so doing. The servant is also 
free to depart without assigning any cause. 
LA.  CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2747 (West 1994). The cases citing Civil Code article 2747 as the 
locus of Louisiana's rigid doctrine of employment at will are literally too numerous to list. 
A representative sampling could include: Thorne v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 542 So. 2d 490, 
491 ( La. 1 9 8 9) (tracing origin of article 2747); Moore v. McDermott, Inc., 494 So. 2d 1159 
(La. 1 9 8 6); Keller v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 597 So. 2d 111 3 ,  1115 ( La. 
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1 992); Martin v. Lincoln Gen. Hosp., 5 8 8 So. 2d 1329, 1 33 2  (La. Ct. App. 
2d Cir. 1991), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 130 2 (La. 1992); Hammond v. Medical Arts Group, 
Inc ., 574 So. 2d 521, 525 ( La .  Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 99 1 ); Bradley v. Latter & B lum, Inc., 5 59 
So. 2d 46, 47-4 8 (La. Ct.  App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 566 So. 2d 397 ( La. 1990 ) ;  Herbert, 
56 4 So. 2d at 373; Wise v. Dufresne, 537 So. 2d 86 0 ,  86 2 ( La.  Ct. App. 5 th Cir. 1 9 8 9); 
Ja�kson v. E.B .R. Parish Sch. Bd.,  393 So. 2d 243, 245 (La. Ct. App. ) st Cir. 1 9 8 0) (citing 
article 2747 as "the source of' the principle that employees without fixed-term contracts 
cannot maintain a claim for wrongful discharge, nor collect back wages on the basis of such 
a claim). 
24 . See infra notes 233-240 and accompanying text . 
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obligations, and further, that if the courts were to do so, they could 
retain the legitimate benefits of the general rule of employment at will 
while preventing its most egregious abuses. The Louisiana Civil Code 
recognizes important distinctions between contracts for a fixed term 
and contracts not for a fixed term. 25 Thus, one cannot, consistent with 
the Code, require "good cause" terminations of employees who do not 
have fixed-term contracts. However, properly interpreted, the 
Louisiana Civil Code requires the parties to all contracts, including 
employment contracts of indefinite term, to perform their obligations 
in good faith. 
Part I of this article sets the stage by tracing the development of 
the principle of employment at will in Louisiana. Part II focuses on 
Louisiana Civil Code articles 1 67, 2746, and especially 2747-the 
texts that have been cited by courts and litigants to justify their 
treatment of employment for an indefinite term as an exception to the 
general rules governing obligations under the Code. Part II also 
demonstrates that those articles should not be interpreted in a broad 
manner. Part III then argues that at-will employment contracts should 
be constrained by the same obligations of good faith that the Louisiana 
Civil Code imposes on all other contracting parties. 
One final note seems appropriate at the outset. It could be argued 
that even if the doctrine of employment at will in general, and article 
2747 in particular, have been wrongly interpreted, the error has 
become so rooted in Louisiana law that it should now be changed only 
by legislation. The argument is not without force. Nonetheless, it 
should not preclude reinterpretation, if such reinterpretation proves 
justified. While the general concept of employment at will certainly is  
deeply embedded in the Code,26 that general concept is  not under 
attack here. By contrast, the misreading of article 2747 and the 
subsequent absolutist interpretation of employer's rights under the 
doctrine of employment at will-which are under attack in this 
article-are both of much more recent vintage and dubious 
25 . See infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
26. See, e.g. , Andrepont v. Lake Charles Harbor Tenninal Dist., 602 So. 2d 704, 
707-08 n. J (La. 1992) (tracing the origin of related article 2749 back to the French Projet du 
Gouvemement of 1800, Book III, Title XIII, article 114); Thome, 542 So. 2d at 491 (tracing 
the origins of the general rule of employment at will back to the Louisiana Digest of 1808 
and Pothier, among others); Brannan v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 5 26 So. 2d I IO I ,  I 103 (La. 1988) 
(citing the "consistent line of jurisprudence" supporting the general concept of employment 
at will in Louisiana). See generally infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
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provenance. In any event, civilian legal theory teaches that the law is 
found in the written Code itself rather than in the jurisprudence 
interpreting that Code.27 And certainly the Louisiana Supreme Court 
has acted to correct other errors of interpretation in the Civil Code that 
crept into Louisiana jurisprudence through mistaken reliance on 
common-law principles.28 The same action is required here. 
l. PROLOGUE: EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES, AND 1HE LoillSIANA CNIL 
CODES 
The Louisiana Civil Code traditionally dealt with the relations 
of employers and employees in two p laces . Before repeal, Title VI 
of Book I of the Code dealt with the personal relations of masters 
and various types of "servants" in a manner similar to that in which 
other Titles of that Book treated the personal relations o f  husbands 
and wives or of parents and children.29 Chapter 3 of Title IX of 
Book ill of the Code, on the other h and, deals with the contractual 
27. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has said: "In a jurisdiction such as Louisiana 
which applies civilian theories of legal method, prior judicial decisions do not represent law: 
They are merely judicial interpretations. They should therefore be overruled when not in 
accord with what is now detennined to be the legislative intent." Holland v. Buckley, 305 
So. 2d 1 1 3, 1 1 9-20 (La. 1974) (overruling a long line of inconsistent Louisiana cases 
interpreting article 232 1 ,  and looking instead to the original French sources of that article to 
detennine its true, originally intended, meaning). 
This basic principle is established in the very first article of the Louisiana Civil Code, 
which provides that "[t]he sources of law are legislation and custom," not jurisprudence. 
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. l (West 1993). Revision comment (b) to article l makes explicit 
the superiority of written law, including the Code i tself, to any interpretive case law: 
According to civilian doctrine, legislation and custom are authoritative or 
primary sources of law. They are contrasted with persuasive or secondary sources 
of law, such as jurisprudence, doctrine, conventional usages, and equity, that may 
guide the court in reaching a decision in the absence of legislation and custom. 
LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 1 cmt. b (citing A.N. YIANNOPOUL.OS, LoUISIANA CNIL LAW SYSTEM 
§§ 3 1 ,  32 ( 1977)). 
28. See, e.g., 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spumey, 538 So. 2d 228, 234 (La. 1 989) 
(reversing Louisiana's long-standing rejection o f  claims for intentional interference with 
contractual relations as both outmoded and based on faulty, common-law influenced 
misinterpretation of the Civil Code); Holland, 305 So. 2d at 1 14 (overruling "as erroneous 
certain decisions which have crept in, based on the common law of England, that an owner 
of a domestic animal is not liable for injuries caused by the animal unless the victim proves 
that the owner knew or should have known of the animal's harm-causing characteristic and 
nevertheless negligently let it do harm"). 
29. These articles are rooted in a paradigm that views some types of servants as 
members of the master's extended household. See infra notes 198-21 4  and accompanying 
text. 
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relations of those same masters and servants, generally conceiving 
the c ontractual relation as a type of "lease."30 
After the abolition of slavery,31 Book I of the Louisiana Civil 
Code recognized only a single class of servants, "free servants," 
comprehensively defined as all persons "who let, hire or engage their 
services to another in this State, to be employed therein at any w ork, 
c ommerce or occupation whatever . . . .  "32 Article 164 subdivided 
those "free servants" into three subclasses:  (I)  "those who only hire 
out their services by the day, week, or year, in consideration of certain 
wages," who were c onsidered to have only "leased" their services to 
their employer; (2) indentured or "bound" servants who were 
considered to have "sold" their services for a period of time; and 
(3) apprentices, who were also legally bound to serve for a fixed 
period of time.33 The remaining articles of this chapter dealt with the 
30. Of course, the Code also touches on employer-employee relations in other places 
for specific purposes. Thus, for example, articles 3 1 9 1  and 3252 establish a general 
privilege in favor of certain servants claiming back wages, and article 3494(1) establishes a 
prescriptive period of three years for such wage claims. See infra notes 1 85-197, 2 1 5-2 1 9  
and accompanying text. However, the basic rules were and are set by the articles discussed 
in the text. 
3 1 .  Prior to the abolition of slavery, the Louisiana Civil Codes recognized two 
classes of servants: "free servants" and "slaves." 1 808 DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS OF THE 
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS art. 1 ,  at 36 (de Ia Vergne ed. 1 968) [hereinafter LA. DIGEST OF 
1 808]; LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 1 55 ( 1 825). The Digest and the 1 825 Code also contained a 
separate chapter of this Title, detailing the rights and duties of masters and slaves. LA. 
DIGEST OF 1808, supra arts. 1 5-27, at 38-40; LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 172-196 ( 1 825). 
32.  Louisiana Civil Code article 1 63 provided the following: 
Free servants are in general all free person s  who let, hire or engage their 
services to another in this State, to be employed therein at any work, commerce or 
occupation whatever for the benefit of him who has contracted with them, for a 
certain price or retribution, or upon certain conditions. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 63 (West 1972). The article was derived, without substantial 
change, from equivalent provisions of the 1 808 Digest and the Code of 1 825. See LA. 
DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  art. 2, at 36; LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 156 ( 1825). 
33 .  Louisiana Civil Code article 164 provided the following: 
There are three kinds of free servants in this State, to wit: 
I .  Those who hire out their services by the day, week, month or year, in 
consideration of certain wages; the rules which fix the extent and limits of those 
contracts are established by the title: Of Letting and Hiring. 
2. Those who engage to serve for a fixed time for a certain 
consideration, and who are therefore, considered not as having hired out, but as 
having sold their services. 
3. Apprentices, that is, those who engage to serve any one in order to 
learn some art, trade or profession. 
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rights and duties of bound servants-that is, indentured servants and 
apprentices34-and with the effects of the master-servant relationship 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 164 (West 1 972). This article was derived from equivalents in the 
Civil Code of 1 825 and the 1 808 Digest. LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 1 57 ( 1 825); LA. DIGEST OF 
1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  arts. 3, 4, at 36. 
34. The pertinent Louisiana Civil Code articles provided the following: 
ARTICLE 1 65. The regulations, manner and mode according to which persons 
may be bound to serve, either as apprentices or otherwise are prescribed by 
special laws. 
ARTICLE 1 66. The time of the engagement of minors, if there be no stipulation 
that it shall terminate sooner, shall expire for males, when they attain the age of 
eighteen years, and females, when they attain the age of fifteen. 
ARTICLE 167.  Persons who have attained the age of majority cannot bind 
themselves for a longer term than ten years. 
ARTICLE 1 68 .  Engagements of service contracted in a foreign country for a 
longer term, shall be reduced to ten years, to count from the day of the arrival of 
the person bound in this State. 
ARTICLE 1 69.  An implied condition of the contract entered into between the 
master and bound servant or apprentice is that the latter binds himself to serve the 
former during all the time of his engagement, and the master on his  side binds 
himself to maintain the indentured servant or apprentice during the same time. 
The master is also bound to instruct the apprentice in his art, trade or 
profession, and to teach him or cause him to be taught to read, write and cipher. 
ARTICLE 1 70. Bound servants and apprentices and their masters may be 
compelled to the specific performance of their respective engagements, but those 
engagements may be rescinded before the time fixed for the contract, either at the 
suit of such bound servants or apprentices respectively, or at the demand of such 
master, if they have just cause to claim such rescission, and in such case the judge 
shall direct a restitution of such a part of the money received on account of such 
engagement, in proportion to the time not yet elapsed of that which has been fixed 
by the indenture, unless such rescission is occasioned by the fault of him who paid 
the money, in which case no restitution shall be made. 
ARTICLE 1 7 1 .  If any master shall abuse, or cruelly or evilly treat his bound 
servant or apprentice, or shall not discharge his duty towards him, or if the bound 
servant or apprentice shall abscond or absent himself from the service of his 
master without leave, or shall not discharge his duty to his master, in any of these 
cases, there will be a sufficient cause to release the aggrieved party from his 
engagement, or to grant him such other redress as the equity and nature of the case 
may require, at the discretion of the judge. 
ARTICLE 1 72. The death of the master of the apprentice dissolves the engagement 
of the latter, in the condition in which it is,  and there can be n o  claim for 
remuneration on either side. But if the heir or one of the heirs of the master be a 
man of the same condition, trade or profession, he can cause himself to be 
authorized to take the place of the deceased with regard to the apprentice. 
ARTICLE 173.  A master may correct his indented servant or apprentice for 
negligence or other misbehavior, provided he does it with moderation, and 
provided he does not make use of the whip; but he can not exercise such rights 
with those who only let their services. 
LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 1 65-173 (West 1 972). Each of these articles was derived from a 
similar provision of the Code of 1825 and the Digest of 1808. See LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, 
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on third parties. 35 The entire Title was repealed in 1990 on the ground 
that it had become essentially anachronistic.36 
By contrast, Chapter 3 of Title IX of Book III of the Code, the 
chapter which governs the contractual relations of employers and 
employees, has remained essentially unchanged from the initial 
organization of the Territory of Orleans until the present day. 37 Then, 
as now, the contractual relation between an employer and a free 
employee was conceptualized as a species of "lease"-specificall y, a 
"lease of services"-and was made subject to the Code provisions 
governing obligations in general and leases in particular.38 This Title 
of the Civil Code also distinguished amon g  three categories of free 
employees: one general category of "servants" or "laborers"; and two 
supra note 3 1 ,  arts. 6- 1 0, at 36-38; LA. Civ. CODE ANN arts. 1 57-1 67 (1 825). Prior to repeal, 
the only significant amendments to the text were the 1964 change in articles 167 and 1 68 
extending the maximum term for an engagement from five to ten years, and the repeal of 
article 1 66 in 1974. Act No. 355, 1 964 La. Acts; Act No. 89 § 2, 1 974 La. Acts. 
35.  Louisiana Civil Code articles 174 through 1 77 provided the following: 
ARTICLE 174. A master may bring an action against any man for beating or 
maiming his servant, but in such case he must assign as a cause of action, his own 
damage arising from the loss of services, and this loss must be proved upon the 
trial. 
ARTICLE 175. A master may justify an assault in defense of his servant, and a 
servant may justify an assault in defense of his master, the master because he has 
an interest in his servant, not to be deprived of his services; the servant because it 
is part of his duty for which he receives wages, to stand by and defend his master. 
ARTICLE 176. The master is answerable for the offenses and quasi-offenses 
committed by his servants, according to the rules which are explained under the 
title: Of quasi-contracts, and of offenses and quasi-offenses. 
ARTICLE 177. The master is answerable for the damage caused to individuals or 
to the community in general by whatever is thrown out of his house into the street 
or public road, and inasmuch as the master has the superintendence and police of 
his house, and is responsible for the faults committed therein. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1 74- 1 77 (West 1972). These provisions were likewise derived 
from substantially similar predecessors in the 1808 Digest and 1825 Civil Code. See LA. 
DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  arts. 1 1 - 14, at 38; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 168- 1 7 1  ( 1 8 25) .  
36.  Act, No. 705 § I ,  1 990 La. Acts. The only provision of this Title that was 
retained was article 1 76, making an employer liable for offenses or quasi-offenses 
committed by his servant, which was redesignated as paragraph four of article 2320. 
37. Compare LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 27 1 7-272 1 with LA. DIGEST OF 1808, supra 
note 3 1 ,  arts. 56-60, at 382. 
38.  Until its repeal in 1 990, article 164 of the Louisiana Civil Code made this point 
expressly, stating that such employment contracts were subject to the rules "established in  
the title: Of Letting and Hiring." See supra note 33 (quoting article 164). Although article 
164 has been repealed, other provisions contained within Title IX of Book Ill, "Of Lease,"' 
make it clear that the employees are still generally considered to be "leasing" their services 
to their employer. See infra notes 222-226 and accompanying text. 
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specialized categories of workers-"carriers and watermen" and 
"workmen who hire out their labor or i ndustry to make buildings or 
other works"-whose occupations subjected them to special 
regulation.39 Today, as in the past, the five articles dealing with the 
contractual rights and duties of "laborers" and "servants" in general 
have been regarded as applicable to all employees not fall ing into 
either of those special categories.40 
While all five of these articles address the broad issue of tenure 
of employment, they differ markedly as to the breadth of their 
application. Article 2746 applies to all types of laborers and sets out 
the important principle that a worker cannot enforceably bind herself 
to service in perpetuity.41 The remaining articles, in contrast, appear by 
their terms to apply to more limited classes of employees. Article 
2747 refers on its face to servants "attached to [the] person or family" 
of their master, and provides that such servants can be dismissed or 
can depart at any time, without the need to assign any reason for doing 
so, and without legal liability on either part.42 Article 2748 applies to 
39. Article 2745, which introduces the chapter "Of the Letting Out of Labor or 
Industry," explains: 
ARTICLE 2745. Labor may be let out in three ways: 
1 .  Laborers may hire their services to another person. 
2. Carriers and watermen hire out their services for the conveyance 
either of persons or of goods and merchandise. 
3. Workmen hire out their labor or industry to make buildings or other 
works. 
The special regulations applicable to carriers and watermen are set out at articles 275 1 
through 2755, and those applicable to contractors, or other workmen who "build by a plot" 
or "work by the job" are set out in articles 2756 through 2777. Neither set of articles are 
applicable to the issues raised here. 
40. This does not mean, however, that all provisions of articles 2746 through 2750 
apply to all employees who are neither "carriers and watermen" nor contractors who hire out 
"to make buildings or other works." Article 2748, for example, applies b y  its terms only to a 
more limited class of "[l]aborers, who hire themselves out to serve on plantations or to work 
in manufactures," and article 2747 applies by its terms only to "hired servant[s] attached to 
[the master's] person or family." 
41 .  Article 2746 provides the following: "A man can only hire out his services for a 
certain limited time, or for the performance of a certain enterprise." LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 
2746 (West 1 994). For the history and interpretation of this article, see infra notes 130- 134 
and accompanyin g  text. 
42. Article 2747 provides the following: "A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired 
servant �ttached to his person or family, without assigning any reason for so doing. The 
servant ts also free to depart without assigning any cause." LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2747 
(West 1994). For the history and interpretatio n  of this article see the discussion in Part II, 
infra. ' 
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laborers "who hire themselves out to work on plantations or to work in 
manufactures,"43 and articles 2749 and 2750 apply to those who are 
parties to fixed-term employment contracts .44 Employees covered by 
these latter three articles can neither be dismissed nor leave their 
employment before their contractual terms expire, unless "just cause" 
or a "serious ground of complaint" can be shown. 
These are the relevant articles. What remains for discussion are 
the concepts that lay behind the articles and the way in which those 
concepts have been interpreted and applied by Louisiana courts. 
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL IN LOUISIANA 
The great majority of the available nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Louisiana cases dealing with what we today would 
call allegations of "wrongful termination" involve alleged or 
admitted fixed-term employment contracts. These cases usually 
turned on whether such a contract existed and, if so, whether "good 
cause" existed to terminate that contract.45 These cases are important 
for their clear negative implication that "good cause" need not be 
43. Article 2748 provides the following: 
Laborers, who hire themselves out to serve on plantations or to work i n  
manufactures, have not the right of leaving the person who has hired them, nor 
can they be sent away by the proprietor, until the t ime has expired during which 
they had agreed to serve, unless good and just causes be assigned. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2748 (West 1994) . 
44. Articles 2749 and 2750 provide the following: 
ARTICLE 2749. I f. without any serious ground of complaint, a man should send 
away a labourer whose services he has hired for a certain time. before that time 
has expired, he shall be bound to pay to such labourer the whole of the salaries 
which he would have been entitled to receive, had the ful l  tenn of his services 
arrived. 
ARTICLE 2750. B u t  if, on the other hand, a laborer, after having hired out h i s  
services, should leave h i s  employer before the time of his engagement has 
expired, without having just cause of complaint against his employer, the laborer 
shall then forfeit all the wages that may be due to him, and shall moreover he 
compelled to repay al l the money he has received, either as due for his wages, or 
in advance thereof on the running year or on the time of his engagement. 
LA. Ctv. CODE ANN. arts. 2749, 2750 (West 1994). 
45. See, e.g., Berl in  v. P.L. Cusachs, Ltd., 1 1 4  La. 744, 38 So. 539. 544 ( 1 905) 
(finding no good cause for defendants to discharge plaintiff and awarding him the damages 
specified by article 2749); Dietzgen Co. v. Kokosky. 1 1 3  La. 449, 37 So. 24 ( 1904); Ford v. 
Danks, 16 La. Ann. 1 1 7  ( 1 86 1  ); Shoemaker v. Bryan. 1 2  La. Ann. 698 ( 1 857): Lartique v. 
Peet, 5 Rob. 91 ( 1 843); Sherburne v. Orleans Cotton Press, 1 5  La. 360 ( 1 840); Beckman v. 
New Orleans Cotton Press Co., 12  La. 67, 70 ( 1 838). 
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shown to dismiss an employee without a fixed-term contract. In 
other words, an important distinction has long been recognized 
between fixed-term and at-will employment. However, the cases say 
little about the central inquiry here, n amely, whether an employer's 
right to dismiss an at-will employee should be limited by the 
requirement of good faith which applies to similar obligations under 
the Louisiana Civil Code. Although no early case discusses this 
issue directly, some indication of the original judicial 
understanding-and of how this original understanding came to be 
obscured--can be discerned. 
A Glimpses of an Original Understanding: Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Century Jurisprudence on Termination of At- Will 
Employees 
Few reported cases from the nineteenth or early twentieth 
centuries i nvolve termination o f  at-will employees. Fewer still 
involve any allegation of overreaching or abusive conduct on the part 
of the employer. However, the few cases indicate some judicial 
attention to the equities of the particular situation and an 
unwillingness to allow employers to use their right to terminate at 
will in unfair or abusive ways. Where the employer's  exercise of the 
right to terminate an at-will employee was upheld,  courts were 
careful to make clear that the employer was not exercising his right 
in such a way as to take undue advantage of the employee. 
For example, in Long v. Kee,46 the Louisiana Supreme Court was 
called upon to resolve a dispute between the owner of a plantation and 
the person he had hired to manage that plantation. Although the 
employment contract at issue "fixe[d] no period for its duration,"47 the 
court clearly recognized that the employer was not completely free to 
fire the manager at any time. Rather, the employer's undisputed power 
to terminate the contract could only be exercised at the end of a year­
in other words, when the manager had had a chance to reap the fruits 
of his labors for the year. Because the employer did notify the 
manager of his termination at the proper time, the termination was 
upheld.48 
46. 42 La. Ann. 899, 8 So. 610 (1 890). 
47. Id. at 902, 8 So. at 61 1 .  
. 48. Id. at 904, 8 So. at 612. It could be argued that Long is not a real employment at will case at all because its outcome could be explained by reference to a specific code 
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The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision i n  Baron v. Placide49 i s  
also i l lustrative. There, the court considered the claims o f  a French 
dancer who contracted to perform as a danseuse and mime at the 
defendant's New Orleans theater. Although the contract contemplated 
a fixed term, the employer reserved the right to discharge the plaintiff 
without cause upon two months notice . The contract also contained a 
penalty clause in the amount of 15,000 francs in the event of breach by 
either party. A dispute developed,50 and the defendant peremptori ly 
fired the dancer without notice. The defendant, in addition to 
contesting l iabil ity, contended that the maximum damages which he 
could be required to pay would be the two months salary to which the 
plaintiff would have been entitled had he properly exercised his option 
to dismiss her according to the contract.  The court found for the 
plaintiff on both issues, rejecting the defendant's broad construction of 
his rights under the at-will clause as inherently unfair to the 
employee.51 Notably, the court also rejected the plaintiff's demand for 
the ful l 1 5 ,000 francs that would have been due to her under the 
penalty clause and, instead, rel ied on a Code article appl icahle to 
provision. art icle 2748, which provides that "[I Jahorers, who hire t hemselves out to serve 0 1 1  
plantations" cannot "he sent away by the proprietor. un1 i l  the t i me has expired during whid1 
t hey had agreed to serve. un less goo<l an<l jusJ causes he ass igned ." LA. C1v. Col li . i\NN.  art . 
2748 ! West 1 952) .  Howe ver. two points militate aga i mt such a rnndusion. hrsl . i n  J h i ., 
r;1st• there was no set "time" <luring which the defendant ;igrecd to serve. 1h11s mak i n i.: 
app l i t·at ion of artic le 2748 probl emat ic at best. SernnJ. the opin ion in l.1111g nowhrre rl'lns 
t o  article 2748 or any of its predecessors; Jl  appears to hased, instead. on what the court saw 
as more general princi p les of law. St'I' also Leonard v. Sparks. J (�J La . .'i4.1 . . H So. 'i'l4 
( I  <JO.l l. In Lnmarcl. the Lou i siana Supre me Cou rt u phe ld the right of an employn to t in· 
one of twn at-wi l l  empl oyees, despite t he all egat i on Jhat Jhe employ,·es had ll>1111nl ;1 
partnership Jo perform the assigned work, and t h;1t one cou ld not h,· fired wi1h11u1 Jhe othc1 
'l lH>u)!h the hul k  of the di scussion in the case rel ates to t he separate issue of whet hn 1 h c  
emp loyees actual ly  were partners i111a st'. 1he court was also careful t o  po111t out th .it t he 
emp loyer had not ahuse<l h i s  rights hy lir1 11i: one of t h e  t wo. On the n>nt rary. Jhe ;1pparcn1 
prq1ondcr;mce of the e v idence was thal the p lai n t i ff had "grossly insulted" h1' e111pln\l' I 
and. as the court noted. the employer 's n)!hl to J 1 s ml's the plaintiff . . ,·;mrltll " el l  he 
q11estroned, 1•11rtic11larl,· if tht• change 1n1.1 ji1r good n111s1·. "  Id at .'i-19 . .  1 . 1  So. ;1t 'i'Jll 
< e mphasis added ) .  
4lJ. 7 Li. i\nn. 229 ( I  8.'i2l. 
50. The dispute arose when the defendant dm:cted the pla111till to. ;1mon)! hn 1 1t her 
duties. "dance parlor dances in parlor dress. with the tii:urants of till' l'<>mpany .. 1 11 .1 
t heatrical play which was hcmg presented at his tht·ater. The plaintiff ult1 1na1L·h· rdu ,cd t < 1  
d o  "" on the grou nd that such employment was outside her du!les tanJ apparent!\ 1-enc;llh 
her dignity) as ;1 premiae .feco11,Jr densrrw·. Id. at 2.�0. 
5 1 .  The rnurt reasoned hoth that such a c11nstrm:tion would render the l r411 1d.1tt·d 
1fam;1ges clause nugatory agamst the employer and. apparent l y. th;ll the employee h;1J lx·cn 
hamicd by the ahrup t way m wh..-h she ha<l hct-n fi red . Id. at :!.1 1 .  
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conventional obligations to order what would be a more fair settlement 
under the circumstances-that the plaintiff recover only the amount 
that would have been due her under the unexpired term of the 
contract.52 
It also appears that during the early years of this century, 
Louisiana courts were far more willing than they later became to infer 
that an employment contract was for a definite term, particularly where 
doing so was necessary to avoid unfairness to the terminated 
employee. Such a presumption was long common w ith respect to 
agricultural employees-and remains clearly reflected in Civil Code 
article 2748-because of the evident impropriety of allowing a 
landowner to take advantage of a hired cultivator by dismissing him 
after the work of planting is done, but before the crops are reaped.53 
But the principle was not originally limited to this agricultural 
paradigm. Thus, for example, in Woods v. WA. Shumard Co. ,54 the 
plaintiff sued on a verbal employment contract, a contract which both 
parties agreed "was for no definite fixed time."55 The court 
nonetheless held that since their arrangement obl igated the employee 
to pay certain taxes and expenses on behalf of the employer, the 
contract must have been intended to extend for at least one year. 
Otherwise, the court reasoned, "defendant could have appropriated the 
plaintiff's earnings for the payment of license taxes and other 
expenses, and terminated his employment," raising an obvious 
potential for abuse of rights that the contract should be construed to 
avoid.56 Similarly, in Kramer v. Dixie Laundry Co. ,57 the court 
resolved a conflict in testimony in favor of a plaintiff's contention that 
his oral employment contract was for a one-year term, l argely because 
the employee had relocated from another city in order to take the job. 
The court held that he therefore "should have been given some 
52. Id. (relying on article 2 1 23 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825, which 
authorized the court to modify a penalty when the principal obligation has been partially 
executed). 
. 53. See, e.g., Miller v. Gidiere, 36 La. Ann. 201 ,  204 ( l  884) (finding that a dtsch"!'ged overseer had an oral contract of employment for one year, but finding that the 
owner s subsequent discharge of the overseer was "for cause". 
54. l l4 La. 452, 38 So. 416 ( 1905). 
55. Id. at 453, 38 So. at 418. 
56. Id., 3 8  So. at 419. 
57. 8 Orleans App. 284 (191 1 ). 
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assurance that his employment would be of a character sufficiently 
stable to justify" that move.58 
In sum, the early case law on the rights and obligations that 
accompany employment contracts is sparse and for the most part 
indirect. However, i t  i s  noteworthy that this admittedly meager record 
gives no indication that, prior to the 1920s, Louisiana courts treated 
employment contracts without a fixed term as inherently different 
from other types of contracts terminable at the will of the parties. On 
the contrary, Louisiana courts appear to have treated employment 
contracts as subject to the same general regime as other types of 
conventional obligations.59 There is also at least some evidence that 
courts were unwilling to allow employers to impose undue hardship 
on the terminated employee.60 Finally, there is no indication that the 
Louisiana courts originally interpreted article 2747 to apply to ordinary 
at will employees or relied on that article to justify treating the legal 
rights and obligations of such employees as an exception to the general 
rules governing leases or other obligations terminable at will. 
B. Pitcher and Its Progeny: Importing the Common-Law 
Interpretation of Employers ' Power over At-Will Employees 
Louisiana courts in the 1920s and 1 930s often based decisions 
on perceived analogies to common-law precedents from other 
jurisdictions, rather  than reasoning directly from the Louisiana Civil 
Code, as interpreted by civilian methodology.6 1 This pattern also 
58. Id. at 285. 
59. See. e.g. , Berli n  v. P.L. Cusachs, Ltd., 1 1 4 La. 744, 38 So. 539 ( 1 905) 
(determining the amount of damages by referring to provisions of the Civil Code deal ing 
with conventional obligations in general). 
60. The Long, Woods, and Kramer cases are discussed at notes 46-48 and 54-58, 
supra. 
6 1 .  See, e.g. , Peter Stein, Judge and Juris I in 1he Civil law: A Hislorica/ 
Interpretation, 46 LA. L. REV. 24 1 ,  257 ( 1 985) (noting Louisiana's "drift towards the 
common-law for over a century and a half after the end of colonial rule," a drift that has 
been arrested only in "recent decades"). This tendency was particularly noticeable in the 
law of obligations, when Louisiana decisions from the 1 920s and 1 930s are full of analyses 
predicated on concepts of "consideration" and other common-law notions unknown to both 
the civilian tradition in general and the Louisiana Civil Code in particular. See. e.g . . United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Crais, 127 So. 4 1 4  (La. Ct. App. Ori. Cir. 1 930) (defining 
the relevant legal issue, for a contract governed by Louisiana law, as whether "the contract is 
supported by valid and legal consideration," and citing Corpus Juris. a common-law treatise, 
as controlling authority on the issue of the sufficiency of that "consideration"). 
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prevailed with respect to the Louisiana courts' analysis of 
employment at will. 
The first indication of the Louisiana courts' adoption of a 
common-law approach came not in cases raising issues of wrongful 
tennination per se, but rather in cases involving the related issue of 
whether, if an employee continues to perform after the expiration of an 
originall y  fixed-term employment contract, the employment relation 
will be considered tacitly renewed for another term. During the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a line of Louisiana cases had 
held that employment contracts  could be tacitly renewed in this 
fashion,62 a conclusion that appears to have been based on an analogy 
between leases of services and leases of property, which the Code 
specifically makes renewable for a term by such tacit reconduction.63 
However, in its 1 926 decision in Russell v. White Oil Corp.,64 the 
62. See, e.g., Sullivan v. New Orleans Stave & Heading Co., 44 La. Ann. 787, 79 1 ,  
1 1  So. 89, 90 ( 1 892) (denying a terminated employee any recovery i n  quantum meruit 
because his contract was considered to have been tacitly renewed); Lalande v. Aldrich, 41  
La. Ann. 307, 3 1 1 ,  6 So. 28, 29 ( 1899) (holding that contract of  plantation overseer was 
tacitly renewed for another year); Alba v. Moriarty & Co., 36 La. Ann. 680, 68 1 -82 ( 1884) 
(holding contract of salesman tacitly renewed). Cf National Automatic Fire Alarm Co. v. 
New Orleans & N.E.R.R. Co., 1 1 5  La. 633, 39 So. 738 ( 1 905). The importance of National 
Automatic is somewhat obscure. The plaintiff i n  that case rendered services under a contract 
originally set for a two-year term. After that initial term expired, the plaintiff continued to 
render services for an additional three months before the defendant terminated the services. 
The plaintiff contended that the contract had been tacitly renewed for an additional two 
years, and that he was entitled to that which he would have earned at the contract price 
during those two years. It appears that the court was, at that time, still willing to admit the 
possibility that an employment contract could, like a lease of property, be tacitly renewed for 
a term. Id. at 636, 39 So. at 739 ("A contract for hire of services may also be continued by 
reconduction."). However, the court was clearly unwilling to adopt the logical consequence 
of that principle and award the plaintiff his full contract damages. Instead, the court 
distinguished Sullivan and Lalande, pointing out that in neither case did the employee 
recover for work not actually performed. Accordingly, the court awarded the plain.
tiff 
recovery only for the three months he actually provided services. Apparently, the conclusion 
that the contract had been renewed did not preclude the court from further concluding that 
the renewed contract could nonetheless be terminated prior to the expiration of its tenn. Id. 
at 638, 39 So. at 740. 
63. LA. Ov. CODE ANN. arts. 2668, 2669 (West 1994). Alba and the other cases 
permitting tacit reconduction in the employment context failed to explain the conceptual 
basis for their holdings. The inference that the decisions were based upon an analogy 
bet�een l�ases of property and leases of services is based primarily on the statements �y 
�hief Justice Bennudez, dissenting in Alba, and Chief Justice Breaux, co1IUTienting on this 
h�e of cases in National Automatic. See Alba, 36 La. Ann. at 682-84 (Bermudez, CJ., 
dissenting); National Automatic, 1 1 5  La. at 638, 39 So. at 740. . 64· 1 62 La. 9, 1 10 So. 70 (1926); see also Williamson v. National Beneficial Life 
Ins. Co., 133 So. 5 1 5  (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1931  ). 
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Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this prior line of Louisiana 
jurisprudence, holding instead that when such an employee continues 
to work after the expiration of a fixed-term contract, he reverts to at­
will status. In doing so, the court conducted little analysis of Louisiana 
law in general, or the Civil Code in particular.65 Instead, the court 
relied on common-law authority for the proposition that the 
employment relation  must be mutual in its outlines-that if the 
employee is free to leave his job without liability, the employer must 
be reciprocally and equally free to fire the employee at any time, also 
without liability.66 Because the court found that the plaintiff Russell 
would not have to serve another term, the employer White Oil was not 
bound to employ h im either.67 
The Louisiana Supreme Court first applied this new approach to 
terminations of pure at-will employees-and first signaled Louisiana's 
adherence to the absolutist, common-law analysis of employment at 
will-in its 1932 decision in Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 
Inc. 68 There, the plaintiff alleged that he was fired by the defendant 
without cause and sought damages. The trial court granted the 
defendant's exception of no cause of action, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed, despite the plaintiff's proffer of a written employment 
contract that explicitly provided that "this contract of employment is to 
continue as long as [the defendant company] is operating."69 In 
reaching this result, the court once again did not rely on coda] or 
civilian authority of any kind; indeed, it, cited only one Louisiana case, 
Russell, and only for the general (and unexceptional) proposition that 
contracts that are not for a fixed term can be terminated at will. On the 
crucial question of the legal effect of the contractual language, the 
65. The Russell court cited only a single Louisiana precedent, National Automatic 
Fire Alarm Co. v. New Orleans & N.E.R.R. Co., 1 1 5  La. 633, 39 So. 738. Russell, 1 62 La. 
at 1 0, 1 1 0  So. at 7 1 .  Although Russell cited National Automatic as having "overruled" Alba 
and its progeny, that reading seems overstated. The National Automatic court explicitly 
reaffirmed the principle that employment contracts could be tacitly renewed for a term. 
Indeed, lower court opinions continued long after National Automatic to cite Alba as 
controlling authority on this point. See, e.g., Newman v. Longshoremen's P.U. Benevolent 
Assoc., 11 Teiss. 38, 39 (La. Ct. App. 1913) (citing A lba for the proposition that, "[i]n a 
general way, the principle of tacit reconduction applies to a contract of hiring as well as to a 
lease upon property"). 
66. Russell, 1 62 La. at 1 1 ,  I IO So. at 71 (citing CORPUS JURIS and Cutter v. Powell, 
6 T.R. 320 ( 1795), reprinted in 2 SMITH'S LEADING CASES I (London 1929)). 
67. Id. at 1 2, 1 1 0  S o. at 7 1 .  
68. 174 La. 66, 1 39 So. 760 ( 1932). 
69. Id. at 66, 1 39 So. at 761 .  
1 538 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
court in Pitcher relied entirely on common-law autho rity and 
common-law reasoning, and particularly on the common-law 
requirements that contractual promises must be "mutual" and 
supported by "consideration."70 The Pitcher court's reliance o n  these 
common-law doctrines was explicit, permitting the court, in  a 
rhetorical flourish, to expand on the public policy and legal issues it 
saw as relevant: 
An employee is never presumed to engage his services permanently, 
thereby cutting himself off from all chances of improving his 
condition; indeed, in this land of opportunity it would be against public 
policy and the spirit of our institutions that any man should thus 
handicap himself; and the law will presume almost juris et de jure that 
he did not so intend. And if the contract of employment be not binding 
on the employee for the whole term of such employment, it cannot be 
binding upon the employer; there would be lack of "mutuality." But if 
the employee has given, in addition to the services which he promised 
to perform, a consideration, whatever the nature of such consideration 
be, then he has in effect purchased, for a valuable consideration, an 
option to keep the employment for the term specified; and such a 
contract is a valid one.71  
There are multiple ironies here. First, this opinion was written 
in 1932, at the depth of the worst economic depression in American 
history. At that time, few workers were likely to be "improving 
[their] condition" by trading steady empl oyment for membership in 
the ranks of the jobless. Second, the court's rhetoric-and its 
adoption of the mutuality requirement-allowed it to obscure the 
real issue at stake. Public policy might well forbid enforcement of 
promises by employees to remain i n  a particular job permanently. 
70. Id. The Pitcher court's analysis was based in part on two cases, both from 
common-law states: Sullivan v. Detroit, Ypsilanti & Ann Arbor Ry., 98 N.W. 756 (Mich 
1904), and Rape v. Mobile & Ohio R.R., JOO So. 585 (Miss. 1924). However, the court 
appeared to place primary reliance, not on particular decisions, but rather on excerpts from 
two compilations of United States authority, "Ruling Case Law" and "American Law 
Reports"---excerpts which were themselves, as the Pitcher court proudly i nformed the 
reader, variously supported by case law from the following jurisdictions: Arkansas, 
California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
West Virginia, and England. As a roster of common-law jurisdictions, this listing is indeed 
impressive. But as a guide to interpreting the unique legal traditions of Louisiana, such a 
recitation of authority should be somewhat less persuasive. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 
1 967 cmt. c (West 1987) (distinguishing cause from consideration). 
7 1 .  Pitcher, 174 La. at 69, 139 So. at 761. 
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Legal authority ranging from the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, to article 2746 of the Louisiana Civil 
Code might be cited in support of such a view. However, the case 
simply did not involve any issue regarding an alleged right of an 
employer to force an employee to remain on a job against his will .  
Unless one imports the common-law doctrine of mutuality, the 
contractual responsibilities of the parties should be analyzed 
separately, and public policy arguments relating to one would seem 
to have little relevance to the other. Finally, for reasons that should 
be obvious to any Louisiana lawyer, the argument made in Pitcher 
bears no relation to the Louisiana law of obligations. On the 
contrary, the terminology and the reasoning make sense only in the 
context of common-law analysis of contracts.72 
In any event, applying those common-law requirements, the 
Pitcher court refused to enforce the employer's contractual promise 
not to fire Mr. Pitcher. Because the plaintiff was free to quit his job, 
mutuality required that the employer must-regardless of the words of 
the contract-remain similarly free to terminate the employee's 
services.73 Such a unilateral promise not to fire would only be 
enforced when it was supported by "special consideration," a 
requirement which the court found absent from the case.74 
Regardless of one's views of the proper relations between 
employers and employees, the conclusion seems inescapable that 
Pitcher was flawed in its reasoning, if not wrong in its result.75 The 
72. See infra note 227 (discussing briefly the irrelevance of these traditional 
common-law concepts of "consideration" and "mutuality" to the Louisiana law of 
obligations. 
73.  Pitcher, 1 74 La. at  69, 1 39 So. at 761 .  
74. See id. The court stated the following: 
But if the employee has given, in addition to the services which he promised to 
perform, a consideration, whatever the nature of such consideration be, then he 
has in effect purchased, for a valuable consideration, an option to keep the 
employment for the tenn specified; and such a contract is a valid one. 
Id. As the court was quick to explain, "special consideration" had to be something that the 
employee gives to the employer over and above mere faithful performance by the employee 
of his work. Id. 
75. The ultimate question of whether the court reached the right result in Pitcher 
depends in large part on issues of fact which the court did not explore. For example, 
whether sufficient cause could be found to support the employer's unilateral promise not to 
fire the employee might depend on the specific facts of the situation, including whether the 
employee reasonably relied on that promise to his detriment. See LA CJV. CooE ANN. art. 
l 967 (West 1987). Alternatively, such a contract might have been rendered unenforceable 
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court was no doubt correct in its basic legal premise-that 
employment contracts for an indefinite term, like any other contracts 
for an indefinite term-can ordinarily be terminated at the will of 
e ither party. However, the court clearly failed in its analysis of 
whether the written contract, in which the employer had specifically 
promised to retain its employee as long as the company was operating, 
should have been interpreted as falling within that category of 
contracts terminable at will. Moreover, rather than analyze the parties ' 
rights and obligations under the contract according to the established 
principles of the Louisiana Civil Code-including the established 
principle that parties to contracts terminable at will remain subject to 
the requirements of good faith in exercising their termination rights­
the court chose instead to simply regard the employer's promise as 
unenforceable as a matter of law. In doing so, the Pitcher court 
imported into Louisiana law a set of alien concepts, concepts which 
continued to distort Louisiana's law of employment at will even after 
the revival of codal analysis in the Louisiana courts. Nonetheless, 
despite its flaws, Pitcher has deeply influenced subsequent Louisiana 
courts' consideration of all claims alleging wrongful termination of at­
will employees. 
From 1932 until 1988, the Louisiana Supreme Court took only a 
limited role in defining the contours of the at-will doctrine. The 
supreme court did act to some extent to c onfirm and extend the rule of 
Pitcher, holding that every employment contract reverts to at-will 
status after five years, regardless of the terms of the contract or any 
"special consideration" contributed by the employee.76 However, on 
by article 2746, which provides that, "A man can only hire out his services for a certain 
limited time . . . .  " Or, if the contract had already been in operation for more than five years, 
perhaps it could have been argued that the contract converted to at-will status after that time. 
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 67 (West 1972). However, the relevance of article 1 67 to free 
employees is not at all clear. See infra note 127. 
76. See, e.g., Pechon v. National Corp. Serv. , 234 La. 397, 408, 100 So. 2d 2 1 3, 2 1 8  
( 1958) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that he gave special consideration in the form of giving up 
a better job); Lowther v. Fireside Mutual Life Ins. Co., 228 La. 946, 950, 84 So. 2d 596, 597 
( 1955) (rejecting the argument that article 167 was anachronistic); Page v. New Orleans 
Pub. Serv., Inc., 1 84 La. 6 1 7 ,  620, 167 So. 99, 1 00 ( 1936) (holding that giving up a 
lucrative job in California is not special consideration justifying departure from the rule of 
employment at will and interpreting article 167 according to the doctrine of mutuality 
articulated in Pitcher); see also Shaughnessy v. D' Antoni, 100 F.2d 422, 424-25 (5th Cir. 
1938) (holding ten-year employment contract valid for five years only); Hill v. Missouri Pac. 
Ry. , 8 F. Supp. 80, 8 1  (W.D. La. 1933) (holding plaintiff had no claim for wrongful 
discharge despite employer's contract to employ plaintiff for life or until retirement on full 
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the broader issue of interpreting the at-will rule, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court spoke rarely and with moderation.77 
Despite the Supreme Court's quiescence, a distinct radicalization 
of the law took place in the Louisiana Courts of Appeal. Though there 
were occasional exceptions,78 those courts tended to adopt a much 
pension; contract entered into in return for plaintiff's agreement to abandon claim for 
injuries); Griffith v. Sollay Foundation Drilling Inc., 373 So. 2d 979 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 
1 979) (relying on Pitcher to hold employee terminable without cause or notice, despite his 
having moved from Atlanta and accepted a job based on an oral promise of "lifetime 
employment"); Thaxton v. Roberson, 224 So. 2d 1 83,  1 85-86 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 969) 
(holding that a contract for a fixed-tenn of employment converts to at-will status after five 
years, but does not bar employee's recovery for services actually rendered thereafter); Smith 
v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 1 63 So. 2d 124, 126 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (finding c ontract 
converts to at-will status after five years). 
Several of these decisions were criticized at the time they were rendered. See, e.g., 
M .J.S. ,  Note, 13 TuL. L. REv. 467 ( 1 939) (criticizing Shaughnessy on the ground that article 
1 67 should be interpreted to refer only to the maximum term for which apprentices and 
similar bound servants may bind themselves, not to any limitation on the contractual 
freedom of employers and free employees); Note, Recent Jurisprudence, supra note 5 
(criticizing Hill for failure to recognize that the public policy behind article 1 67 does not 
extend to preventing employers from making unilateral promises limiting what would 
otherwise be their power to fire at will, especially when that promise was made in return for 
another valuable promise). 
77. Between 1 958 and 1 988, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided only two cases 
which touched directly on issues of employment at will. In Long v. Foster & Associates, 
242 La. 295, 1 36 So. 2d 48 ( 1 96 1 ), the parties had entered into an employment contract for 
a five-year tenn, but the contract reserved to the employee the right to leave at any time, 
without liability. The employer fired the employee before the term had elapsed, but resisted 
liability on the ground that the contract was not "mutual" and that he could not be bound by 
a term unless the employee was likewise bound. The court enforced the contract, holding 
that the employer was bound despite the unilateral potestative condition. Id. at 53-54, 1 3 6  
So. 2 d  at 309- 1 4; see Note, 22 LA. L. REV. 872 ( 1 962) (discussing Long). I n  Moore v. 
McDermott, Inc., 48 1 So. 2d 602 (La. 1986), the court, in dictum, appeared to cast some 
doubt on the propriety of an absolutist reading of the at-will doctrine. Rather than argue in 
support of such an approach, the court instead quoted approvingly from Wiley v. M issouri 
Pacific R.R., 430 So. 2d 1 0 1 6  (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 982), seemingly adopting the Wiley 
court's concerns regarding employers' superior bargaining power and the consequent 
movement away from an absolutist interpretation of the at-will rule in other jurisdictions. 
Moore, 48 1 So. 2d at 605. 
In other cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court seemed to take into account the typical 
difference in bargaining power between employers and employees, though in no case did 
this result appear in an express holding modifying the rigors of the at-will rule in Louisiana. 
See Wiley, 430 So. 2d at I 0 1 8  (discussing in dictum the social reasons for the decline of an 
absolutist interpretation of employment at will in other states). 
78. In a few cases from this period, lower courts seemed willing to find an oral 
contract of employment for a fixed-tenn based on nothing more than the "custom" of a 
particular industry. See, e.g. , Roussel v. James U. Blanchard & Co., 430 So. 2d 247, 249 
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 983) (finding an oral employment contract for a six-month term and 
holding where no term is expressed, the ''understanding of the parties is to be detennined 
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more absolutist interpretation of the at-will rule than the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, relying on Pitcher to uphold the employer's right to 
tenninate employees regardless of the circumstances. Particularly 
during the 1 970s and 1980s, lower courts in the state began to 
routinely uphold the employers' right to fire an at-will employee as a 
matter of law, without even permitting employees to present evidence 
that the firings violated public policy79 or contradicted the employer's 
promises to the employee,80 or that the circumstances otherwise 
from their written or oral negotiations, usages of the business and, in general , nature of the 
employment and its surrounding circumstances"); Aguillard v. Lake Charles Stevedores, 
Inc., 284 So. 2d 1 24, 1 26 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 974) (relying on the custom of a particular 
workplace to hold that an at-will employee who was injured on the job could not be 
terminated; rather, the employer was required to pay salary and benefits for an additional 
term of two-and-a-half years); Harrosh v. Fife Bros. Health Ass'n, I So. 2d 323,  327 (La. Ct. 
App. Orleans 1 94 1 )  (finding an oral contract of employment for a fixed term on weak facts; 
relying to a large extent on the inference that it would have been unreasonable to believe that 
the employee would have rejected a better offer, as he did, unless he was promised some sort 
of job security). 
79. See, e.g. , Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 4 1 2  So. 2d 706 , 70 8 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) 
(holding that at-will employee who was fired when he refused to participate in employer's 
deceptive trade practices had no cause of action for wrongful termination, and rejecting the 
argument that then-article 1 1  (now article 7) embodies a public policy exception to the at­
will rule), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 379 (La. 1 982); Baynard v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 
Am., 399 So. 2d 1 200, 1 20 2  (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981)  (holding in  a case arising before 
enactment of the federal Age Discrimination Act and its Louisiana equivalents, that an 
employee who was fired solely because of age states no cause of action against his 
employer); Freeman v. Ebilco, Inc., 338 So. 2d 967, 96 8 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 976) 
(holding, in case arising before enactment of LA. R.S. 23:136 1 ,  that injured employee who 
allegedly was fired in retaliation for claiming workers' compensation stated no cause of 
action); see also Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Serv., Inc., 50 1 F.2d 1 04, 10 7 (5th Cir. 
1974) (holding that the plaintiff who alleged that he was fired in retaliation for making a 
complaint to the Wage and Hour Division of the federal Department of Labor stated no 
claim). 
80 . See, e.g., Wall v. Tulane Univ. , 499 So. 2d 375, 376 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.) 
(holding that since employee was at will, empl oyer was free not only to fire him at any time 
but also to unilaterally revoke benefits described in the employer's Staff Handbook), writ 
denied, 500 So. 2d 427 (La. 1 987); Thebner v. Xerox Corp., 480 So. 2d 454, 455 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d Cir. 1985) (holding at-will employee who alleges that he was fired in violation of 
procedures set out in company policy manual states no claim), writ denied, 484 So. 2d 1239 
(La. 1986); Terrebonne v. Louisiana Ass'n of Educators, 444 So. 2d 2 0 6  (La. Ct. App. 1st 
Cir. 1983) (holding that where teacher was fired despite Board resolution to re-employ all 
staff until a particular date, Board resolution was not binding and that teacher remained at­
will because there was no "meeting of the minds" and because teacher remained free to 
quit); Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So.  2d 637, 638 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1982) 
(holding at-will employee who was fired without receiving the three prior warnings called 
for by employer's personnel policy stated no claim); Senac v. L. M. Berry Co., 299 So. 2d 
433, 434 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (holding plaintiff failed to state cause of action where 
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indicated that the employer may have been exercising his rights i n  bad 
faith.81 
Equally important was the gradual shift in the purported codal 
basis for these holdings. Pitcher did not rely on Civil Code authority 
at all. Shortly thereafter, however, lower courts rooted this line of 
cases in the Louisiana Civil Code. Article 16782 was the first article 
courts seized upon. Post-Pitcher decisions initially relied on article 
167 to justify their conclusions that employees who had employment 
contracts of indefinite term, or who had worked for more than five 
years, reverted to at-will status.83 Later cases found an equivalent 
he was fired without cause, despite allegedly having been induced to leave another job based 
on an oral contract that he would not be dismissed without cause). 
8 1 .  See, e.g. , Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc., 52 I So. 2d 48 I (La. Ct. App. 4th 
Cir.) (holding employer had not corrunitted an abuse of rights when it fired employees, who 
were willing to take employer-mandated lie detector test but refused to sign a consent form 
waiving all rights against  the company administering those tests), writ denied, 522 So. 2d 
5 7 1  (La. 1988); O'Neal v. Chris Steak House, 525 So. 2d 325, 328 (La. Ct. App. ! st Cir. 
I 988) (finding plaintiff stated no cause of action despite his claim that the employer fired 
him in order to prevent h i m  from collecting on substantial conditional benefits); Clements v. 
Ryan, 382 So. 2d 279, 282 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 980) (holding employee who was accused 
of stealing, and was fired despite having twice passed lie detector tests, stated no cause of 
action for wrongful termination or defamation); Ingram v.  Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. 
Corp., 323 So. 2d 92 1 ,  923 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 975) (finding plaintiffs who claimed 
employer and union conspired to have them dismissed stated no cause of action under 
Louisiana law); Copeland v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 288 So. 2d 404, 407-09 (La. Ct. App. 
4th Cir.) (holding employee who was discharged twenty-one days before he could exercise 
option to purchase stock had no claim for wrongful tennination or for value of the stock), 
writ denied, 290 So. 2d 9 1 1  (La. 1 974). 
82. Prior to 1 964, article 1 67 of the Louisiana Civil Code provided the following: 
"Persons who have attained the age of majority cannot bind themselves for a longer term 
than five years." In 1 964, the article was amended to provide a maximum term of ten years. 
Act No. 355, 1964 La. Acts. In 1 990, article 1 67 was repealed, along with most of the rest 
of Book I, Tttle VI, "Of Master and Servant." Act No. 705 § I 1 990 La. Acts. 
83. See. e.g. , Lowther v. Fireside Mutual Life Ins. Co., 228 La. 946, 950, 84 So. 2d 
596, 597 ( 1955) (rejecting argument that article 1 67 was anachronistic and thus ought he 
narrowly interpreted); Page v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 1 84 La. 617, 6 1 8, 1 67 So. 99, 
I 00 ( 1936) (relying on article 1 67); see also Shaughnessy v. D' Antoni, 100 F.2d 422, 425 
(5th Cir. 1938) (relying on article 1 67); Hill v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 8 F. Supp. 80, 8 1  (W.D. 
La. 1 933) (relying on article 167 to uphold dismissal of employee who had agreed to 
abandon a claim for injuries in return for a promise to employ him until retirement): Thaxton 
v. Roberson, 224 So. 2d 1 83 ,  1 86 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 969) (holding that article 1 67 not a 
bar to recovery for time actually worked beyond five years, but converts contract to at-will  
status after that time). Remarkably, article 167 continued to be cited for this proposition­
that long-term contracts convert to at-will status after a period of years-even after it had 
been repealed. See Chauvin v. Tandy Corp., 984 F.2d 695, 697-98 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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principle in article 2746.84 Only in the early 1960s did courts begin to 
focus on article 274785 and the perceived dichotomy between articles 
2747 and 274986 as the codal locus of the employment at-will rule in 
Louisiana. However, though this focus on article 2747 is of recent 
vintage, it quickly became and remains canonical. Since 1 962, 
virtually all decisions involving the rights of at-will employees have 
relied on article 2747 to establish that employment at will is 
entrenched in the Civil Code of Louisiana. 87 
84. See, e.g. , Pechon v. National Corp. Serv., 234 La. 397, 408, I 00 So. 2d 2 1 3 ,  2 1 8  
( 1 958) (rejecting employee's claim that he enjoyed a n  oral contract of employment "for 
life," based on articles 1 67 and 2746); Manning v. Shreveport Transit Co., 1 30 So. 2d 497, 
498 (La. Ct. App. !st Cir. 1 961 )  (citing article 2746 as the locus of the Louisiana doctrine of 
employment at will). See supra note 41 (quoting article 2746). 
85. The first case which referred to article 2747 as the fount of Louisiana's law of 
employment at will appears to have been Phillips v. Mid-Continent Life Insurance Co., 1 30 
So. 2d 791 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961 ). However, since the Phillips court found that the 
employee in that case enjoyed a contract for a term, that statement was arguably only 
dictum. Phillips, 1 30 So. 2d at 798. In Baker v. Union Tank Car Co., 140 So. 2d 397, 402 
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1 962), that proposition first became a clear holding. The plaintiff in 
Baker had been employed by the defendant for twenty years. Although the collective 
bargaining agreement covering the plaintiff had expired, he and other workers continued to 
work during negotiations for a new agreement. Before that new agreement was finalized, 
the defendant fired the plaintiff. The court held that, u nder article 2747, in the absence of a 
fixed-term contract or a bargaining agreement in force, the plaintiff was an at-will employee 
who could be fired at any time. Baker, 140 So. 2d at 3 98-402. 
86. See, e.g., Breaux v. South Louisiana Elec. Coop. Ass'n, 471 So. 2d 967, 968-69 
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985);  Hoover v. Livingston Bank, 45 1 So. 2d 3, 4-5 (La. Ct. App. 1 st 
Cir. 1984). 
87. The cases from this period which refer to article 2747 as the source of 
Louisiana's at-will rule are far too numerous to list. See, e.g., John P. Harris, M.D., Inc. v. 
Parmley, 480 So. 2d 500, 503 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1 9 85); Thebner v. Xerox Corp., 480 So. 
2d 454, 455 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 985), writ denied, 484 So. 2d 1 39 (La. 1 986) ; Aldahir v. 
Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc., 420 So. 2d 714 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.), 
writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1 147 (La. 1 982); Gil v. Metal S erv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706, 707 (La. 
Ct. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 379 (La. 1 982); Jackson v. East B aton Rouge 
Parish Sch. Bd., 393 So. 2d 243, 245 (La. Ct. App. 1 st Cir. 1 980); Linzay v. Tangipahoa 
Parish Farm Bureau, 387 So.  2d 1 343, 1345 (La. Ct. App. 1 st Cir.), writ denied, 393 So. 2d 
748 (La. 1980); Clements v. Ryan, 382 So. 2d 279, 281 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 980); 
Jackson v. East Baton Rouge Parish Indigent Defender's Bd., 353 So. 2d 344, 345 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st Cir. 1977); Griffith v. Sollay Found. Drillin g  Inc., 373 So. 2d 979, 9 8 1 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d Cir. 1979); Ingram v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 323 So. 2d 9 2 1 ,  923 (La. 
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 975). 
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C. From Brannan to the Present: Absolutism Triumphant 
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In 1988, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs in Brannan 
v. l-l)reth Laboratories Inc.,88 a grant which gave the court, for the 
first time in thirty years, an opportunity to review Louisiana's law of 
employment at will. But instead of re-examining that doctrine, the 
supreme court merely reaffirmed the flawed precedent of Pitche r  and 
placed its imprimatur on the lower courts ' reliance on article 2747 as 
the source of the at-will principle in Louisiana. 
The facts of Brannan were not disputed. In 1964, the plaintiff 
left a secure civil service job to take a position as a pharmaceutical 
salesman with Wyeth Labs.89 Though his employment was not for a 
fixed term, the plaintiff alleged, and the jury evidently believed, that he 
took the Wyeth job in reliance on oral assurances that he would not be 
fired except for just cause.90 Although his performance was not stellar, 
the plaintiff received raises every year from 1 964 until 1 982.91 In 
1 982, the employer received complaints from doctors, stating that 
Brannan had failed to take their orders for Wyeth Products.92 After an 
investigation, the employer discovered that Brannan had falsified some 
"doctor call" reports; Brannan claimed to have made solicitations that 
he never made. Wyeth dismissed the plaintiff.93 
Brannan brought suit alleging, among other things, wrongful 
termination of an oral employment contract. After trial, the jury found 
in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him $250,000 in damages on that 
claim.94 The Fifth Circuit affirrned.95 The court of appeal correctly 
acknowledged that, as a general rule, at-will employees can quit or be 
88. 526 So. 2d 1 1 0 I (La. 1 988). 
89. Brannan, 526 So. 2d at 1 1 02. 
90. Id. The plaintiff also relied on the defendant's 'Territory Managers Manual," 
which set out a multistep process for dealing with employees who do not perform 
adequately. According to that manual, such employees are to be first put in a "performance 
improvement program"; then, if their performance does not improve, on probation. Only 
after probation can an employee be fired. Id. at 1 1 02-03. 
9 1 .  Id. at 1 1 03. In 1 979, Brannan was placed on the performance improvement 
program in an effort to increase his number of daily doctor calls from approximately six to a 
minimum of seven calls per day. Though he did not improve, he continued to be employed. 
Id. at 1 1 02-03. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at I 102. The plaintiff was awarded an additional $60,000 for defamation, 
wrongful denial of stock option rights, and accrued dental benefits. 
95. Brannan v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 5 1 6  So. 2d 1 57, 1 73 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1 987), 
ajf'd in part and rev'd in part, 526 So. 2d 1 101 (La. 1988). 
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fired at any time without liability, and that employment c ontracts 
generally could not at that time extend beyond ten years.96 However, 
the court went on to hold that both of these principles c ould be 
modified. First, the ten-year rule would not apply where the employee 
gives "special consideration" in return for lifetime employment. 
Second, employers could contractually agree to modify or condition 
what would otherwise be their right t o  terminate employees at will. 
Third, the manuals and other documents relied on by the plaintiff, 
while not contracts in themselves, n o netheless could be used as 
evidence of an underlying oral agreement not to fire the plaintiff 
without sufficient cause.97 Applying these principles, the Fifth Circuit 
found that sufficient evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the 
employer had orally agreed not to fire the plaintiff except for just 
cause, and that sufficient cause was lacking in this case.98 
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.99 The court cited four 
Civil Code articles as "pertinent to" the issue of wrongful termination: 
the familiar articles 167 and 2746 and, for the first time in the supreme 
court, articles 2747 and 2024 as well.100 The court did not, h owever, 
engage in any thorough re-examination of the importance of these 
articles. Rather, it simply relied on Pitcher and the line of post-Pitcher 
96. Id. at 164. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 1 65-68. The Fifth Circuit was less specific on the issue of whether 
sufficient special consideration existed to support modification of the ten-year rule in this 
case. However, the implication seems to have been that the special consideration here was 
the plaintiff's decision to g]ve up a secure civil service job. But see Page v. New Orleans 
Pub. Serv. , Inc., 184 La. 6 1 7, 167 So. 99, 100 (1936) (holding that plaintiff's act of giving 
up a lucrative job in California not special consideration justifying modification of the rule 
of article 167). 
99. Brannan, 526 So. 2d 1101 (reversing the decision below except with respect to 
plaintiffs claim for $50 worth of unpaid dental benefits). 
100. Id. at 1103. Of these articles, articles 167 and 2746, which at that time 
precluded an employee from binding himself for more than ten years, were familiar bases for 
prior Louisiana Supreme Court decisions on these issues. See, e.g. , Pechon v. National 
Corp. Serv., 234 La. 397, 408, 1 00  So. 2d 213, 2 1 8  (1958). Brannan did, however, break 
new ground, at least for the Louisiana Supreme Court because the court relied on articles 
2747 and 2040. Specifically, Brannan marked the first time that the Louisiana Supreme 
Court held that article 2747, which provides that a servant attached to the person or family 
of the employer can quit or be dismissed at any time without liability, embodied a principle 
of employment at will applicable to the generality o f  employees. It also marked the first 
Louisiana Supreme Court reference to employment at will in connection with article 2024, 
which provides generally that contracts of unspecified duration can be terminated by either 
party, on reasonable notice to the other. See supra notes 34, 41, 42 (quoting articles 1 67, 
2746, and 2747, respectively); see also infra note 1 22 (quoting article 2024). 
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jurisprudence to reaffirm that employment contracts for an indefinite 
term or for a term in excess of ten years are treated as terminable at 
will ,  at least in  the absence of "special consideration."IoI In particular, 
the court approvi ngly quoted the passage from Pitcher, which rooted 
these doctrines i n  the common-law concepts of mutuality and 
consideration. Applying these principles, the court found that 
Brannan's decision to leave his civil service job to take a higher paying 
position with Wyeth Labs did not constitute "special consideration" 
and that his employment was therefore terminable at will, regardless of 
whether the employer had made any promises to the contrary. I02 His 
claim for wrongful termination was therefore denied. 
In one sense, the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Brannan 
should not be surprising. The facts of the case presented l ittle 
evidence of bad faith or abusive conduct by the employer; on the 
contrary, dismissal of Brannan could have been justified o n  any 
interpretation of employment at will .  Im Indeed, as the court went out 
of its way to point  out, Brannan 's conduct would likely have provided 
good cause for termination of an employee with a fixed-term 
contract. I04 However, the court's analysis  of the issues could be taken 
as evidence that easy cases can make (or at least perpetuate) bad l aw. 
The Brannan court's adoption of article 2747 as the source of the 
at-will rule and its reaffirmation of the Pitcher analysis resulted in a 
continuation and intensification of the hostil ity with which lower 
courts in Louisiana have regarded all claims of wrongful termination 
brought by at-wi l l  employees, a hostil ity which ha'i often prevai led 
regardless of circumstances indicating bad faith on the part of the 
employer. Thus, since Brannan, Louisiana courts have relied on these 
principles to hold that an employer, though statutorily barred from 
direct retal iation against a workers ' compensation claimant, may 
nonetheless retal i ate by dismissing the claimant's relative I05 or 
I 0 I .  Brannan. 256 So. 2d at 1 1 03-04. 
1 02. Id. at 1 1 04. 
I 03. II is noteworthy that. although Ihc jury in the case detcnnined Ihat Wyeth lacked 
adequate grounds to fire Brannan. the Louisiana Supreme Court devoied more than a page 
of its opinion to a detailed recitation of his deficiencies. particularly his falsification of 
doctor call reports. Id. at 1 1 02-03. 
I 04. Id. at I 004-05. 
1 05 .  Portie v. Devall Towing & Boat Serv . .  Inc .. 634 So. 2d 1 324. 1 326 (La. Ct. App. 
3d Cir. 1 994) (holding that workers' compensation c lai mant stated no cause of action when 
employer retaliated by firing claimant's brother). The court ruled that article 2747 and 
Brannan insulate the employer from liability for dismissal of at-will employees unless that 
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spouse.106 They have relied on article 2747 to distinguish federal law 
and hold that an employer may escape liability for violating state laws 
against employment discrimination simply by showing that a 
nondiscriminatory reason also contributed to the dismissal. 107 
Louisiana courts have also held that at-w ill employees who claimed 
that they were fired solely in order to deprive them of accrued 
retirement benefits, 108 or as part of an internal corporate power 
struggle,109 or because of a soured sexual relationship with their 
boss,1 10 or as the result of nothing more than an error by a co-
firing contravenes a specific statutory exception, and that LA. R.S. 23: 1 36 1  is  a "penal 
statute" which must be narrowly interpreted to grant protection only to the compensation 
claimant himself. Id. 
106. Woodson v. Alarm Protection Servs., Inc. ,  5 3 1  So. 2d 542, 543-44 (La. Ct. App. 
5th Cir.) (holding that the wife of a workers' compensation claimant had no claim despite 
being fired in retaliation for her husband's claim; holding also that section 1 3 6 1  protects 
only the individual employee asserting the claim), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 358 (La. 1 988). 
107. Bradley v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 559 So. 2d 46, 48 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.), writ 
denied, 566 So. 2d 397 (La. 1990). Louisiana courts generally interpret LA. R.S.  
23: 1 006(8), a Louisiana statute outlawing employment discrimination, in conformity with 
federal law interpreting Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2000h. However, in Bradley, the court relied on article 2747 to articulate a rare analysis 
different from-and less favorable to employees-that which was applied under federal law. 
In Bradley, a terminated probationary employee brought an action under LA. R.S. 
23: 1006(8), alleging that she was fired because of her gender. The employer countered by 
alleging that the plaintiff had been excessively absent. Under federal antidiscrimination law, 
as it existed at the time, the employee could prevail unless the employer showed that he 
would have reached the same decision to fire solely on the basis of its asserted legitimate 
nondiscriminatory motive. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 ( 1 989). 
The Bradley court, relying on the strong tradition of employment at will in Louisiana, held 
in contrast that LA. R.S. 23:  I 006(B) imposed no similar burden on the employer to show the 
absence of "but for" causation. Rather, the employer can apparently prevail in such a case 
simply by showing that nondiscriminatory reasons contributed to the decision to fire, even if 
that decision was also the result of prohibited discrimination. 
108. Williams v. Touro Infirmary, 578 So. 2d I 006, I 0 I 0 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 99 1)  
(holding that at-will employees who claimed they were fired in an effort to deprive them of 
accrued retirement benefits stated no claim for wrongful discharge). 
109. Dunbar v. Williams, 554 So. 2d 56 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.), reh'g granted in part, 
No. CA-8330, 1989 La. App. LEXIS 899 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. May 9, 1989). A minority 
shareholder was deprived of the vice presidency and later fired, all as part of an intra­
corporate dispute. The court held that, despite any possible equities, the minority 
shareholder enjoyed neither a contract for a term nor express statutory protection, and was 
therefore terminable at will. Id. at 69. 
1 10. Hammond v. Medical Arts Group, Inc., 574 So. 2d 521 , 523 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
Cir. 1991). In Hammond, the plaintiff nurse had a consensual sexual relationship with one 
of the members of the medical partnership which employed her. After the affair ended, 
tension developed between the plaintiff and that doctor. The plaintiff finally quit and 
brought an action alleging constructive discharge. The court held that the plaintiff stated no 
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employee, 1 1 1  did not state claims sufficient to pennit the employees to 
i ntroduce evidence of their contentions. Courts have even rel ied on 
article 2747 and Brannan to bar dismissed employees from asserting 
otherwise applicable tort claims against employers1 12 or third parties. 1 1 3 
In a related l ine of cases, Louisiana courts have likewise upheld 
employers' power to fire at-will employees without liability even when 
the termination breached the employer's express representations to the 
employee that he would not be fired unless certain procedures were 
claim either for wrongful discharge or for intentional i n fliction of emotional distress. Id. at 
525. 
1 1 1 . See, e.g., Johnson v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 808, 809 (5th Cir. 1 990) 
(holding at-will plaintiff who was fired after failing polygraph exam allegedly negligently 
administered by co-employee was precluded by article 2747 and Brannan from stati n g  any 
claim for wrongful termination); Martin v. Lincoln Gen. Hosp., 588 So. 2d 1 329, 1 337-38 
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1 99 1 )  (reversing jury verdict i n  favor of an at-will employee fired 
because of a co-employee's  apparently inaccurate reports of financial improprieties,  and 
holding that article 2747 precludes all claims for wrongful discharge), writ denied, 592 So. 
2d 1 302 (La. 1 992). 
1 1 2.  See, e.g. , Massey v. G.B. Cooley Hosp., 593 So. 2d 460, 464 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
Cir.  1 992) (denying fired employee's claims against employer for wrongful termination and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress on the ground that employer's conduct was not 
sufficiently "outrageous"; citing Gil for the proposition that Louisiana law gives employer 
"the right to fire [an employee] for any reason at all"), judgment set aside, 6 1 6  So. 2d 1 242 
(La. 1 993); Roberts v.  Louisiana Bank & Trust, 550 So.  2d 809, 8 1 2  (La. Ct.  App. 2 d  Cir. )  
(finding the fired bank teller stated no cause o f  action for wrongful termination or 
defamation), writ denied, 552 So. 2d 398 (La. 1 989). 
1 1 3. See, e.g., Durand v. McGaw, 635 So. 2d 409, 4 1 1 - 1 2  (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. )  
(holding that fired employee could state no claim against third party for intentional or 
negligent interference with contract; since employee was terminable at wi ll ,  he h ad "no 
contract or legally protected interest in his employment necessary for a claim for tortious 
interference with contract."),  writ denied, 640 So. 2d 1 3 1 8  (La. 1 994); Herbert v. Placid Ref. 
Co., 564 So. 2d 37 1 ,  373-74 (La. Ct. App. ! st Cir.) (holding that employee stated no claim 
for negligence or negl igent interference with contract rights against drug lah that a l legedly 
negligently performed drug test, causing termination; since employee was at will. he cannot 
complain about reasons for that firing), writ denied, 569 So. 2d 981 (La. 1 990). 8111 sec 
Neel v. Citrus Lands of Louisiana, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1 299, 1 301  (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 99 3 )  
(holding that at-will employee o f  mineral lessee who lost job when lessor barred h i m  from 
land states a cause of action against that lessor for intentional interference with contractual 
relations); Neherenz v. Dunn, 593 So. 2d 9 1 5. 9 1 8  (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 992) (al lowing 
claim against drug lab whose al legedly negligent tests led to plaintiff's dismissal: plaint i ff's 
at-will status not a bar); Lewis v. Aluminum Co. of Am . .  588 So. 2d 167 (La. Ct. App. 4th 
Cir. 1 99 1 )  (same as Neherenz). As the court in lewis explained: 
Even when employment is terminable at wi ll ,  La. Civ. Code article 2747, the 
employment is a subsisting relationship. of value to the employee until it i s  
terminated. Thus while the possibility of employment termination at any time 
affects the amount of d amages sustained by the employee, it should not affect the 
employee's right of recovery. 
588 So. 2d at 1 7 1  n.4. 
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followed. 1 14 Thus, for example, the plaintiff in Mix v. University of 
New Orleans,1 1 5  a discharged employee at will alleged that his 
termination was invalid because the employer failed to follow its own 
"Grievance Procedure for Unclassified Personnel." The court of 
appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment 
in favor of the defendant, holding that the grievance procedure was not 
bargained for and instead was presented as an inducement for the 
employee to accept employment. In the court's eyes, the grievance 
procedure was nothing more than a "unilateral expression of company 
policy" or a "mere gratuity," as to which there was no "meeting of the 
minds," and thus was not binding on the employee. 1 16 The plaintiff 
could therefore be fired at any time with no procedures or reason 
required.1 17 It is particularly noteworthy that while the court in Mix 
was insistent that Louisiana's doctrine of employment at will is  based 
in civil rather than common law, and that therefore common-law 
1 1 4. See also M arson v. Northwestern State Univ., 607 So. 2d 1093, 1 09 6  (La. Ct. 
App. 3d Cir. 1992) (holding against discharged nontenured faculty member who claimed 
that notice of termination was not sent in accord with Faculty Handbook; and upholding 
summary judgment for defendant, announcing what appears to be a per se rule that, as a 
matter of law, "policy handbooks do not constitute a part of the contract per se"); Miceli v. 
Universal Health Servs. ,  Inc., 606 So. 2d 908, 9 1 0  (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.) (holding that 
employee was at will, despite language in employee handbook; court both applied 
disclaimer to find that the h andbook was not part of employee's contract, and then recited all 
of the provisions of this noncontract that the employee assertedly breached), writ denied, 
609 So. 2d 227 (La. 1 99 2) ;  Keller v. Sisters of Charity of Incarnate Word, 597 So. 2d 1 1 1 3, 
1 1 1 5  (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1 992) (holding employer's personnel manual , which laid out 
graded levels of discipline preceding termination, not to be a contract). The Keller court 
followed Thebner v. Xerox Corp., 400 So. 2d 454 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 985), writ denied, 
484 So. 2d 139 (La. 1 986), in asserting that the "elements for confection [of a contract were 
not] not present," but did not specify which element was missing. See also Gilbert v. Tulane 
Univ., 909 F.2d 1 24, 1 26 (5th Cir. 1 990) (following Wall v. Tulane Univ., 499 So. 2d 375 
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 986), writ denied, 500 So. 2d 427 (La. 1987), and holding that the 
Tulane employee handbook is not an enforceable contract). But see Cowart v. Lee, 626 So. 
2d 93, 94-96 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993) (holding that LA. R.S. 17:8 1 .5 does place some 
procedural restraints on school boards who tenninate employees, and thus removes 
employees from category of employees at will). 
1 1 5. 609 So. 2d 958 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 993).  
1 1 6. Id. at 961 (citing Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Synd., 174 La. 66,  1 39 So.  760 
( 1 932); State v. Motor, 5 5 1  P.2d 783 (Kan. 1976)). 
1 1 7. As the court stated: 'The reasons for tennination need not be accurate, fair or 
reasonable . . . .  The question of why Mix was tenninated is irrelevant and c onsequently 
raises no genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 964. 
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"exceptions" to that doctrine cannot apply, 1 1 8 the court's actual analysis 
employed common-law concepts and methodology throughout. 1 1 9 
Perhaps the ultimate expression of the lower courts' hostility to 
the claims of terminated employees can be found in the Fifth Circuit's 
recent decision in Finkle v. Majik Market.1 20 The plaintiff, a 
discharged assistant store manager, conceded that he was employed at 
will and could thus be fired without cause. 1 21 However, he contended 
that company policy and Louisiana Civil Code article 2024, the article 
which governs termination of contracts terminable at will, 1 22 both 
required that such firing be preceded by reasonable notice. The district 
court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed. In an effort to justify the failure to provide the 
employee even the minimal "notice" rights embodied in article 2024, 
the Finkle court embarked on a novel analysis, arguing that 
1 1 8.  Id. at 96 1 n. 1 .  
1 1 9. The Mix court was sensitive to the potential for conflation of common- and civil­
law authority, at least to some extent. Thus, while the court noted that the defendant had 
relied on "several excellent, well reasoned cases from around the country involving 
remarkably similar facts," i t  decli ned to rely expressly on them, except "to refute the 
contention that Louisiana policy is somehow abberrational or anachronistic." Id. at 96 1 n. I .  
However, on a deeper level, the court's implicit reliance on common-law concepts and 
reasoning is apparent. Nowhere in Mix does the court discuss the parties' contract in terms 
of "cause" or any other codal requirement for enforceability of conventional obligations; 
rather, the grievance procedure relied on by the plaintiff was held to be unenforceable 
essentially because of the lack of the common-law requirements of mutual ity or 
consideration. Nor did the court attempt to reason from the language and purpose of article 
2747, the only Civil Code article which it apparently found relevant to the dispute before it. 
Instead, the court relied solely on precedent and appeared to regard the lack of precedent 
which squarely supported the plaintiff as dispositive against him. Id. at 962-64. 
Again, it may be that the same result could have been reached through civilian analysis. 
Or perhaps not. But in either event, it is clear that the reasoning process which Louisiana 
courts have actually followed in Mix and elsewhere continues to bear all the hallmarks of its 
common-law origin. 
1 20. 628 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. I 993 ). 
1 2 1 .  Id. at 260. 
1 22.  Louisiana Civil Code article 2024 provides the following: 
ARTICLE 2024. A contract of unspecified duration may be lerminated at the will of  
either party by giving notice, reasonable in  time and form, to the other party. 
This article was added i n  I 984. However, as the revision comments make clear, the 
concept it states was not new, but rather only makes generally applicable a principle of good 
faith that had previously been embodied in other more specific code articles. LA. Clv. CODE 
ANN. art. 2024 cmts. (West 1 987). Remarkably, in light of the result in Finkle, revision 
comment (c) following article 2024 explicitly states that discharge of at-will employees is 
governed by that article: "(c) Under this Anicle. a contract for employment for an indefinite 
duration may be tenninated at the will or either party."' (Emphasis added.) 
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employment relations can be classified into three, rather than the 
traditional two, separate regimes: those in which the employment is 
for a definite term; those in which the employee is employed 
according to a contract of unspecified duration; and employees at will, 
now conceived of as a third category of employees guvemed by article 
2747 alone.123 Thus, the court accepted the defendant's argument that 
this last category of employment relations is not even contractual in 
nature, and thus article 2024 did not apply. 124 Apparently, acc ording to 
the court in Finkle, the employee just happened to show up to work 
each day, and the employer just happened to give him money each 
week, without any promise on either side or any understanding that the 
payment was in return for the performance. 
The purpose behind presenting the case law has not been to imply 
that all of the .cases reached the wrong result, or that Louisiana should 
abandon the doctrine of employment at will . Rather, the cases 
highlight two important points about the Louisiana courts ' current 
approach to these issues. First, the current approach did not develop 
organically out of the Louisiana Civil Code and was not interpreted by 
traditional civilian methods of analysis. Instead, that approach has its 
roots in common-law analysis and concepts. Although later cases 
have attempted to root their analyses in various articles of the 
Louisiana Civil Code-initially article 1 67,  later article 2746, and after 
1 961  and continuing until today, in article 2747-the historical process 
shows that the courts' analysis has been "grafted onto" rather than 
"derived from" those articles. Louisiana's adoption of absolutist 
common-law concepts of employment at will came first. The Civil 
Code was cited in support of that analysis only later. Second, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court has never definitively ruled that issues such 
as good faith or reliance on representations by employers are irrelevant 
to an analysis of employment at will in Louisiana. Although the 
absolutist tradition is strong in Louisiana, the actual holdings that 
123. Finkle, 628 So. 2d at 26 1 -62. 
124. In the court' s words: 
In this case, defendant has provided ample evidence to show that the 
relationship between it and plaintiff was simple, at-will employment. The 
affidavits of the company personnel state that plaintiff was not hired under a 
contract for an indefinite or definite term. 
Id. at 262. Cf Brannan v. \fyeth Labs, Inc. , 526 So. 2d 1 1  O l (La. 1988) (identifying article 
2024 as one of the articles of the Civil Code "pertinent to" terminatio n  of at-will 
employees). 
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embody this extreme version of the doctrine exist only among the 
courts of appeal ; the views of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal have 
never been ratified or adopted by the Louisian a  Supreme Court. 
It is not enough, however, to demonstrate that Louisiana's 
doctrine of employment at will has been shaped by common-law 
influences, or that the state's highest court has not yet definitively ruled 
on the more extreme uses to which that analysis has been put. What 
remains unclear i s  how that analysis should proceed so that it 
conforms to the terms and methodology of the Louisiana Civil Code. 
ill. ON 1HE MISINTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 1 67, 2746, AND 2747: 
WHY AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT AGREE1\1ENTS SHOULD BE TREA1ED 
LIKE ALL 0rn:ER 0BI...IGATIONS 'TERMINABLE AT WILL 
Louisiana courts have treated at-wi l l  employment contracts as 
sui generis, to be anal yzed without reference to the analysis accorded 
similar obligations terminable at wil l .  Although original ly borrowed 
from common-law sources, this specialized treatment has been 
justified by reference to certain specific Louisiana Civil Code 
articles-former article 1 67 (present article 2746) and today article 
2747-and by the implicit rule that specific coda! provisions pre vail 
over general ones. Thus, the first step in analysis must be to 
determine the importance of these articles, whether they appl y  to 
ordinary employees and, if so, whether they should be interpreted in 
a manner that subjects ordinary employees to a special ized regi me, 
one which does not apply to similar leases and convent ional 
obl i gations. 
A. Former Article 167 
Former article  1 67 can be disposed of quickly. Until its repeal 
in 1 990, that article provided the following: "Persons who h ave 
attained the age of majority cannot bind themselves for a longer term 
than ten years." 125 Because article 1 67 has been repealed, 126 it 
certainly provides no current basis for i nterpreting the re lations o f  
employers and employees according t o  a special regime. However, i t  
125. LA. CIY. CODE ANN. art. 167 (West 1972). Originally. the maximum term 
permi tted by article 167 was five years. It was amended in 1964 to extend the term to ten 
years. Act No. 355 1964 La. Acts. 
126. Act No. 705, § 1 1990 La. Acts. 
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is worth noting that even when still in effect, article 167 provided no 
justification for an absolutist approach to an employers' right to 
terminate at-will employees. Several reasons underlie this 
conclusion. First, the sources and context of article 1 67 strongly 
suggest that it was intended to apply only to "bound" servants, such 
as apprentices or indentured servants, who were considered to have 
"sold" rather than "leased" their services .  127 Second, article 1 67 was 
intended, and should have been interpreted, to protect rather than to 
justify bad faith conduct toward employees. 128 Finally, even if 
1 27. Several items of evidence converge to support the conclusion that article 167 
was intended to apply only to bound servants. First, the drafting history of the group of 
articles of which article 1 67 was a part indicates that all-including article 1 67-were 
intended to apply only t o  bound servants. Articles 1 65 through 173 were derived from 
substantially similar provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. 
arts. 157-167 ( 1 825); see supra note 34 (presenting articles 165 through 1 73). In particular, 
article 167 was a verbatim copy of a predecessor provision in  the Code of 1 825, a provision 
which had no cognate in the Digest of 1 808. LA. Crv. CODE ANN art. 160 ( 1 825). As the 
Projet for the 1 825 Civil Code made clear, these articles were all added, as a group, in order 
to conform the Code to statutory law regulating bound servants: 
We have been under the necessity of altering this chapter in order to insert in it the 
principal dispositions of the act of May 2 1 ,  1 806, entitled "an act to regulate the 
duties and rights of apprentices, & c." 
LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES: A REPUBLICATION OF THE PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 
LOUISIANA OF 1825, at 1 1  ( 1 937) [hereinafter PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA OF 
1 825). 
The plain language of articles 165 through 173 also clearly indicates that they are of 
limited application, either because they specifically refer to apprentices or "bound" servants, 
or because they would make little sense in any other context. See supra note 34 (setting out 
the full texts of the relevant articles). Thus, although the English text of article 1 67 does not 
specifically limit its application to apprentices or indentured servants, the context in which 
that article appears is certainly suggestive. 
Finally, this pervasive unity of application is particularly evident in the French texts of 
the corresponding articles of the 1 825 Civil Code, which use the verb "s'engager" to 
describe the process by which an apprentice or indentured servant becomes bound, and the 
cognate noun "engage" throughout the predecessors of the above articles to describe the 
class of servants to which they apply. The French text of the 1825 predecessor of article 
167, in particular, used this same term, "engage," to identify those servants to which it 
applied. See generally M.J.S., supra note 76, at 467 (arguing that article 1 67 should be 
understood, from its context, to apply only to bound servants). 
1 28. When the predecessor of article 167 was first inserted into the Louisiana Civil 
Code in 1825, the drafters chose to shorten the maximum term for engagement from the 
seven years permitted b y  the then-applicable statute t o  the five years originally permitted by 
the Code. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1 60 (1 825). As the drafters of the 1 825 Projet explained: 
'The term formerly permitted was seven, but it is better for the person employed to renew 
his engagement, if he thinks proper, than to be boun d  for so long a time." PROJET OF THE 
CIVIL. CODE OF LoUISIANA OF 1 825. supra note 1 27' at 1 2. 
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expansively interpreted, article 1 67 provided only that contracts for 
more than a set number of years reverted to at-will status 
thereafter.1 29 Article 1 67, by itself, limited only the permissible 
length of the contracts to which it refers. Article 167 contained no 
language suggesting how the substantive rights of employers and 
employees in at-will  relationships should be interpreted, nor 
provided any authority for interpreting such contracts differently than 
any other contract terminable at will. 
B. Article 2746 
Article 2746 likewise provides no justification for treating 
employment contracts as inherently different from other sorts of 
contracts terminable at will. That article provides the following: "A 
man can only hire out his services for a certain limited time, or for 
the performance of a certain enterprise."130 Unlike former article 
1 67,  article 27 46 remains in effect and does appear to apply to 
ordinary employees. 1 3 1  However, the drafting history132 and ultimate 
Subsequent courts and commentators have recognized the dominant purpose of article 
1 67 to protect, rather than disadvantage, employees. See, e.g., Thaxton v. Roberson, 224 So. 
2d 1 83, 1 85 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1969) (holding that since article 167 was intended to 
protect employees, i t  should not be interpreted to bar recovery, at the contract rate, for time 
an employee actually worked beyond the maximum five-year term of his contract); Recenr 
Jurisprudence, supra note 76 (discussing a plethora of civilian and Louisiana authority for 
the proposition that article 1 67 was intended only to prevent employees from being bound 
for more than five years, and not to confer any rights on the employer). 
1 29. See supra note 76 (discussion therein). 
1 30. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2746 (West 1 994). 
1 3 1 .  The grounds for distinguishing the applicability of article 2746 from that of 
former article 1 67 are at  least twofold. First is  their respective contexts. Former article 1 67 
appeared in the Code among a series of other articles which unmistakably applied only to 
apprentices, indentured servants, and the like. See supra note 1 27 (discussion therein). 
Article 2746, in contrast, is placed in Book III, Title IX, Chapter 3, the chapter which 
discusses the contractual relations of employers and employees in general. The second 
difference between article 2746 and former article l 67 is their language. Former article 1 67 
spoke of the maximum length of time for which employees may "bind themselves" 
("s 'engage," in the French version of the 1 825 predecessor), a choice of words which 
suggests some form of bound servitude. Article 2746, in contrast, speaks of the limits on a 
person 's ability to "hire out his services," ("engager ses services" in the French versio n  of 
the 1 825 predecessor), a choice which suggests a more limited, and thus more typical, kind 
of employer-employee relation. 
1 32. Current article 2746 is a verbatim copy of a predecessor in the Louisiana Civil 
Code of 1 825, which was itself copied, without substantial change, from the Louisiana 
Digest of 1808. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2717 (1 825); La. Digest of 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  art. 
56, at 382. The French text of the article was also copied verbatim from the Digest of 1 808 
to the Code of 1 825, and reads as follows: "On ne peut engager ses services qu'a terns. ou 
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sources133 of article 2746 clearly indicate that this article too was 
intended only for a limited purpose-i.e., to protect employees by 
preventing them from alienating the whole of their life's working 
capacity, an act which the original French sources of article 2746 
saw as equivalent to selling oneself into slavery. 134 At most, article 
pour une enterprise detenninee." LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  art. 56 at 383;  LA. 
CN. CODE ANN. art. 2747 (West 1 972) (notes). As can be seen, the English text is, in this 
case, an accurate translation of the French original. 
1 33. The French text of this article was copied verbatim from the French Code Civil 
of 1804, the Code Napoleon. CODE Clvn.. art. 1 780 ( 1 804); LA. Clv. CODE ANN. a11. 2746 
(West 1972) (notes). See generally Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: !rs 
Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TuL. L. REV. 4, 1 1 3 ( 1 971 ). Article I 780 of the 
French Code Civil of 1 804 was in tum derived from a somewhat differently phrased article 
of the French Projet of 1 800, the study that led to the Code Napoleon: " 1 1 1 .  On ne peut 
engager ses services qu' a  temps, et non pour la vie." PROJET DE CODE CIVIL, PRESENTE PAR 
LA COMMISSION NOMINEE PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT LE 24 THERM[J){)R AN VIII. bk. Ill ,  tit. 
XII, art. 1 1 1  (1800) [hereinafter FRENCH PROJET OF 1 800] . 
1 34. The draft version of this article as it originally appeared in the French Projet of 
1 800 made this purpose explicit because it expressly forbade enforcement of employment 
contracts "for life" ("pour la vie"). 
This understanding was also made clear in the "Observations" of the French Appellate 
Tribunals on the draft text of the Projet of 1800, and in the "Discussions" of the Conseil 
d'Etat, in which that draft text was amended and cast into its final form. Several of the 
Tribunaux d'Appel suggested that a reasonably short maximum term for employment 
contracts should be established in order to prevent employment from degenerating into a 
kind of servitude. 5 P.A FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PREPARATO!RES DE CODE 
Crvn. 84 (Paris 1836) (comments of the Tribunal d 'Orleans); 4 FENET, supra, at 209 
(comments of the Tribunal de Lyon). The Conseil d ' Etat was also clear that this was the 
reason for the provision, and that the change in terminology between the Projet of 1 800 and 
the Code Civil of 1804 was not intended to change its meaning: 
A !'occasion du louage des domestiques et ouvriers, ii etatit convenable de 
consacrer de nouveau le principe de la liberte individuelle; c'est ce que fait le 
projet en statuant qu'on ne peut engager ses services qu'a temps ou pour une 
entreprise determinee. 
4 FENET, supra, at 339. 
Yillaume, in his nineteenth century commentary of the Code Napoleon, was even more 
explicit, both as to the reason for the inclusion of this article in the Code Napoleon, and its 
intent to protect the employee. The employer, according to Villaume, gained no rights by 
virtue of this article. He wrote: 
La Joi n'admet pas comme valable !'obligation prise par un homme de 
servir toute sa vie, ce que serait contraire a la liberte naturelle et a Ia <lignite 
humaine. II en serait de meme si )'engagement etatit fait pour un temps fixe ou un 
entreprise determinee, si ce temps ou la durc�e de I' entreprise etaient assez 
considerables pour absorber la vie de celui qui s' oblige. 
Mais je ne vois pas ce qui empecherait le mfutre de s' obliger a garder un 
domestique pendant toute sa vie; dans cette convention, rien de contraire a I' ordre 
public, rien a la liberte; cet article ne s'y oppose pas; seulement, si l 'ouvrier 
manque a ses engagements, le miiitre peut le renvoyer. 
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2746 provides some authority for the proposition that contracts 
without a specific end point should be considered terminable at wi l l ;  
i t  also says nothing about whether exercise of the right to fire an at­
will employee requires good faith, or whether the right can be 
modified by contract.  
C. Article 2747 
Article 2747, i n  contrast, poses a more difficult interpretive 
challenge. Louisiana courts have relied on this article for the l ast 
thirty years to justify their absolutist approach to employment at wi l l .  
In contrast to former article 1 67 and article 2746, article 2747 does 
provide authority for an absolutist approach to an employer's right to 
fire, at least in the circumstances to which it refers. Article 2 747 
provides as follows: 
A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant attached to his person or 
family, without assigning any reason for so doing. The servant is also 
f d . h . . 135 ree to epart wit out ass1gmng any cause. 
Remarkably, although this article has been ci ted and quoted by 
Louisiana courts on many occasions, no court has expressly considered 
the question of whether article 2747 appl ies to all employees who 
work without a fixed-term contract, or rather to only a limited 
subcategory of such employees. While many courts have assumed 
without discussion that the article can be broadly applied,1.16 the plain 
language of article 2747 suggests that it does not apply to every 
employee. Instead, the article, on its face, appears to apply to only a 
restricted class of employees-to servants who are "attached to [the 
master's] person or family." The question is whether this apparently 
l imiting language should be interpreted in accord with its ostensible 
meaning. 1 37 To answer this question, it will be necessary to investigate 
the sources from which the article was drawn, the specific language 
M. F. YU!LLAUME, COMMENTAIRE ANALYTIQUE OU CODE NAPOLEON 598 (Paris 1 858). 
1 35.  LA CIY. CODE ANN. art. 2747 (West 1 988). 
1 36. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
1 3 7. I am indebted to a col league, Robert Pascal, for pointing out the significance o f  
this limiting language. Like the courts o f  Louisiana, I too read article 2747 for years without 
ever paying attention to those words or reflecting on their possible meaning. That we did so 
is  a testament to the power of a received understanding lo obscure what should have 
otherwise been obvious. That Professor Pascal perceived the plain meaning of the words i s  
a testament to the value o f  rigorous civilian scholarship an d  t o  the virtues o f  critical 
awareness of and fidelity 10 texts which such training engenders. 
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which it employs, the relation between article 2747 and other articles 
of the Louisiana Civil Code which also deal with similar categories of 
employees, and the early case law defining those special categories. 
1 .  Origin and Sources of Article 2747 
The drafting history of article 2747 is clear, although not in 
itself helpful in elucidating the meaning of the relevant phrase. 
Article 2747 has never been amended, and is thus not accompanied 
by any Revision Comments. Its text was copied verbatim from a 
predecessor article of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825, 138 which 
was itself copied from the Louisiana Digest of 1808. 1 39 Moreau­
Lislet's "source notes" to the Louisiana Digest of 1 808 do not list 
any source for the predecessor of present article 2747. 1 40 However, 
the text of the relevant article of the Louisiana Digest of 1 808 is a 
close copy from the French Projet du Gouvemement of 1 800, 141  the 
study that led to the Code Napoleon. 142 Thus, scholars have had no 
difficulty in concluding that the ultimate source of current article 
2747-like that of all the other Code articles on lease of services­
was the French Projet of 1 800143 and more broadly, the Roman and 
French legal traditions which underlay that Projet. 
1 3 8. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 27 18 (1 825). 
1 39. LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  art. 57, at 382. The English text of this 
article in the Digest is identical to current article 2747. The French text of the article­
which, as the language in which the Digest was composed, is the more authoritative-reads 
slightly differently than the English version, as follows: 
ARTICLE 57. Les domestiques attaches a la personne du mfutre, ou au service des 
maisons, peuvent etre renvoyes en tout terns sans expression de cause, et peuvent 
de meme quitter leurs mfiltres. 
140. LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra, note 3 1 ,  opp. at 382. See generally Mitchell 
Franklin, An Important Document in the History of American Roman and Civil Law: The 
de la Vergne Manuscript, 33 TuL. L. R.Ev. 35 ( 1958) (describing the discovery and initial 
evaluation of the de la Vergne manuscript) ; Robert Pascal, A Recent Discovery: A Copy of 
the "Digest of the Civil l.Aws" of 1808 with Marginal Source References in Moreau-Lislet's 
Hand, 26 LA. L. REV. 25 (1 965) (describing the discovery of and evaluating another volume 
apparently containing the original draft of Moreau-Lislet's notes). 
1 4 1 .  FRENCH PROJET OF 1 800, supra note 133, bk. III, tit. XII, art. 1 1 2. 
142. Interestingly, the relevant article from the French Projet of 1800 was never 
incorporated into the Code Napoleon, or into any subsequent version of the French Code 
Civil. It lives today only in the Civil Code of Louisiana. See infra notes 1 6 1 - 1 66 and 
accompanying text. 
143 .  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2747 (West 1972) (notes); Batiza, supra note 1 33, at 
1 1 3. 
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a. The Anci enne Regime: Of Rome and Pothier 
A central institution of Roman private law was the "family," an 
expansive concept that included not just blood and adoptive 
relations, but also the servants and retainers attached to the family. 
All who lived within and as part of that extended family-sons, 
slaves, and everyon e  in  between-lived under the originally absolute 
and always substantial power of the paterfamilias, who alone owned 
and disposed of family property.144 Productive labor was generally 
performed within the context of the nearly self-sufficient household 
and by its members. For this reason, the lease of labor or services by 
nonfamily outsiders,  though recognized at Roman law,145 w as a 
relatively rare and unimportant institution, one which was never well 
articulated or developed in Roman law. 146 It is clear, however, that 
Roman law maintained an important distinction between workers 
who resided within the master's household and were subject to his 
general authority, and workers who were not part of the household 
and whose relations to the paterfamilias were solely contractual m 
nature. 147 
1 44. As one commentator has stated: 
The word Familia has many meanings, but in  its strict sense it denotes a 
group consisting of a paterfamilias and those under his control, i.e., his children, 
adoptive or natural, who have not passed out of the family by emancipation or the 
like, remoter issue through males, in the same case, the wife, . . .  civil bondsmen 
and slaves. 
WllLJAM W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 1 02 
( 1 92 1 ); see also HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 1 35-46 (Legal Classics Library ed. 1 982); 
BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 65-67 ( 1 962). 
1 45.  This lease could take one of two forms: the locatio conductio operarum, in 
which the worker, as lessor, places his services at the disposal of the employer, as lessee; and 
the locatio conductio operis, in which the employer, as lessor, places out a piece of work to 
be done (the worker, as lessee, in effect leases the job). Interestingly, only certain forms of 
work-those relatively laborious, menial or "illiberal" arts which could be valued in 
money-could be the subject of the locatio. Exercise of the "liberal arts" such as the 
services of an attorney, were not considered appropriate for lease. See generally BUCKLAND, 
supra note 144, at 500-03; L. B. CURZON, ROMAN LAW 1 52-54 ( 1 966); NICHOLAS, supra 
note 144, at 1 82-83. 
1 46. Wll1JAM BUCKLAND, ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 276 
( 1 9 1 2) ("In view of the large part which locatio plays in  modem life, and it seems, must 
have played at Rome, the paucity of our information in the texts is somewhat surprising."); 
NICHOLAS, supra note 1 44, at 1 83-84; Thomas Tucker, Sources of Louisiana 's Law of 
Persons: Blackstone, Domat and the French Codes, 44 TUL. L. REY. 264, 268-69 ( 1 970). 
1 47. Tucker, supra note 146, at 268-69. 
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The law of pre-revolutionary France was broadly similar to that 
of Rome. Although the family no longer held unquestioned primacy 
as the organizing principle of civil society in pre-revolutionary 
France, 148 members of the household still performed much work 
within the context of the household. Lease of services, though still 
recognized, continued to be a relatively undeveloped category of legal 
analysis. 149 Jurists of the time typically discussed the overall topic of 
leases and hires almost entirely in the context of leases of things, and 
generally dealt with problems arising out of the lease of services only 
as relatively minor specifications of or deviations from the basic rules 
governing leases in general . 150 It appears, however, that the important 
148. See, e.g., I JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER , tit. 2, § 2, at 
1 4 1 -42 (Luther Cushing trans., William Strahan ed., 1 85 3 )  (noting that the Roman-derived 
distinction between fathers and sons remained important as a basis for French law, but 
adding that new distinctions among persons unknown to Roman law-such as those 
regarding the nobility, burgesses, and vassals-had also become important as well). 
149.  One French commentator summed it up this way: 
Our ancient authors, with Pothier at their head, were not concerned with the 
letting of work; they did not detennine either its nature, nor its conditions, nor its 
effects, and there are two reasons for that: ( I )  the Roman law could not serve 
them as a guide, having known only servile work; (2) under the ancient monarchy, 
industrial work was subjected either to a corporative regime regulated by interior 
rules of the corps of industry, or to the regime of privileged manufacturers, the 
first form of big industry, governed by royal ordinances. All that was considered 
as a matter of policy, much more than of law. And the jurists, such as Pothier, 
found as submitted to juristic principles, only the hiring of domestics, a small and 
infertile matter, especially at that time. 
2 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL No. 1 828, at 102 (Louisiana State 
Law Institute, 1 1 th ed. 1 93 9 ,  1 959); see also Tucker, supra note 146, at 273. 
1 50. Thus, for example, Domat's treatment of leases of services was limited to such 
specialized issues as the degree of care which the worker must exercise with regard to the 
employer's property, the special duties of carriers and w atermen, allocating the risk when the 
project is destroyed before completion, and the liability of the employer for wages under 
various eventualities. DOMAT, supra note 148, bk. I, tit. IV, §§ 8 & 9, at 278-83 . Domat 
treated the issue of lease of property, especially real property, first and most extensively. 
Only the two relatively short sections of his treatise noted above dealt with the location 
operarum, the leases of services. 
Pothier, in his treatise on leases, wrote extensively about leases of labor or industry 
only in two places. The more lengthy of the two treatments, Part Seven of the treatise, dealt 
with the locatio operis, the letting and hiring of a piece of work. Though important, the 
legal relationship contemplated in this Part was more akin to what we would classify as the 
relationship between a principal and an independent contractor, rather than that existing 
between an employer and an employee. ROBERT POTHIER, TREATISE ON THE CONTRACT OF 
LETTING AND HIRING §§ 392-457, at 146-7 1 (G.A. Mulligan trans., 1 953). That latter 
relationship, conceptualized as the letting or hiring of services by a worker to an employer 
(locatio operarum), was discussed by Pothier in only a single article of thirteen sections. 
The only issues discussed in that article were the questions of whether and to what extent 
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distinction between  servants who were members of the employer's 
household and those who only leased their labor was maintained. 
Thus, for example, Pothier, in his limited discussion of the lease of 
services, seems to speak of at least two different types of persons who 
enter into such leases, distinguishing between serviteurs or 
domestiques (domestic or personal servants) and ouvriers (workers or 
artisans ) . 1 5 1 Pothier also clearly distinguished between servants who 
live with the master and those who do not, stating, for example, that a 
master must ordinarily pay wages to servants of the former class even 
when the servants are ill and cannot work, but that the master owes no 
similar obligation to servants of the latter class. 152 
More important for purposes of this article, however, Pothier 
specifically noted that while it was customary to hire farmworkers or 
artisans for a fixed period, the custom of the time permitted masters to 
discharge servants who "serve the person of their master" at any time, 
without cause or liability. Section 176 of Pothier's treatise states: 
To hire servants for fixed periods is customary in the case of rural 
servants, such as plough-men, vintagers, millers, etc. and also in the 
case of farm-maids. Hirings for fixed periods are likewise customary 
general principles regarding the remission of rent should be applied to the analogous 
problem of remission of wages in situations where an employee is unable to perform the 
tasks assigned. POTHIER, supra, §§ 1 65- 1 77, at 65-69. 
1 5 1 .  POTHIER, supra note 1 50, §§ 1 65- 1 78,  at 92-98; see Tucker, supra note 1 46, at 
274 (quoting POTIIlER, supra note 1 50, § 10. Tucker read Pothier as distinguishing between 
three types of servants: 
Whenever the lease of services was distinguished in Pothier's Traite from 
the lease of a thing, i t  was only with reference to the three sorts of servants 
mentioned [in § 1 0, "serviteurs et servantes," "manouvres," and "artisans"], 
though the tenn, serviteur, seems to have been used interchangeably with 
domestique, and manouvres with ouvriers. These are the same three referred to i n  
the Projet [of 1 800], which used domestique, ouvrier, and ouvrier artiste. 
Tucker, supra note 146, at 274. 
1 52. Pothier wrote: 
Now, one can say that our servants, living with us, are in our service, even 
while they are ill, and that they do not cease to be in our service, nor cease to be 
able to describe themselves as being our servants. This cannot, however, have any 
application to a contract of lease, for when a man lets me his services for a year 
for a certain sum, the sum which I undertake to pay h i m, is intended by both of us 
to be a wage for the actual services he is to render, and not to be a consideration 
paid to him for merely occupying the position of servant: he must have rendered 
me the services or have been in a position to do so during the whole of the period 
of his contract. The cases are, therefore, not parallel . . . .  
POTHIER, supra note 1 50, § 168,  at 66-67. 
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in towns in the case of artisans. But as to servants who let their 
services to persons in town of the bourgeois class, or in the country to 
members of the nobility to serve the person of their master; though 
suchlike services are let at so much per annum, they are nevertheless 
considered to be let only for such time as it may please the masters to 
retain them. That is why masters can dismiss at will such servants, 
without giving a reason, and paying them only up to the date of 
dismissal. 1 53 
Notably, Pothier was equally clear that the freedom to terminate the 
relationship did not apply in both directions.154 The second 
paragraph of § 1 76 stated that house and family retainers, though 
subject to dismissal at any time, were not free to quit before the end 
of their term. Pothier wrote: 
These servants, however, are not allowed to leave their master's 
service without his permission, and if they do they will be ordered by 
the Court to return and to remain in their master's service, either until 
the day of the next term up to which it is customary in the locality to 
hire servants, or during such a period of time as will be sufficient to 
enable the master to obtain another servant, this period to be 
detennined by the judge. In this matter the various customs of the 
various localities must be observed. 155 
Regardless of how one might view this l ack of mutuality, the crucial 
point is that for Pothier, it is only a special, limited custom which 
pertains only to limited classes of servants who perform d omestic 
tasks within the household or who are otherwise attached to the 
1 53. Id. § 176, at 69. The distinctions which Pothier draws-between industrial 
workers ("ouvriers") and farmworkers ("serviteurs de campagne") on the one hand, and 
domestic or personal servants ("service de la personne du maitre") on the other-are more 
evident in the French text: 
Ces louages de services pour un temps detennine sont d'usage a l'egard des 
serviteurs de campagne, tels que Jes serviteurs de labour, de vignerons,  de 
meuniers, etc., !es servantes de cour. Ils sont aussi d' usage dans Jes villes a 
l'egard des ouvriers. A l'egard des serviteurs qui louent leurs services aux 
bourgeois des villes ou meme a la campagne aux gentilshommes pour le service 
de la personne du mfutre; quoiqu'ils !es louent a raison de tant par an, ils sont 
neanmoins censes ne les louer que pour le temps qu' ii plaira au mil.itre de les avoir 
a son service. C' est pourquoi le maitre peut !es renvoyer quand bon lui semble, et 
sans en dire la raison, en leur payant leurs services jusqu'au jour qu'ils les 
renvoie. 
1 54. ROBERT PonIIER, OUVRES DE POTHIER: ThAITE DU CONTRAT DE LoUAGE ET 
TRArrE DES CHEPTELS § 1 76, at 97 (Nouvelle ed., 1806). 
155. POTHIER, supra note 150, § 176, at 69. 
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person of the master that gives the master the right to dismiss such 
servants at will with out assigning a reason and without incurring  any 
l iability for future wages. Moreover, since Pothier found it necessary 
to state that domestics subject to dismissal at will could nonetheless 
be required to remain at service "until the day of the next term up to 
which it is customary in the locality to h ire servants," it is clear that 
the employer's unilateral right to discharge the servant at will would 
apply even if the servant and master had entered into a contract 
which, by custom or otherwise, contemplated a set term of 
employment. In other words, for Pothier, the kind of "employment 
at will" contemplated in § 1 76 is not the converse of employment for 
a fixed term. It is,  rather, a limited exception to the general rules 
governing lease of services-an exception that applies regardless of 
whether those services are let by the day or by the year, but one that 
applies to only a very limited class of employees. 
b .  The French  Projet of 1 800 
The French Projet de Code Civil of 1 800156 continued these 
distinctions, embodying them in a series of articles which retained 
the traditional differentiations among types of servants noted by 
Pothier. Those articles appear to have been carefully drafted to 
maintain a distinction between three types of workers: domestiques, 
ouvriers, and ouvriers artiste (artisans) . 1 57 More specifically, the 
Projet carefully and clearly distinguished between two types of 
domestiques: those who were "attached to the person of the master, 
or to service of the house," who could quit or be dismissed at will 
1 56. FRENCH PROJET OF 1 800, supra note 1 33.  
1 57. In addition to the articles quoted in the text, section 1 1 6  articulates a special rule 
of nonliability for a limited class of artisans ("ouvriers artiste") employed by the day. 
Section 1 1 6 states in part: "1 1 6. L' ouvrier artiste employe a la joumee, n' est pas tenu de la 
mal-fa�on de son ouvrage." FRENCH PROJET OF 1 800, supra note 1 33, art. 1 1 6. See 
generally M. F. VU!Ll.AUME, COMMENTAIRE ANALYTIQUE DU CODE NAPOLEON art. 1 780, at 
598 ( 1 855) (distinguishing between domestiques and ouvriers). Yuillame wrote: 
Je crois que I' o n  doit donner la qualification de domestiques aux serviteurs 
a gages qui donnent leurs SOinS a Ja personne OU au menage, OU qui aident dans Jes 
travaux agricoles, qui logent et vivent dans la maison. 
La denominatio n  d'ouvriers est donnee aux gens de travail qui louent leurs 
services a tant par jour, ou dont la profession est classee panni Jes arts 
mecaniques. 
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without cause; and those who worked in other capacities, who could 
not: 
1 12. Les domestiques attaches a la personne du maitre, OU au 
service des maisons, peuvent etre renvoyes en tout temps sans 
expression de cause, et peuvent de meme quitter leurs maitres. 
1 13. Les domestiques attaches a la culture, Jes servantes de cour, les 
ouvriers artistes, ne peuvent ni quitter leurs maitres, ni etre renvoyes 
par eux, avant le temps convenu, que pour le cause grave. 
1 14. Si, hors le cas de cause grave, le maitre renvoie son 
domestique ou son ouvrier avant le temps convenu, ii doit Jui payer le 
salaire entier de l ' annee, ou du temps pour lequel ii l' avait loue, 
deduction faite de la somme que le domestique ou l'ouvrier pourra 
vraisemblablement gagner ailleurs, pendant le temps qui reste a courir. 
1 1 5. Si c' est le domestique ou I' ouvrier qui quitte sans cause 
legitime, ii doit etre condarnne, envers le maitre, a une indemnite qui 
est fixee sur ce qu' il en coute de plus au maitre pour obtenir d'un autre 
les mernes services. 1 58 
The Projet took at least a small step in the direction of egalitarianism 
by providing that the servants attached to the master 's person or 
household were as free to quit as the master was free to discharge 
them.1 59 However, the Projet, like Planiol, made it clear that only 
that limited class of house or personal servants was subject to this 
absolute rule of termination at will. As the articles quoted above 
make clear, other types of domestics, like other workers or artisans, 
were not covered by article 1 1 2 and thus could neither quit nor be 
fired without good cause before the expiration of their terms of 
employment.160 Nor would there be any basis in Pothier or the Projet 
1 58. FRENCH PROJET OF 1 800, supra note 133,  arts. 1 1 2- 1 1 5. 
1 59. Note, however, that not all vestiges of class distinction were eliminated from the 
Projet's treatment of these issues. For example, the Projet provided that the master's 
affirmation was to be considered conclusive in any dispute over the amount of a servant's 
wages or over what sums, if any, were due to that servant. Id. art. 1 10. 
1 60. This point was also made explicitly in the "Observations" of the Tribunal de 
Colmar, one of the appellate courts which made official comments on the draft text of the 
Projet of 1800. That tribunal expressed concern that article 1 1 2 made no express provision 
for payment of wages due to dismissed house and personal servants. While article 1 1 3  did 
include such a provision, the Tribunal de Colmar decided that article 1 13  would not apply to 
house and personal servants of the sort referred to in article 1 1 2: 
L'article 1 1 2  et suivans traitent des domestiques. Le premier porte que Jes 
domestiques attaches a la personne du mfutre ou au service des maisons peuvent 
etre renvoyes, en tout temps, sans expression de cause, et peuvent de meme quitter 
leurs mfutres; mais ii ne statue pas sur le mode de paiement de leurs gages. Les 
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to argue that leases of services for an indeterminate term by other 
types of domestics or ordinary workers would be treated any 
differently than any other form of lease for an indeterminate term. 
The rationale for such a tradition of exceptional treatment of 
house or body servants seems reasonably self-evident. As Roman and 
traditional law recognized, family or personal retainers effectively 
constituted a part of the master's family. Such retainers, and those 
whom they serve, participate in a relationship that presupposes and 
requires a unique kind of intimacy and trust. As Pothier and the 
French Projet of 1 800 seem to have recognized, such an intimate 
relationship cannot subsist in the absence of mutual trust. 
Despite these policy arguments, however, the articles quoted 
above were not ultimately incorporated into the French Civil Code, 
which was adopted in 1 804.161 The reasons for this rejection are not 
entirely clear. The collected Observations of the Tribunal de 
Cassations and the Tibunaux d' Appel on the proposed text of the 
Projet contain few references to the relevant articles, none of which 
shed light on why the articles were dropped. 162 In addition, the 
articles suivans contiennent des dispositions a cet egard; mais comme ils ne 
parlent que des domestiques attaches a culture, on pourrait dire que le mode de 
paiement de ceux-ci n'est pas applicable aux domestiques dont parle !'article 1 1 2. 
II serait bon, par consequent, que la Joi s'expliquat plus particulierement. 
3 FENET, supra note 1 34,  at 491 .  
I t  i s  also interesting t o  note that the Tribunal d e  Nancy suggested that articles 1 1 2  
through 1 1 5  should be combined into a single article, which would have subjected all 
employees who work for wages to a single, unilateral regime: All wage earners could be 
fired at-will by their employer, but none could quit without good cause. 4 FENET, supra note 
1 34, at 616. This suggestion was never acted on. However, the fact that it was made further 
demonstrates that the regimes contemplated by articles 1 1 2 and by 1 13 through 1 1 5  apply to 
different categories of servants, not just different types of contracts. 
1 6 1 .  The French Civil Code of 1804, the Code Napoleon, retained only two of the 
Projet's articles concerning workers and domestics in general: 
1 780. On ne peut engager ses services qu' a  temps, ou pour une entreprise 
determinee. 
1781.  Le miiitres est cru sur son affirmation, Pour las quotite des gages; 
Pour le paiement du salaire de I' annee echue; Et pour Jes a-comptes donnes pour 
I' annee courante. 
CODE CrvIL arts. 1 780, 1 78 1  ( 1 804). Plainly, none of these articles deal with issues 
regarding the tenninability of leases of services. 
1 62. Other than the comments of the Tribunals of Colmar and Nancy (see supra note 
1 60), the observations relevant to the articles discussed here were few and relatively 
nonsubstantive: ( I )  the Tribunal de Cassation suggested only that article 1 14 be amended to 
deny employers the benefit of a deduction for wages that the unreasonably discharged 
employee could earn elsewhere, 2 FENET, supra note 1 34, at 732; (2) the Tribunal de 
1 566 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
relevant articles already had been deleted from the later draft which 
was discussed and amended by the Conseil d'Etat. 163 Nevertheless, 
one can at least sunnise, with Planiol, both that the egalitarian and 
individualist thrust of the French revolution made legal distinctions 
based on personal status unpalatable,164 and that the simultaneous 
enactment of an extensive industrial law by the Consulate rendered 
unnecessary any detailed codal treatment of the rights and duties of 
employers and employees. 165 
Finally, it is worth noting that the common law of England, 
though starting from different basic principles, had given rise to a 
similar distinction between those servants who are and those who are 
not part of the master's household. Thus, for example, Blackstone 
distinguished between "menial servants; so called from bein g  intra 
Montpelier and the Tribunal de Toulouse both suggested that articles 1 1 4 and 1 1 5 should be 
amended to provide for liquidated damages equivalent to a set fraction of the annual salary, 
4 FENET, supra note I 34, at 462; 5 FENET, supra note 1 34, at 623; (3) the Tribunal de Paris 
wanted to substitute the term "artisans" for "ouvriers artistes" in articles 1 1 3  and 1 1 6, 5 
FENET, supra note 1 34, at 277; (4) the Tribunal de Poitiers wanted to add a provision to 
article 1 1 2 limiting any indellUlity due to masters whose servants leave (or to servants 
terminated without cause), 5 id. at 3 1 7; and (5) the Tribunal de Rauen noted only that police 
regulations would be required to carry out the purposes of article 1 1 2, id. at 543. 
I 63. 4 FENET, supra note 1 34, at 23 1 -32, 255-56, 287-88, 303-04 (recording the 
proceedings during which a draft of the Code Civil--one which did not include any of the 
Projet articles quoted in the text-was discussed and amended by the Conseil d 'Etat). 
Despite the absence of an equivalent to Projet article I 1 2, some comments indicate that the 
Conseil d'Etat also understood that legal distinctions n eeded to be made between "domestic 
servants" and ordinary "workers." Id. at 255 (quoting M. Defennon that "Jes regles relatives 
aux ouvriers ne sont pas Jes memes que celles qui concernent !es domestiques"); see also id. 
at 320- 2 1 ,  339 (stating the "Communication Officielle Au Tribunal" which accompanied the 
transmission of the final amended draft of the Code Ci vi 1 to the French General Assembly). 
1 64. See, e.g., 1 Pl.ANIOL, supra note 149, at No. 584 (commenting on the 
applicability of other provisions of the Civil Code, which established the domicile of a 
servant as that of his master). Planiol suggested: 
First of all, it is necessary that the person really work in the capacity o f  a 
domestic, though it is not designated as such in the Code, through scruples 
probably, but which it describes is beyond a doubt. The coda! text is addressed to 
persons who serve or work habitually for another person and who Jive with him 
and in the same house. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Tucker, supra note 146, at 275. But see CODE Crvn.. art. I 78 1 
( 1 804) (depriving servants of the opportunity to be heard to contest masters' affirmations 
regarding the amount and payment of their wages). See generally infra notes 1 85-2 1 9  and 
accompanying text. 
1 65.  2 PI.ANIOL, supra note 1 49, at No. 1 829 (discussing the Jaw of 22 Germinal, 
Year �I). Since that time, the law governing the relations of employers and employees has 
been, m France, governed almost completely by statute rather than by the Civil Code. 
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. "166 d "l b h l h' d b moema, or omest1cs, an a orers, w o are on y tre y the day 
or week, and do not live intra moenia, as part of the family."167 
Although Blackstone was apparently not the direct source of those 
provisions of the Louisiana Digest of 1 808 that dealt specifically with 
leases of services,  it is clear that the drafters of the Digest were 
familiar with his work and relied on it in drafting other portions o f  that 
Digest, 168 including several articles relating to the relations of masters 
and servants. 1 69 
c. Louisian a  Digest and Civil Codes: Incorporation and 
Early Interpretation 
While the French Projet of 1800 had only a limited influence on 
the ultimate shape of employer-employee relations in France, i t  was 
the source of Louis iana's law of lease of services. The drafters of the 
Louisiana Digest o f  1 808 adhered closely  but not exactly to the text 
of the French Proj et, writing as follows: 
Art. 57. Les domestiques attaches a la personne du mai'tre, OU a u  
service des maisons, peuvent etre renvoyes e n  tout temps sans 
expression de cause, et peuvent de meme quitter leurs maitres . 
Art. 58. Les personnes qui ont l oue leurs services sur les 
habitations, OU dans toutes autres manufactures pour y etre employees 
ax travail qui say font, ne peuvent ni quitter le proprietaire auquel i ls  
sont loues, n i  etre renvoyes par eux avant le  terns convenu, que pour 
cause grave. 
Art. 59. Si hors le cas de cause grave, le proprietaire renvoie la 
personne qui lui a loue ses services, ainsi qu ' i l  marque en ! ' article 
precedent, avant ! 'expiration du temps convenu, ii doit lui payer le 
salaire entier de l ' annee, ou du temps pour lequel i i  l 'avait loue. 
Art. 60. Si c 'est au contraire la personne qui a engage ainsi scs 
services, qui quitte le proprietaire, sans cause legitime, ii perdra le 
salaire pour le terns qui s 'est ecoule jusqu' alors sur son engagement. 
1 66. 1 WlUJAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425. 
1 67. Id. at *426- *27. 
1 68. Batiza. supra note 1 33. at 1 2. 45. 6 1 -62 (crediting Blackstone's COMMEl'fTARIL'i 
as an imponant source of twenty-five articles of the Louisiana Digest of 1 808. including 
articles on the application and construction of laws and the law of corporations). 
1 69. Id. at 5 1  (crediting Blackstone as the sole source of Book I, Title VI. a11iclcs 8-
14 of the Louisiana Digest of 1 808. which dealt with the rights and duties of indentured 
servants and the effects o f  the master-servant relationship on rhird pa!1ies). 
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ou sera oblige de restituer au proprietaire ce qu'il aura re(j:u de lui 
d'avance sur l'annee courante, ou sur le terns de l'engagement. 170 
The changes made by the drafters of the Louisiana Digest from the 
text of the French Projet of 1 800 appear to have been both 
intentional and meaningful .  In particular, it is noteworthy that the 
Louisiana draftsmen retained the terminology of the Projet only in 
article 57 of the Digest of 1808, using the traditional terms 
"domestique" and "ma'itre" only when speaking of those servants 
"attaches a la personne du maftre, ou au service des maisons," who 
can be terminated at will. In all other contexts, terms such as 
"personne qui ant Laue [or engage1 leurs services" and 
"proprietaire" were used. The obvious implication is that the 
Louisiana draftsmen i ntended, by their c hoice of terms, to reinforce 
the limiting language of article 57, namely, that article 57 applied 
only to a limited c l ass of servants who form part of the master's 
extended family by living in his home and rendering personal or 
household services while there. 17 1  The English version of the 
Louisiana Digest of 1 808, a translation of the original and 
authoritative French text, made the same distinctions that were made 
in the French version, using the terms "servant" where the French 
text used "domestique," "laborer" where the French text used 
"personne qui ant loue [or engagel leurs services," and generally, 
"proprietor" or "employer" where the French text  used 
"proprietaire."172 This choice of English terminology may have been 
1 70. LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  arts. 57-60, at 383. 
1 7 1 .  This implication is strengthened by the use made of the term "domestique" 
elsewhere in the Louisiana Digest of 1808. As is discussed in more detail at note 2 1 1 ,  infra, 
the French text of Book I of the 1 808 Digest defines "free servants" as including 
"domestiques de maison." LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 34, art. III, at 37. 
1 72. In English, articles 57 through 60 provided as follows: 
Article 57. A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant attached to his person or 
family, without assigning any reason for so doing. The servant is also free to 
depart without assigning any cause. 
Article 58. Labourers who hire themselves out to serve on plantations or to work 
in manufactures, have not the right of leaving the person who has hired them, nor 
can they be sent away by the proprietor, until the time has expired during which 
they had agreed to serve, unless good and just causes can be assigned. 
Article 59. If, without any just ground of complaint, a man should send away a 
labourer whose services he has hired for a certain time, before that time has 
expired, he shall be bound to pay to said labourer, the whole of the salaries which 
he would have been entitled to receive, had the full term of his services arrived 
whether said labourer was hired by the month or by the year. 
' 
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unfortunate, however. Because of the broader meaning which the 
common law has often assigned to the term "servant," using the term 
to refer to any sort of employee inadvertently increased the potential 
for future misinterpretation. 
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825 maintained these distinctions, 
re-enacting both the French and the English texts of these articles 
without official comment173 and without substantial change.174 The 
Louisiana Civil C ode of 1 870, which was promulgated only in 
English, reproduced only the English version of these articles (though 
again without substantial change) yielding articles 2747 through 2750 
as they exist today. 1 75 
Louisiana cases from the nineteenth century clearly indicate that 
the predecessors of present article 2747 were originally understood in 
the traditional manner-as applying only to a narrowly defined 
category of servants. Thus, the article was held to be applicable to the 
claims of a household cook176 (but not to the claims of an attomey1 77), 
Article 60. But if, on the other hand, a labourer, after having hired out his 
services, should leave his employer, before the time of his engagement has 
expired, without having any just cause of complaint against said employer, the 
labourer shall then forfeit all the wages that may be due to him and shall moreover 
be compelled to repay all the money he may have received either as due for his 
wages or in advance thereof on the running year or on the time of his engagement. 
LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  arts . 57-60, at 382. 
1 73.  The Projet of 1 823, the document which formed the basis of the Louisiana Civil 
Code of 1825, suggested many changes from its predecessor, the Louisiana Digest o f  
1 808-including several changes t o  other articles involving the lease of services. However, 
that Projet made no reference to the particular articles under investigation here. Those 
articles were instead simply i ncorporated, without discussion, from the 1808 Digest. PROJET 
OF THE CNil.. CODE OF LoUISIANAOF 1 825, supra note 1 27, at 325-26. 
1 74. LA. CN. CODE ANN. arts. 2747-2750 (West 1 972). 
1 75. See supra notes 42-44. 
1 76. Bethmont v. Davis, I I  Mart. [o.s.J 195 (La. 1 822). 
1 77. Orphan Asylu m  v. Mississippi Marine Ins. Co., 8 La. 1 8 1  ( 1835). The plaintiff, 
an attorney, had a contract to represent the defendant for one year. He was dismissed after 
two-and-a-half months, and sued for the balance of his contractual salary. The trial court 
held that the attorney could be discharged at will under the authority of article 27 1 8, the 
predecessor of current article 2747. The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed: 
[WJe are unable to admit [the correctness of the district court's opinion] 
without relinquishing our understanding of language and opinions touching the 
relations of men in civil society, counselors and attorneys are admitted to the 
profession of law, o n  the supposition of learning and integrity. To place them in 
the precise category of menial and domestic servants, appears to us would be 
incongruous and unauthorized by the law. 
Id. at 1 84 (emphasis added). 
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178 • ·1 t 179 f a supenntendent o a commerc1 usmess or a nver p1 o ,  none o 
whom were found to fall into the category of "menial and domestic 
servants."180 
Cases from that era make it equally clear that article 2747's 
predecessors were understood in the manner of Pothier-as 
establishing not the converse of employment for a fixed term, but 
rather a narrow exception to the ordinary rules governing the ordinary 
relations of employers and employees, an exception that would permit 
termination at will even if the domestic servant was hired according to 
a contract of fixed length. For example, in Bethmont v. Davis, 18 1  the 
Louisiana Supreme Court considered the claims of a French cook, who 
entered into a contract by which he was to leave France, travel to the 
defendant's home in New Orleans, and there serve as a cook for 
eighteen months. After some months, the defendant discharged the 
plaintiff, apparently without cause. The trial court rejected the 
plaintiff's claim for his salary for eighteen months, awarding him only 
a salary for the period he had actually worked, apparently on the 
ground that the predecessor of article 2747 permitted summary 
discharge of domestics whether or not there was a contract of definite 
length. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning: 
Our Code declares, that a man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant, 
attached to his person or family, without assigning any reason for it. 
This argument cannot be shaken by the argument so strongly enforced 
by plaintiff's counsel; that in the present case the parties had contracted 
for a longer time. Because it is precisely for cases of this kind that we 
must presume the law to have been made.182 
178. Beckman v. New Orleans Cotton Press Co.,  1 2  La. 67 ( 1838) (holding that 
contract of superintendent of defendant's business was governed not by the predecessor of 
article 2747, but rather by articles 27 1 9, 2720, and 272 1 of the 1 825 Code (current articles 
2748-2750)). 
1 79.  Shoemaker v. H. & L. Bryan, 12 La. Ann. 697 (La. 1 857). The plaintiff was the 
pilot of a river steamer. The court held that he could not be discharged without cause before 
the end of his contract, arguing that article 2720 (predecessor to current 2749) applies "to all 
persons, except menial servants, who hire out their services for a fixed period . . . . " Id. at 
698 (citing Angelloz v. Rivollet, 2 La. Ann. 652 (1 847) (noting that article 2720, rather than 
article 27 19, applies to claims of person hired to accompany defendant to Louisiana to aid 
her in recovering an inheritance); Decamp v. Hewitt, 1 1  Rob. 290 (La. 1 845) (holding 
claims of salesman governed by 2720); Lartigue v. Peet, 5 Rob. 91 (La. 1 843) (holding 
claims of bookkeeper governed by 2720)). 
1 80. Orphan Asylum v. Mississippi Marine Ins. Co., 8 La. 18 1 ,  184 ( 1 835). 
1 8 1 .  11 Mart. [o.s.] 195 (La. 1 822). 
1 82.  Id. at 198-99. 
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By contrast, in Orphan Asylum v. Mississippi Marine Insurance 
C 1 83 h Lo 
. 
. s o. , t e msiana upreme Court held that an attorney is not a 
"menial or domestic servant" of the sort contemplated by the 
predecessor to current article 2747, and that therefore his fixed-term 
contract had to be enforced according to its terms.184 
In short, the original Roman, French, and common-law sources 
of article 27 4 7, the words chosen by the drafters of the article, and the 
original case law interpreting it, demonstrate that article 2747 was 
never intended or understood to apply as broadly as modem courts 
have applied it. Rather, article 2747 was intended only as a specific 
exception to otherwise applicable law, an exception that applies only 
to a narrow class of domestic-that is to say, household and 
personal-servants who reside and work within the family of those 
whom they serve. 
2. Article 2747 in Context: Concepts of "Domestic" and "Servant" 
in Other Articles of the Louisiana Civil Code 
A number of sources reinforce by analogy the conclusion that 
article 2747 should be interpreted narrowly. The sources include 
Book III, Title XXI, which establishes the privilege enjoyed by 
certain "servants" for satisfaction of wage claims; Book I, Title VI, 
which describes the various types of "servant" as well as the impact 
of those relations on third parties; and Book III, Title XXIV, which 
1 83.  Orphan Asylum, 8 La. at 1 8 1 .  
1 84. In the court's words: 
Any license given to parties bound by contracts to dissolve the obligation 
arising from them at the will of either, forms an exception to the general rule of 
inviolability which should prevail in  all agreements legally made between 
individuals. The attorney employed by the defendants in the present case, does 
not come within any exception to the general rule; he and those under him have 
therefore a right to c l ai m  its benefit. 
Id. at 1 85 .  
Soon after Orphan Asylum was decided, the law became clear that an attorney can be 
dismissed at will, and that such an attorney has only a claim for quantum meruit for services 
already rendered. However, that result was not based on any claim that attorneys arc 
governed by article 2747 or its predecessors. Rather, the analysis came to be that attorneys 
are not lessors of services or "employees" of any sort; racher they are agents. governed by 
the Civil Code articles concerning mandate. See, e.g. , Gurley v. City of New Orleans. 4 1  La. 
Ann. 75, 5 So. 659-6 1 (La. 1 889). But see In re Dissolucion of Mosquito Hawks, Inc . .  I 09 
So. 2d 8 1 5, 8 19-20 (La. Ct. App. Ori. Cir. 1959) (following Orphan Asylum in holding that 
an attorney is nol covered by article 2747, and chat cherefore article 2749 and rules applying 
to ordinary laborers apply). 
1 572 TULANE IA W REVIEW [Vol.  69 
relates to prescription. All reaffirm the conclusions drawn above as 
to the meaning of article 2747, and as to the identity of the l imited 
class of "domestiques" to which article 2747 was intended to refer. 
a. Analogies from Book ill, Title XXI: Servants Entitled to 
Privilege 
The closest analogue in the current Code to the language of 
article 2747 can be found in Book ill, Title XXI, which establishes a 
system of special privileges entitling specific classes of creditors to a 
preference in satisfying their claims out of their debtors' assets . 185 
Among those entitle d  to a general privilege on movables are certain 
domestic servants who live with and work for the master's family. 
Articles 3 1 9 1  and 3205 provide in part: 
AKTICLE 319 1 .  The debts which are privileged in all the movables in 
general, are those hereafter enumerated, and are paid in the following 
order: 
* * * 
4. The wages of servants for the year past, and so much as is due for 
the current year. 
* * * 
ARTICLE 3205. Servants or domestics are those who receive wages, 
and stay in the house of the person paying and employing them for his 
service or that of his family; such are valets, footmen, cooks, butlers, 
and others who reside in the house.186 
1 85. LA. C!Y. CooE ANN. arts. 3 1 84-3 1 89 (West 1 994). 
1 86. LA. C!Y. CODE ANN. arts. 3 191 ,  3205 (West 1 994). The limited nature of the 
class of servants to which article 3 1 9 1  subdivision 4 applies is underlined by the language in 
some of the other articles of that chapter. Thus, where the drafters of the Code wished to 
establish a privilege for clerks and secretaries, they found it necessary to acknowledge that 
such employees are not "servants," but that they are entitled to a privilege anyway: 
ARTICLE 3214. Although clerks, secretaries and other agents of that sort can not 
be included under the denomination of servants, yet a privilege is granted them for 
their salaries for the last year elapsed, and so much as has elapsed of the current 
year. 
LA. CIV. CooE ANN. art. 3214 (West 1 994). 
Note that article 3252 also lists "servants" seeking recovery of wages as one of the 
classes of creditors entitled to a privilege on both movables and immovables. However, 
since that chapter does not contain any definition of "servant," it must be presumed that the 
class referred to is the same as that defined in article 3205. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3252 
(West 1 994). 
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Article 3 1 9 1  was derived without substantive modification from a 
corresponding article of the 1 825 Code,187 which was in tum derived 
from a somewhat differently phrased predecessor in the Digest of 
1 808. 1 88 Article 3205, which defines the class of servants entitled to 
the privilege, was also derived without substantive change from the 
English text of the Code of 1 825, where it first appeared. 1 89 It i s  
noteworthy, however, that the French text of that provision i n  the 
1 825 Code was even more explicit i n  confining the class of servants 
entitled to the pri v i l ege to those who render "personal" service to the 
master or his family. The 1 825 French version of article 3205 
provided the following: 
On appelle domestiques ou gens de service, ceux qui re\:oivent des 
gages, et demeurent dans Ia maison de la personne qui les paye et Jes 
emploie a son service personnel OU a celui de sa famille. Tels sont Jes 
valets, laquais, cuisiniers, maltres d' hotel ou autres qui sont a demeure 
dans la maison . 1 90 
The similarity between the limited c l ass of domestic servants 
described in article 3205 and that described in 2747 is thus apparent, 
both in the current Engl ish texts of the articles 19 1  and in the original 
French . 1 92 
1 87. LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 3 1 58 ( 1 8 25). 
1 88. The Louisiana Digest of 1 808 provided the following: 
The dehls which arc privileged on all Ihc movcahlcs i n  general ,  arc those 
herei nafter enumerated. and they arc liquidated in the following order, 
* 
4Ihl y. The sal aries of persons who lent thei r services ! per French text: "Les 
salaircs de gens de service''] for the year last past or for what is due on the current  
year. 
I.A Dt<OJsr Of' 1 808 , supra note 3 1 .  art. 73, at 468-69. 
1 89. LA. Ov. CODE ANN. art. 3 1 72 ( 1 825). The new article defin ing "servant" for 
these purposes was first proposed in the Projct for the 1 8 25 Civil Code. though without any 
rernrJcJ explanation or comment. PROJET OF THE Ctv n .  CODE OF LOUISIANA OF 1 8 25. supm 
note 1 27 .  al 368. 
1 <JO. LA. C'lv. Cor)I; ANN. art. 3205 (West 1 972) ( notes) (emphasis added). The notes 
point out that omission of the adjective "personal" from the English text was a 
mistranslation of the French original. 
1 9 1 .  Compan· LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 27 1 8 ( 1 825)  (speaking of "a hired servant 
attached to [the master's J person or family") "'ith LA. Ctv. CODE ANN. art. 3 1 72 ( 1 825)  
(defining "servants" or "domestics" as "those who receive wages. and stay in the house of 
the person employing them for his service or that of his fami ly") . 
1 92. Comport' LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 2 7 1 9  (Fr. text 1 8:!5) ("(l]cs domcstiqucs 
attaches a la pcrsonne du miitrc. ou au service des ma1sons") '"ith LA. Ov CODE ANN. art. 
J:!06 (Fr. text 1 8:!5) (de fi n i ng "<lomestiqucs" as "ccux qui rccoivent des gages. c t  dcmcurcnt 
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Case law from the nineteenth century clearly indicates that this 
article applied to a l imited class of household domestic servants . 
Neither foremen, 193 laborers who maintained commercial buildings 
194 195 • • and grounds, laborers of other sorts, nor even servmg persons m 
commercial taverns and hotels196 were included i n  this small group. 197 
dans la maison de la personne qui !es paye et Jes emploie a son service personnel ou a celui 
de sa famille" (emphasis added)). 
193.  Lewis v. Patterson, 20 La. Ann. 294 (La. 1 868 (holding foreman in printing 
office not entitled to privilege as either a "servant" or a "secretary"); Lauran v. Hotz, 1 Mart. 
[n.s.] 141 (Dist. Ct. E.D. 1 823) (finding foreman of tailor not entitled to privilege for salary 
under Louisiana Digest of 1 808, articles 68, 73, and 76, and holding that article applies only 
to domestic servants, narrowly defined). 
194. World's Indus. & Cotton Centennial Exposition v. North, Central & South Am. 
Exposition, 39 La. Ann. 1 ,  1 So. 358 (1887). The claimants were "part of quite a large 
number of employees engaged to do the current, simple manual or menial work at the 
exposition, such as cleaning the grounds, sweeping and washing the floors, oiling the 
machinery, cleaning lamps, stopping leaks on the roofs, and similar matters, as might be 
required by the ordinary course of things or some emergency." Id. at 3, I So. at 359.  The 
Supreme Court affirmed that they were "neither servants nor domestics" and therefore not 
entitled to any privilege. Id. 
1 95. See, e.g., Barbour v. Duncan's Curator, 1 7  La. 439 (La. 1 841)  (holding that 
laborers employed at a sawmill at daily or monthly wages have no privilege against assets of 
defunct employer). 
1 96. Bartels & Dana v. Their Creditors & the Creditors of Stafford, Bartels & Co., 1 1  
La. Ann. 433, 435 (1856) (holding that employees o f  a hotel are not "servants" o f  the sort 
entitled to a privilege on movables under the 1 825 version of article 3 1 72); Cook v. Dodge, 
6 La. Ann. 275 ( 1851)  (holding that serving persons in a tavern are not "servants" entitled to 
a privilege under the 1 825 version of articles 3 1 58 and 3 172). The court in Cook was 
particularly conscientious in its review, consulting both French and English texts of the 
Code before concluding that: 
We think it was the i ntention of the lawgiver in [article 3 1 72] to protect domestic 
servants, that is to say those employed in the service of a family or the private 
establishment of a person keeping house, and that the servants of a place of public 
entertainment were not contemplated. 
Id. at 277. 
197.  At least one case does appear to have given the concept of "servant" a broader 
reading. Succession of Caldwell, 8 La. Ann. 42 (1853) (holding that a manager of a ten-pin 
alley was entitled to a privilege, either as a "clerk" or a "servant"). Specifically, the 
Caldwell court reasoned: 
[Claimant] had charge of the ten pin alleys, and received the money paid at 
them during the day, and made his returns when they were closed. If this 
occupation did not give him a privilege as an agent under the articles cited, we are 
of the opinion that it is included within the class of servants which is more 
comprehensive in the sense of the Code, and authorizes the privilege allowed. 
Id. at 43. Although the court in Caldwell did suggest that the term "servant" could be 
susceptible to a broad interpretation, the case does not lend much support to such a 
construction. As the above quote makes clear, the court in Caldwell placed its primary 
reliance on subdivision 6 of article 3 191,  one which gives a privilege to "clerks, secretaries 
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b. Analogies from Book I, Title VI: Domestic Servants as 
"Family" 
Until its repeal in 1990,198 Title VI of Book I of the Louisiana 
Civil Code dealt with the personal relationship of masters and 
various types of servants. Leaving aside those provisions which 
dealt solely with issues peculiar to apprentices or other kinds of 
bound or indentured servants, the relevant articles of Title VI c an be 
classified into two groups: those articles which classify different 
types of servants, 1 99 and those articles which deal with the effects of 
this master-servant relationship on third parties.200 These articles 
and other persons of that kind." Its comments on subdivision 4, granting a privilege to 
"servants," appear to be l itt le more than ill-considered dictum. 
1 98. Act . No. 705, § I, 1990 La. Acts (repeal ing LA. Clv. CODE ANN. articles 1 62-
1 65, 1 67- 1 75, and 1 77, and redesignating article 1 76). The reason for repeal was that those 
articles. which dealt l argely with apprentices and si milar bound servants. had become 
outmoded and anachronistic .  Article 1 66, which had provided that the time of engagement 
of minors (apprentices) would expire at age eighteen for males and age fifteen for females. 
had previously been deleted. Act No. 89, § 2, 1 974 La. Acts. 
1 99. Before repeal , the relevant articles of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870 provided 
the following: 
ARTICLE 1 62. There is only one class of servants in this State, to wit:  Free 
servants. 
ARTICLE 1 63 .  Free servants arc in general all free persons who let, hire or engage 
their services to another in this State, to be employed therein at any work. 
commerce or occupation whatever for the benefit of him who has rnntractcd l(ir 
them. for a certain price or retrihulion. or on certain condi tions . 
ARl'lCl.E 1 64. There arc three kinds of free servants in this State, to wit: 
I. Those who only hire out their services by the day. week . month or 
year. in rnnsiderati o n  of certain wages; the rules which fix the extent and l i mits of 
those l'ontracts arc established in the litlc: Of u11i11[i and Hiri11x. 
2. Those who engage to serve for a fixed t i me for a ccnain rnnsideration. 
and who arc therefore considered not as having hi red out but as having sold t he i r  
services. 
3. Apprentices . that is. those who engage to serve any one. in order to 
learn some art. trade or profession . 
LA. Ctv CoDE ANN . ans. 1 62- 1 64  (West 1 972). 
200. Artides 1 74 through 1 77 provide the following : 
ARTICLE 1 74. The master may bring an action against any man for beat i ng or 
maiming his servant. but in such case he must assign as a cause of action. his own 
damage resu lting from the loss of his service. and this  loss must he proved on t he 
trial . 
ARTICLE 1 75. A master may justify an a.�sault  in defense of his servant. and a 
scr.·ant in defense of his ma�ter. the ma.�ter because he has an in1erest in his 
scr.·ant . not to be deprived of his service: the servant because it is pan of his duty 
for which he receives wages . to stand by and defend his master. 
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were derived from the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825,201 which was 
itself derived from the Digest of 1 808 .202 Moreau-Lislet 's source 
notes give little indication of the origin of the relevant provisions of 
the 1 808 Digest.203 However, Professor Batiza assigns most of the 
credit to Blackstone, though Batiza also recognized the contributions 
of Domat and Pothier. 204 
The presence of these articles in Book I, among other Titles 
which deal with the bilateral personal relations of husbands and 
wives,205 and of p arents and children,206 lends support to a narrow 
ARTICLE 1 76. The master is answerable for the offenses and quasi-offenses 
conunitted by his servants, according to the rules which are explained under the 
title of quasi-contracts, and of offenses and quasi-offenses. 
ARTICLE 177. The master is answerable for the damage caused to individuals or 
to the community i n  general by whatever is thrown out of his house into the street 
or public road, and inasmuch as the master has the superintendence of his house, 
and is responsible for the faults conunitted therein .  
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1 74- 177 (West 1972). 
201 .  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1 55-157, 1 6 8- 1 7 1  ( 1 825). The only substantive 
change in the relevant articles of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825 to the Civil Code of 1 870 
was the abolition of slavery. While the Code of 1 825, like its 1808 predecessor, provided 
for that institution, the Code of 1 870 did not. Compare LA. CODE Civ. ANN. art. 1 55 (1 825) 
('There are in this State two classes of servants, to wit: the free servants and slaves.") with 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 62 ( 1 870) ('There is only one class of servants in this State, to wit: 
free servants."). The Digest of 1 808 and the Civil Code of 1 825 each contained an extensive 
chapter delineating the basic relations of master and slave. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1 72-
196 (1 825); LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  arts. 1 5-27' at 38-43. 
202. LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  arts. 1 -4, 1 1 - 14, at 36-39. The only 
significant change in the articles under discussion here between the Digest of 1 808 and the 
Civil Code of 1825, was the recognition of a new class of "free" but nonetheless "bound" or 
indentured servants. Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 57 (1 825) with LA. DIGEST OF 
1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  art. 3 ,  at 36, 37. 
203. Moreau-Lislet's notes opposite the French text list no direct source for articles 1 -
4 ,  and the notes opposite the English text refer only t o  the Digest's own article o n  lease of 
services and Pothier's Traite du Contrat de Louage as collateral material deal i n g  with the 
same subject. The notes opposite the French text of articles 1 1 -14 list no source for article 
1 1 ,  but refer to Las Siete Partidas as the source of the others. LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra 
note 3 1 ,  opp. at 36-39. The relevance of the particular laws of the Partidas to which 
Moreau-Lislet refers remains, however, obscure. 
204. Batiza, supra note 1 33,  at 5 1 .  Professor B atiza cites Domat and Pothier as the 
sources of article 4 of the Louisiana Digest of 1 808. Id. (citing 1 DOMAT, supra note 148, at 
277 n.c. (analogizing a contractor's undertaking of a piece of work-the Roman "locatio 
operis"-to a "sale" of his labors); POTHIER, supra n ote 1 50, at No. 394 (same)). For the 
rest of the relevant articles discussed in text, Professor Batiza cites only Blackstone as a 
source. Id. (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1 66, at 425 (distinguishing types of servants 
and recounting the ways i n  which third parties may be affected by the relation of master and 
servant)). 
205. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 86- 101 (West 1 994). 
206. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 178-245 (West 1 994). 
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interpretation of article 2747. As is shown by its placement, the 
drafters of the Louisiana Civil Code evidently grouped at least some 
"servants" with other members of a master 's household. Moreover, 
several of the specific provisions of these former articles-such as 
provisions which obligated "servants" to physically defend their 
master against assault,207 or which held the master responsible for 
damage caused by objects thrown by servants from the master's 
house208-woul d  make little sense in the context of a l imited, purely 
contractual relationship such as that between ordinary employers and 
employees. On the contrary, such provisions make sense only if some 
"servants" are part of the master's household and subject to his general 
authority. 
In any event, even if this concept of the servants as members of 
the master's famil y  were only implicit in the Digest of 1 808, the 
concept was made quite explicit in the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1 825 
and 1 870. Both of those Codes expressly included "servants of the 
fami ly" in the extended definition of "family," as that te1m is used in 
the Codes. Article 3506( 1 2) provides the following: 
Family, in a limited sense, signifies father, mother and chi ldren. In a 
more extensive sense, it comprehends all  the individuals who l i ve 
under the authority of another, and includes the servants of the 
family.209 
The sources and drafting history of th is article also make clear 
that the class of "servants" referred to as members of the fami ly 
inc ludes only a l imited class of personal or  household servants-those 
common ly referred to in current parlance as domestic servants. and in  
the French text o f  the Codes a<; "domcstiqucs . ' '  Blackstone and 
Poth ier, the sources of this Title, al l  d ifferentiated among servants 
along these precise l ines, treating such domestic servants as 
analytically dist ingu ishable from all others. 2 1 0  
207. LA. Clv. CODE ANN. a/1 .  1 75 (West 1 972) .  
208. LA.  CIY. CODE ANN. art. 1 77 (West 1 972) .  
209. LA.  Clv. CODE ANN. art. 3506( 1 2) ( West 1 994). This art1dc was 1110\ L'LI. wilh 
minimal change. from its original location in the Code or 1 870. LA. Clv. Colli ANN. ;1rt . 
3556( 1 2 ) ( 1 870) ( includi ng servants of "the father or· the family in the tkli m t u>n of 
"fami ly"); see also LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3522( 1 6 )  ( 1 825)  ( including also "slaves nr the 
father or· the family) .  See genera/Ir Tucker. supra note 1 46 ( tracing this cnncert "'  
"servants" as members of the family. to  the Louisiana Civi l  Code of 1 825.  the D1�est of 
1 808. and Lns Siere Partidas) .  
2 1 0. See supra notes 1 53- 1 56. 1 66- 1 67 and accompanying te�L 
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Moreover, the original French text indicates that the drafters of 
the Digest and the Code of 1825 had just such a distinction in mind 
when they composed Book I, just as they did when they composed the 
predecessor of article 2747. Book I, Title VI, article 3 of the Digest of 
1 808-the provision which set up the basic classifications of free 
servants in Louisiana-reads, in the original French, as follows: 
Art. ID. II y a deux sortes de serviteurs libres dans ce Territoire 
sav01r: 
Les serviteurs proprement dits, c ' est-a-dire ceux qui se louent ou 
s' engagent envers un autre pour etre employes a un travail ordinaire ou 
de force; tels que Les domestiques de maison, les ouvriers, manceuvriers 
et tous ceux qui s'engagent pour travailler aux champs et sur les 
habitations &c.21 1  
While the main purpose of this article w as doubtless to distinguish 
apprentices from all other workers, the listing of "types" of workers 
is suggestive. The drafters were c areful to mention domestic 
servants ("domestiques") as a specific and separate class of workers . 
However, this distinction was not carried over when the French 
text of article ill was translated into English. The passage was 
mistranslated and the reference to "household domestics" was 
inexplicably dropped from the English version: 
Art. ID. There are two sorts of servants in this territory, to wit: 
Servants properly so called, or those who let or engage themselves 
to another, to be employed at some ordinary or hard labor; such are 
workmen, laborers, and all those who engage to serve in husbandry or 
upon plantations.2 1 2  
Remarkably, this anomaly-a French text that spoke of 
"domestiques de maison" and an English text that did not-was 
carried forward without apparent recognition or comment into the 
Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825.213 To make matters worse, the Code 
of 1 870 distributed only in English, carried forward only the English 
text, without rectifying its omissions.214 
Nevertheless, the erroneous translation of article ill of the 1 808 
Digest (an error that persisted in the English text of article 1 64  until its 
21 l .  LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  art. III, at 37 (emphasis added). 
212. Id. at 36. 
213. See LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 164 (West 1972) (notes) (reproducing the French 
and English texts of article 1 57 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 825). 214. Id. 
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repeal in 1 990) does not alter the conclusion that important l anguage 
within the original French text of artic le  ill was left out of the English 
translation. Indeed, the location, sources, and original text of the 
relevant articles of Book I lend support to the conclusion that the class 
of servants (or "domestiques") attached to the master's person or 
family is a narrow one indeed. 
c.  Anal ogies from Former Book ID, Title XXill: Prescri­
bing Servants' Wage Claims 
Before the 1 983 amendments,2 15  Louisiana Civil Code article 
3534 established a prescriptive period of one year for wage claims 
brought by "workmen, laborers and servants, for the payment of their 
wages."216 That article was derived without substantial change from 
a corresponding article of the Code of 1 825,2 1 7  which was i n  tum 
derived from a somewhat differently phrased article of the Lou isiana 
Digest of 1 808 . 2 1 8  While these articles made no distinction between 
domestic servant s  and other types of employees for purposes of 
prescription, the fact that each version was carefully drafted to 
include "servants," "workmen," and "laborers" lends additional 
2 1 5. Act No. 1 73 ,  1 983 La. ACIS (comprehensively revising Chapter 4 of lit le X X I V  
o f  Rook Ill  of t h e  Civil Code of  Louisiana. Th e  prescripl ive period for wage daims i n  now 
set hy a11ide 3494, which cstahlishes a three-year period for a l l  claims for wage. kes. and 
the like. 
2 1 6. LA. Ov. ConE ANN. art. 3534 (West 1 97 2 ). 
2 1 7. LA. Clv. Com: ANN. art. 3499 ( 1 825). The French text of Ihc 1 825 vers ion of 
the a11icle is simi l ar. d is t i ngu ishing hetwcen "gens de travail" ( lahorcrs) and "!!ens de 
servi ce" (scrvanls) : 
Celle des ouvriers. gens de travail ct de servil·e. pour le payemenl de !curs 
joumecs . gages ct salaires. 
LA. Civ. COI.>E ANN. art. 3 5 34 (notes). 
2 1 8 . Article 77 provides the following: 
ARTICLE 77. TI1e claims of Icachcrs or school masters . . .  may he prcsni hed 
aga inst . after a yl·ar has elapsed. 
The provisions of this ar1icle extend l i kewise to . . Ihat of workmen ;111d 
day bhourers for t he payment of thei r  days works and of Ihc malcn als hy them 
furnished: and for t h at of Ihe dorncslics wh1Ch lent Iheir scrv1c-cs hy the year. 
LA. DI<ilsr OF 1 808 . . <1qm1 note J I .  ar1. 77. at 4XX. ·n1c French I n l  1s s111ular: 
Id 
A11iclc 77. I L'acllon J des ou wiers ct gens de trava i l .  pour le ravcment de k;1urs 
fou miturcs. Jnumees ct sal aires: Celle de domcsti4ues 4u1 sc lnucnl a ) ' ;111nc.'c. 
pour le  raycment de lcurs gages: 
Sc prcsn i\·cnl par un an . 
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support to the argument that the terms referred to different types of 
employees. That i s  to say, codal refere nces to  "servants" (or, in the 
French version of the Digest of 1 808, "domestiques") should not be 
understood to include ordinary workers. Such was the original 
understanding of these provisions. Several cases from the early 
nineteenth century state specifically that the term "servant" in the 
articles on prescription applies only to "menial" servants and not to 
ordinary workers.219 
Thus, from all the foregoing, it should be clear that neither article 
2747 nor any other provision of the Louisiana Civil Code provides any 
legitimate reason to  regard the vast majority of at-will employees­
that is, all who work in capacities other than that of domestic 
servants-as subject to any special regime. Properly interpreted, 
neither article 2747 nor any other provision of the Code grants such 
"ordinary" employees and employers any special rights or obligations 
that would serve to distinguish their legal relations from those of 
parties to any other sort of contract terminable at the will of the parties. 
Does this then mean that the principle of employment at will 
should be abandoned, that the existence of a contract for a fixed term 
is irrelevant, or that good cause should be required for termination of 
all employees regardless of contractual status? Clearly not. Unlike 
article 2747, Louisiana Civil Code articles 2749 and 2750 apply to 
ordinary employees.220 These latter articles clearly ascribe legal 
consequences to the existence of a c ontract for a fixed term­
specifically, that an employee with such a contract can neither quit nor 
be fired without good cause, without incurring liability for d amages. 
By negative implic ation, employees who do not work according to a 
2 1 9. See, e.g. , Coote v. Cotton, S La. 1 2, 14 ( 1 832) (holding that a plaintiff seeking 
compensation for services rendered in collecting, superintending, and trading in slaves 
owned by defendant was not limited by the one-year prescription period applicable to a 
"servant, laborer or workman"). As the court in Coote explained, "[t]he plaintiff was neither 
a workman nor a laborer, and the word servant in the Civil Code, 3499, is in our opinion to 
be restricted to menial servants." Id. at 15; see also Keaghey v. Barnes, 1 1  Rob. 1 39 (La. 
1 845) ('The plaintiff was neither a workman, nor a laborer. The word servant is nomen 
generalissimum, and in this article of the Code it must be confined to menial servants, 
otherwise it would extend to every one employed by another."); Cresap v. Winter, 14 La. 
553, 555 (1 840) (tracing the origin of article 3500 of the Code of 1 825-providing that 
claims for back wages can be brought even though the claimant is still employed-to the 
need to overcome French authority prohibiting menial servants from instituting such claims 
against the master they were presently serving). 
220. The texts of these articles are quoted at note 44, supra. They contain no 
language limiting the types of employees to which they refer. 
1 995] EMPLOYMENT AT WIU 1 58 1  
contract of fixed term can quit and can be fired without good cause 
and without incurring liability. In other words, the basic doctrine of 
employment at will is alive and well in the Louisiana Civil Code. 
However, the shift in codal basis for the doctrine-from the 
narrow but express command of article 2747, to the negative 
implication of articles 2749 and 2750--has important consequences. 
Although courts may read article 2747 as a specific exception to the 
ordinary rules that would normally apply, no such implication can be 
drawn from articles 2749 and 2750. Thus, while it remains the c ase 
that employment contracts without a fixed term can be tenninated at 
the will of either party, nothing in articles 2749 or 2750 suggests that 
such contracts should be interpreted or enforced in any special or 
unique manner. On the contrary, employment agreements terminable 
at will should be subject to the same regime that the Civil Code 
applies to all other agreements terminable at the will of the parties. 
IV. INTERPRETING EMPLOYMENT AT WILL ACCORDING TO THE 
LoUISIANA CIVIL CODE: APPLYING 11ffi REQUIREMENT OF GOOD 
FAIDI 
Despite the novel analysis set forth in Finkle v. Majik 
Markets,221 the Loui siana Civil Code is clear in its classification and 
treatment of employment at will. The Louisiana Civil Code, like its 
Roman and French predecessors,222 classifies employment as a 
bilateral nominate contract and, specifically, as a type of "lease," one 
m which the employee lets out his labor or industry for a fee .223 
22 1 .  628 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1 993 ). See supra notes 1 20- 1 24 and 
accompanying text. 
222. See, e.g., 6 SAUL LrrvINOFF, LOUISIANA Crvn. LAW TREATISE: OBLIGATIONS: 
BOOK 1 § § 1 24-125, at 207 ( 1 969) (noting that Planiol treated contracts relative to labor, 
including contracts for the lease of labor, as one of the three major classes of contracts). See 
generally discussion at notes 1 48- 1 55, supra. 
223. Louisiana Civil Code articles 2669, 2673, and 2675 make clear that the 
employment relation-that is, any arrangement by which an employee leases out his labor in 
return for wages-is contractual in nature and is conceived as a type of "lease": 
ARTICLE 2669. Lease or hire is a synallagmatic contract, to which consent alone 
is sufficient, and by which one party gives to the other the enjoyment of a thing, or 
his labor, at a fixed price . 
ARTICLE 2673. There are two species of contracts of lease, to wit: 
I .  The letting out of things. 
2. the letting out of labor or industry. 
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Notwithstanding the holding in Finkle, this conclusion follows 
regardless of whether the particular employment contract at issue is 
oral or written224 or terminable at will or for a fixed term. 225 Thus, 
employment agreements remain subject to basic requirements which 
the Civil Code makes applicable to all similar conventional 
obligations, and to all similar leases.226 Determining what l imits, if 
any, those basic requirements place o n  the employer's otherwise 
absolute authority to terminate an at-wil l  employee is thus the central 
question which must now be answered. 
A complete answer to this question would require a thorough 
analysis of a wide range of issues, including: the characterization and 
enforceability-under true civilian principles-of employers ' 
promises not to fire an employee except for cause, or after certain 
procedures are first followed;227 the possible application of the 
ARTICLE 2675. To let out labor or industry is a contract by which one of the 
parties binds himself to do something for the other, in consideration of a certain 
price agreed on by them both. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2669, 2673, 2675 (West 1 994). These articles have not been 
substantively amended since the present Code was enacted, and have remained virtually 
unchanged since 1808. Cf LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2639, 2643, 2645 ( 1 825); LA. DIGEST 
OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  arts. 1 ,  3, at 372. 
224. Article 1927 states that "unless the law prescribes a certain formality" for a 
particular type of contract, either the offer or the acceptance, or both, may be oral. LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 1927. Contracts of employment are not among those which require any 
particular formality. 
225. Louisiana Civil Code article 1770 makes clear that contracts tenninable at the 
will of one or both of the parties are still contracts, and that the option to tenninate must be 
perfonned in good faith. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 770 (West 1987). 
226. Article 2668, the first article of Book III, Title IX of the Code, "Of Lease," 
makes the point explicitly: 
ARTICLE 2668. The contract of lease or letting out (besides the rules in which it is 
subject in common with other agreements, and which are explained under the 
title: Of Conventional Obligations) is governed by particular rules, which are the 
subject of the present title. 
227. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2668 (West 1994). Though a full codal analysis of the 
enforceability of such promises might well be an article i n  itself, a few basic principles seem 
reasonably clear. 
First, an employer i s  free, under the Code, to contractually limit what would otherwise 
be his absolute freedom to tenninate an at-will employee without cause or particular 
procedures. Fonner article 1 1  of the Civil Code of 1 870 expressly stated that any person 
may renounce such a right or privilege. Comment (c) to current article 7 explains that the 
express language was dropped because the propositio n  was "self evident." LA. CIY. CODE 
ANN. art. 7 cmt. (c) (West 1 993); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 197 1 ,  1983 (West 1993). 
Louisiana courts have recognized this freedom, in principle at least. See, e.g., Chauvin v. 
Tandy Corp., 984 F.2d 695, 689-99 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that an issue o f  fact was 
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presented as to whether an employer's request that the employee remain in a particular post 
for an additional year amounted to an enforceable promise not to fire that employee for one 
year); Mix v. University of New Orleans, 609 So. 2d 958, 963 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 993) 
(noting the possibility of a contractual modification of the employer's tights); Morgan v. 
Avondale Shipyards, 376 So. 2d 5 1 6, 5 17  (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 979) (same). 
Second, Louisiana courts which have found such promises by employers to be 
unenforceable have done so for reasons which do not appear to withstand analysis  according 
to the Louisiana Civil Code. In Brannan v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 526 So. 2d 1 1 0 1 ,  1 1 04 
(La. 1 988), the leading modem case on these issues, the court found an alleged promise 
unenforceable for three reasons: ( I )  enforcement would violate the command of what was 
then article 1 67, limiting employment contracts to a maximum term of ten years; (2) the 
promise was made without "consideration"; and (3) the obligation was not "mutual ."  
Brannan, 526 So.  2d at 1 1 04 (quoting Pitcher v. United Oil  & Gas Syndicate, 1 74 La. 66, 
1 39 So. 760 ( 1 932)). However, this reasoning has been undermined by recent amendments 
to the Civil Code and i s  at odds with basic Civil Code principles governing conventional 
obligations. 
Article 1 67, which l imited employment contracts to a maximum of ten years, was 
repealed in 1 990, along with almost all of the rest of Book I, Title VI, "Of Master and 
Servant." To be sure, article 2746 still provides that, "A man can only hire out his services 
for a certain limited period of time, or for the performance of a certain enterprise." 
However, this article, unlike former article 167, appears to have been intended only for the 
l imited purpose of precluding contracts that unduly limit the employee's freedom by 
consigning her to perpetual service. Like article 1 67,  it was not intended to preclude 
employers from obligating themselves to exercise their power to terminate an employee only 
under certain circumstances, or to provide certain procedures prior to termination. Thaxton 
v. Roberson, 224 So. 2d 1 83, 1 85-86 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 969). For a discussion of the 
limited purposes of articles 1 67 and 2746, see generally Recent Jurisprudence, supra note 
76, and discussion at notes 1 25-34, supra. 
The second alleged obstacle to enforcing such employer promises-lack of 
"consideration"-appears to be, i f  anything, even less firmly based on any principle that can 
be legitimately derived from the civilian law of obligations, as embodied in the Louisiana 
Civil Code. The Code makes clear that conventional obligations, including modifications of 
the terms of existing contracts, need not be supported by "consideration." LA. Clv. CooE 
ANN. arts. 1927, 1 966, 1 967 (West 1994); see LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts 1 967 cmt. (c) 
(distinguishing the corrunon-law requirement of "consideration" from the civi l ian 
requirement of "cause"). The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently recognized that 
employers' promises may be enforced regardless of any additional "consideration" by the 
employees. See Knecht v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges & Uni vs .. 59 1 So. 2d 690, 
694-95 (La. 199 1 )  (holding that unclassified university employees who worked overtime 
pursuant to a "compensatory leave" policy which contemplated paid time off for employees 
who worked such overtime, had an enforceable contractual right to recei ve that 
compensatory paid time off). After reciting the requirements for a valid conventional 
obligation under the Civil Code. the court noted that, "[n)early every state has determined. 
using precepts similar to our civilian principles. that when an employer promises a benefit to 
employees. and the employees accept by their actions in meeting the conditions. the result i s  
not a mere gratuity o r  i l lusory promise but a vested right i n  the employee to the promised 
benefit." Id. The court concluded that a like result should be reached in that case. 
Finally, the asserted problem of "mutuality"-that if the employee is free to leave his 
employment without restriction, then the employer must be likewise free to fire the 
employee without restriction-likewise rests on an asserted requirement derived originally 
from common-law rather than civilian sources. The Louisiana Civil Code. unlike the 
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principles of detrimental reliance or estoppel;228 the interpretation and 
application of article 2024, which provides that contracts terminable at 
will should be terminated only on provision of reasonable notice to the 
other party;229 the relevance of the emerging tort of "abuse of 
common law, does not require and has never required "mutuality" of obligations between 
the parties to a contract. Rather, the Code specifically contemplates contracts which are 
"unilateral" in their entirety. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 907 (West 1987). While it has been 
held that an employment contract is a "synallagmatic" or "bilateral" relation, this does not 
necessarily mean that every aspect of the contract must be bilateral. Nothing in the Code 
precludes imposition o f  particular unilateral duties or rights on one party to what is, overall, 
a bilateral contractual relationship. Thus, in Long v. Foster & Associates, Inc. ,  343 La. 48, 
1 3 6  So. 2d 48 ( 1962), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that an employee could recover the 
full amount of wages due him under the unexpired term of a five-year employment contract, 
even though that contract pennitted the employee-but not the employer-to terminate that 
contract at any time, on two weeks notice. The court had no trouble recognizing the contract 
despite the nonmutual right of termination. Id. at 52-53. Other examples of valid contracts 
with unilateral terms include the following: Civil Code article 1975, which specifically 
authorizes "output" or "requirements" contracts, by which one party to the contract has a 
unilateral right to determine the "amount" of the contractual object; and the so-called "take 
or pay" contracts, familiar from mineral law, which similarly give one contracting party a 
unilateral right to determine how much oil or gas will be extracted. 
It is also noteworthy that many common-law jurisdictions in the United States have 
begun to abandon strict application of these requirements in the context of termination of 
employment. Courts in many states have held that employer promises not to terminate an 
employee without cause, or without following certain prior procedures, can be enforced 
regardless of any lack o f  mutuality or specific consideration for that promise. See, e.g., 
HOLLOWAY, supra note 1 3 , at 3-17;  ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 526 (noting that 
"about three quarters of the states hold that promises contained in an employment manual 
may bind an employer," and that those "[c]ourts have addressed the consideration and 
mutuality of obligation obstacles either by viewin g  employment manuals as unilateral 
contracts or by applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel"). 
228. Claims that an employer's unilateral statements operate to estop the employer 
from exercising the right to summarily fire at-will employees have been rej ected by 
Louisiana courts. See, e.g., Thebner v. Xerox Corp. , 480 So. 2d 454, 458 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
Cir. 1 985) (construing narrowly and ultimately rejecting plaintiffs claim that his employer's 
decision to fire him violated principles of estoppel), writ denied, 484 So. 2d 1 39 (La. 1 986). 
However, it may not be appropriate to dispose of the concept quite so summarily. 
Common-law jurisdictions have relied on the doctrine of promissory estoppel to provide 
protection to at-will employees who rely to their detriment on an employer's promises. See 
Mohammed Yehis Mattar, Promissory Estoppel: Common-law Wine in Civil Law Bottles, 4 
TUL. Crv. L.F. 7 1 ,  1 1 8- 1 9  ( 1 988). Moreover, while the term "estoppel" is of common-law 
rather than civilian origin, the core idea that it expresses is reflected in closely related 
concepts (including "detrimental reliance" and the need to perform obligations in good 
faith) that are firmly rooted in the Civil Law in general and the Louisiana Civil Code in 
particular. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1759, 1 967, 1 983 (West 1 987). See generally Mattar, 
supra. 
229. Article 2024 provides the following: 
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rights;"230 and the possible applicability of other tort theories.231 It is 
thus a task that is best left for another day. 
ARTICLE 2024: CONTRACT TERMINATED BY A PARTY'S INITIATNE. A contract of 
unspecified duration may be tenninated at the will of either party by giving notice, 
reasonable in  time and form, to the other party. 
LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 2024 (West 1 987). As comment (a) to this article points out, the 
article is new. I t  was not, however, intended to change the l aw. Rather it was i ntended to 
make generally applicable the principle previously articulated in article 2686 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870. 
The difficult issue is  in  defining exactly what kind of notice is required by this article. 
The revisors of article 2024 put it this way: 
In proceeding under this Article, the parties must comply with the 
overriding duty of good faith. Reasonable advance notice will usually be required 
to avoid unwarranted injury to the interest of the other party. 
LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 2024 cmt. (e) (West 1 987).  Cases interpreting article 2024 are 
relatively sparse, but appear sufficient to establish some basic notion of what the 
requirement of "reasonable notice" entails. See, e.g. , Jones v. Crescent City Health & 
Racqetball Club, 489 So. 2d 3 8 1 ,  383 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1 986) (upholding trial court 
finding that a "lifetime" membership in a health club was a contract for an i ndefinite 
duration, terminable by either party on giving of reasonable notice, and that, on the facts of 
the case, a requiremen t  of two years' notice was not unreasonable); Caston v. Woman's 
Hosp. Found., Inc., 262 So. 2d 62, 64-65 (La. Ct. App. I st Cir.) (holding photographer had 
contract of unspecified duration with hospital, under which he was permitted to photograph 
newborn babies and sell photos to parents and awarding damages equal to six months'  profit 
when hospital terminated the arrangement without notice), writ denied, 266 So. 2d 220 (La. 
1 972); see also System Fed. No. 59 v. Louisiana & A. Ry., 30 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. La. 1 940) 
(holding if parties specify notice period in their contract, that period controls), ajf'd, 1 1 9 
F.2d 509 (5th Cir.) ,  and cert. denied, 3 1 4  U.S. 656 ( 1 94 1  ) .  
230. In Louisiana, the tort of abuse of rights has been held applicable "only in  limited 
circumstances" when the plaintiff can show: 
that the holder of the right used it either: 
( I )  to harm another or where the predominant motive was to cause h arm; 
or 
(2) where there is no serious or legiti mate interest worthy of judicial 
protection; or 
(3) where the holder uses the right in violation of moral rules, good faith 
or elementary fairness; or 
(4) where the holder uses it for a purpose other than that for which the 
right was granted. 
Dufour v. Westlawn Cemeteries, Inc., 639 So. 2d 843. 848 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1 994) 
(citing Truschinger v. Pak, 5 1 3  So. 2d 1 1 5 1 ,  1 1 54 (La. 1 987);  Kok v. Harris, 563 So. 2d 
374, 377 (La. Ct. App. l st Cir. 1 990)). 
Some courts have interpreted these standards narrowly, rejecting claims of abuse of 
rights in the context of alleged wrongful termination of at-will employees. See, e.g . . Walther 
v. National Tea Co., 848 F.2d 5 1 8, 5 1 9-20 (5th Cir. 1 988):  Jones v. New Orleans Legal 
Assistance Corp.,  568 So. 2d 663 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 990); Ballaron v. Equitable 
Shipyards, Inc., 5 2 1  So. 2d 48 1 ,  483 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. ). writ denied, 522 So. 2d 57 1 
(La. 1 988); see also Johnson v. Delchamps. Inc . .  897 F.2d 808, 8 1 1  (5th Cir. 1 990) 
(following Ballaron). Nonetheless, it is clear that the tort is recognized in this jurisdiction, 
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It is, however, possible to at least begin sketching a few of the 
most basic outlines of what a truly Civil Code-based analysis of 
employment at will would require. Thus, for example, it appears that 
some of the growing common-law "exceptions" to the strict rule of 
employment at will, such as the free standing "public policy" 
exception, have no legitimate place in Louisiana employment l aw.232 
and that it can be applied in the context of an abusive discharge of an at-will employee. 
Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 344 So. 2d 1 353, 1 370-71 (La. 1976) (granting recovery 
to a terminated at-will employee whose employer terminated him solely to avoid paying him 
substantial deferred compensation to which he would otherwise have been entitled). 
It is also noteworthy that a variety of commentators have advocated the use o f  the 
concept in a variety of contexts, including some which bear analytic similarities to contracts 
of employment. See, e.g., George M. Armstrong & John C. LaMaster, Retaliatory Eviction 
as Abuse of Rights: A Civilian Approach to Landlord-Tenant Disputes, 47 LA. L. REY. I 
( 1986); Julio Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35 LA. L. REV. 965, 1004 (1975); Hunter C. 
Leake, II, Comment, Abuse of Rights in Louisiana, 7 TUL. L. REV. 426 (1933); Comment, 
"At-will" Franchise Tenninations and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine-The Maturation of 
Louisiana law, 42 LA. L. REV. 210, 218 (1981); see also Onorato v. Maestri , 1 73 La. 375, 
1 37 So. 66, 69 (193 1 )  (granting recovery to lease broker when lessor attempted to avoid 
payment of commission by exercising legal right to rescind lease negotiated by broker, then 
re-entering into similar lease with same prospective lessee). 
23 1 .  By far the most common tort claim made by discharged employees has been the 
allegation that their termination constituted "intentional infliction of emotional distress." It 
would seem, however, that this tort is at best a problematic vehicle to remedy workplace 
unfairness. The tort has been narrowly construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which 
has articulated the legal standard as whether the defendant's actions were "so outrageous in 
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to 
be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." White v. 
Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1 205, 1 209 (La. 1991) .  Lower courts in this state have continued 
this tradition of narrow interpretation, uniformly refusing to grant discharged at-will 
employees any recovery based on claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
regardless of the surrounding circumstances. See, e.g . ,  Portie v. Devall Towing & Boat 
Serv., Inc., 634 So. 2d 1 324, 1 325 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 994) (employee fired in retaliation 
for his brother filing a workers' compensation claim); Massey v. G.B. Cooley Hosp., 593 
So.  2d 460, 461 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1992) (employer made allegedly defamatory 
statements about employee), judgment set aside, 6 1 6  S o .  2d 1 242 (La. 1993); Hammond v. 
Medical Arts Group, Inc. , 574 So. 2d 521 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 991) (nurse fired because 
of failed sexual relationship with employer); Ballaron, 521 So. 2d at 48 1 (employer 
attempting to force employee to give up rights against a third party). See generally Dennis 
D. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at-will: The Case 
Against "Tortification " of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1994). 
232. One court in Louisiana has indicated, though in dictum, that discharge of an at­
will employee would be actionable if it contravened "an established social policy." 
Schulteiss v. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, 592 F. Supp. 628, 630 n.2 
(W.D. La. 1984) (citing, inter alia, dictum from Wiley v. Missouri. Pac. R.R., 430 So. 2d 
1016, 1019 n.7 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (noting the imposition of a good faith 
requirement in other states), writ denied, 431 So. 2d 1055 (La. 1983))). The precedential 
force
.
of this d�ision is limited, however. The relevant language was only dictum, and the 
court s reasomng was based more on an analogy to federal maritime law than on an analysi s  
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By contrast, it  appears equally clear that other potential limits on the 
right to terminate employment-in particular, the requirement  that all 
obligations must be perfonned in good fai th-should apply to a t-wil1 
employment i n  exactly the same way as they have applied to all o ther 
agreements which are subject to termination at the will of the parties. 
A. The Requirement of Good Faith 
One of the most fundamental principles of the Louisiana Civil 
C ode is the basic requirement of "good fai th," a requiremen t  which 
applies to and governs all contractual rela tions. The universality of 
this principle is explicitly stated in the Code233 and has been 
repeatedly reaffirmed by leading commentators.234 In particular, 
Louisiana Civil C ode article 1770 specifically states that the 
of Louisiana law. More i mportantly, the free-standing "public policy" exception which has 
been adopted by some common-law courts also seems out of place in Louisiana. The Civil 
Code does have an article which implicates such concepts of public policy: 
ARTICLE 7: LAWS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST. Persons may 
not by their juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the 
public interest. Any act in derogation of such laws is  an absolute nullity. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 7 (West 1987). However, article 7 is limited by its terms to 
"juridical acts" which derogate from "laws enacted" by the legislature. Even if an 
employment contract could be considered a juridical act, article 7 would not provide courts a 
mandate to determine for themselves whether a particular termination violated "public 
policy"; that policy could only be determined by reference to specific statutes. As noted 
above, the legislature has added "anti-discrimination" or "anti-retaliation" provisions to its 
statutes in some cases, presumably where it deemed necessary. Judicial assertion of a 
"public policy" exceptio n  to employment at-will would amount to engrafting such a 
provision onto a statute for which the legislature has declined to provide, something a 
Louisiana court should not do. Cf Christopher Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy 
Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TuL. 
L. REV. 1583 (1994) (reviewing and analyzing "public policy" decisions from a variety of 
common-law jurisdictions, and advocating its use in such jurisdictions). 
233. Articles 1 759 and 1983 provide the following: 
ARTICLE 1 759: Gooo FAITH. Good faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor 
and the obligee in whatever pertains to the obligation. 
ARTICLE 1983: LAW FOR THE PARTIES; PERFORMANCE IN GOOD FAITH. Contracts 
have the effect of law for the parties and may be dissolved only through the 
consent of the parties or on grounds provided by law. Contracts must be 
performed in good faith. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1 759, 1 983 (West 1994). 
234. See, e.g., 5 SAUL LITVINOFF, LoU!SIANA Crvn. LAW TREATISE: THE LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS § 1 .8, at 17 ( 1 992); ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LoUISJANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL: A PRECIS 23 (1993) (describing the obligation of good faith rooted in Roman 
law, but raised to the status of an explicit Code provision by a process of induction-as one 
which ''underlies the entire law of obligations"). 
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obligation of good faith governs termination of contracts terminable 
at will: 
ARTICLE 1770. A suspensive condition that depends solely on the 
whim of the obliger makes the obligation null. 
A resolutory condition that depends solely on the will of the obliger 
must be fulfilled in good faith.235 
Clearly, the power of either the employer or the employee to 
terminate an at-wi l l  employment contract ends the employment 
contract, and is thus a "resolutory condition" as that term is used in 
article 1770.236 This power to terminate the contract is also one 
235. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1770 (West 1994). Although this article is new (it was 
adopted in 1984), it was not intended to change the law. Rather, it was a consolidation of 
the substance of three predecessor articles of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870. The change 
was necessary to avoid the confusion that had been introduced into the law by j udicial 
misinterpretation and misuse of the concept of the "potestative condition." LA. Crv. CODE 
ANN. art. 1770, cmts. (a) & (e) (West 1994) . The 1 870 predecessors of current article 1 770 
provided as follows: 
ARTICLE 2024. The potestative condition is that which makes the execution of 
the agreement depend on an event which it is in the power of one or the other of 
the contracting parties to bring about or to hinder. 
ARTICLE 2034. Every obligation is null, that has been contracted, o n  a 
potestative condition, on the part of him who binds himself. 
ARTICLE 2035. The last preceding article is limited to potestative conditions, 
which make the obligation depend solely on the exercise of the obligor's will; but 
if the condition be, that the obligor shall do or not do a certain act, though the 
doing or not doing of the act depends on the will of the obligor, yet the obligation 
depending on such condition, is not void. 
Article 2024 was derived without substantial change from the Louisiana Civil Code of 
1 825 and the Digest of 1 808. Articles 2034 and 2035 were derived without substantial 
change from the Code of 1 825, but had no equivalents in the Digest of 1 808. See LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. arts. 20 19,  2029, 2030 ( 1 925); LA. DIGEST OF 1 808, supra note 3 1 ,  art. 70, at 
272. 
Prior to the enactment of current article 1 770, an extensive body of jurisprudence had 
developed which was devoted to distinguishing "potestative" conditions which rendered 
contracts null from other conditions which did not have such an effect. These cases 
generally reached results paralleling the distinction between "will" and "whim" articulated 
in article 1770. See, e.g., Sam's Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 694 F. 2d 998, 
1 001 -03 (5th Cir. 1982); State v. Laconco, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1 376, 1 385 (D.D.C.  1 977); 
Franks v. Louisiana Health Servs. & Indemnity Co., 382 So. 2d 1 064, 1068 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
Cir. 1 980); Professional Billing Agency, Inc. v. Tarantino,  350 So. 2d 258, 260 (La. Ct. App. 
4th Cir. 1977); Lee Lumber Co., Ltd. v. International Paper Co., 321 So. 2d 244, 247 (La. 
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 975). See generally Vernon Palmer & Andrew L. Plauche, Jr. , A Review 
of the Louisiana Law on Potestative Conditions, 47 TUL. L. REV. 284 (1973). 
236. Article 1 767 defines a "resolutory condition" as follows: "If the obligation may 
be immediately enforced but will come to an end when the uncertain event occurs, the 
condition is resolutory." Clearly, an "at-will" employment contract is one which will come 
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which depends on the "will" rather than the "whim" of the 
employer,237 and therefore does not render the employment 
agreement null .  238 Indeed, that power must be regarded as dependent 
on the parties' "will" rather than their mere "whim" in order to avoid 
rendering at-will employment contracts wholly illusory.239 Thus, the 
to an end if and when an uncertain event, the decision of either party to tenninate the 
arrangement, occurs. 
237. The distinction between "whim" and "will," as those terms are used in articl e  
1 770, i s  explained i n  the 1 984 Revision Comments: 
An event which is left to the obligor's whim is one whose occurrence 
depends entirely on his will, such as his wishing or not wishing something . . . . 
An event is not left to an obligor's whim when it is one that he may or may not 
bring about after a considered weighing of interests, such as his entering a 
contract with a third party. 
* * * 
Thus, in the traditional example, an obligation to buy a house if the obligor 
moves to Paris is valid rather than null because it is assumed that moving to Paris 
or not will be decided according to serious reasons such as obtaining a position 
there or securing admission to a school in that city. It is assumed, in other words, 
that the obligor will  not decide not to move to Paris for the sole purpose of 
deceiving the other p arty. 
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1 770 revision cmts. (d) & (e) (West 1 987). 
By this definition, the decision of an employer to fire an employee (or of an employee 
to quit her job) is clearly a matter of "will" rather than "whi m." For either party, the 
termination of the agreement will have meaningful consequences: The employer will have 
to find and train another employee or do without the services that the fired employee 
performed, and the employee will have to secure another job, one which will involve 
different terms and conditions than the job she left. Thus, for both employer and employee. 
the decision is one which wil l  ordinarily reflect a "considered weighing of interests" rather 
than mere caprice. 
238. Cf Long v. Foster & Assoc., 242 La. 295, 303, 1 36 So. 2d 48, 52-53 ( 1 962) 
(holding that the inclusion o f  a unilateral right in the employee to terminate on two weeks 
notice did not constitute a potestative condition nullifying what was otherwise a fixed-term 
contract of employment). 
239. Application of this principle to contracts terminable at will-and the necessity o f 
l i miting the right to terminate in this way in order to prevent the underlying obligation from 
becoming illusory-is explained in comment (f) of the official Revision Comments 
following article 1 770: 
COMMENT (!). Under the second paragraph of this Article. a resolutory condition 
that depends solely on the obligor's will must be fulfi l led in good faith. but docs 
not make the obligations null .  Thus, a "tennination at-wi ll" clause is not 
necessarily null if the right to tenninate is exercised in good faith. 
• • • 
Practical reasons prevent the conclusion that a resolutory condition that 
depends on the will of the obligor should always make the obligation null. Thus. 
in a simple sale in which the vendee reserves the choice of paying the price or 
returning the thing, it is clear that there is a resolutory condition that depends on 
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decision to end any at-will contract, including an at-will employment 
contract, must necessarily be governed by the second sentence of 
article 1770 and its requirement that the power be exercised in "good 
faith."240 The hard questions, however, lie in determining what this 
requirement of "good faith" means, and how it should be applied in 
the context of employment at will. 
B. Defining the Requirement of "Good Faith " 
Remarkably, although the concept of "good faith" appears in 
many places in the Louisiana Civil Code,241 the Code nowhere 
attempts to define that term. However, commentary and case law 
provide a working definition of the elusive concept of "good faith."  
As Professor Litvinoff has recently noted, the concept of "good 
faith" has both subjective and somewhat objective (or at least inter-
the will of the vendee, who is obligor of the obligation to pay the price. Neither 
the contract nor the vendee's obligation is null in such a case, however. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 770 revision cmt. (t) (West 1 994 ). 
240. Though the Revision Comments to the relevant provisions of the Louisiana 
Code are not as explicit as one might wish, they appear to contemplate that the analysis and 
results proposed here do apply to termination of contracts of employment at-will. Comment 
(t) to article 1770 contains a specific cross-reference: "For employment contracts, see 
Comment (C) to C.C. Article 2024." That comment (c), in tum, states that "a contract of 
employment for an indefinite duration may be terminated at the will of either party." While 
that statement may seem like little more than a tautological definition, it appears that the use 
of the word "will" in comment (c) was advised and intentional and should be understood in 
light of the distinction between "will" and "whim" articulated in article 1770. 
To be sure, a few decisions can be found which reject application of article 1 770 to at­
will contracts of employment. See, e.g., Frichter v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 620 
F. Supp. 922, 927 (E.D. La. 1 985) (denying that a "duty to perform the at-will contract in 
good faith create[s] in and of itself an expectation of employment security" and does not 
limit an employer's power to fire at-will), aff'd, 790 F.2d 89 1 (5th Cir. 1986). These cases 
have, however, reached these results on the basis of the erroneous assumption that article 
2747 requires that employment contracts be interpreted sui generis, rather than according to 
ordinary coda! principles. 
For an interesting comparison, see generally Note, Protecting At-Will Employees 
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Tenninate only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
1 8 16 (1 980) (advocating application of a good-faith requirement for discharge of at-will 
employees in common-law jurisdictions). 
24 1 .  A very partial but representative list might i nclude LA. Clv. CODE ANN. arts. 96 
(civil effects of absolutely null marriage extended to party who entered into it in good faith); 
488 (possessor in good faith of products has right to reimbursement of expenses); 523 
(defining "good faith" in the context of transfer of moveables); 1963 (contract made with 
third party to prevent threatened injury may not be rescinded for duress if third party was in 
good faith); and 3475 (prescriptive period of 10 (rather than 30) years for possessor of 
property if "good faith [and] just title"). 
1 995] EMPLOYMENT AT WIU 1 59 1  
subjective) components. Specifically, good faith requires the actor to 
sincerely (even if erroneously) believe that he is acting according to 
law, and that his actions comport with minimal standards of probity, 
honesty, and loyalty to other parties to the contract.242 In the particular 
context of conventional obligations, these underlying principles 
suggest that a party to a contract is not free to pursue his individual 
ends without regard for the interests of the other parties to the contract. 
Rather, each party is required to collaborate with other parties to 
facilitate attainment of their mutual ends.243 Revision Comment (f) to 
242. Litvinoff explains: 
Although the words "good faith" are of very current use, and though they 
are used on the general assumption that everybody understands what they mean, 
the fact is that the concept of good faith is not easy to define. It has been said that, 
in  a legal context, good faith has a psychological and an ethical component. The 
former would consist in a belief that one is acti n g  according to the law, and is 
designated as good faith-belief. The latter would consist in conducting oneself 
according to moral standards, and is designated as good faith-probity, or good 
faith-honesty, and i s  germane to the ideas of loyalty and respect for the pledged 
word. From the vantage point of the psychological component, it does not matter 
if the belief is erroneous, provided that it is sincere. That is recognized in other 
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code that, for particular purposes. define a 
person's good faith as ignorance of the existence of the adverse interest of other 
persons. From the vantage point of the ethical component, good faith provi<les 
one of the opportun ities in which moral ity meets with the law. 
5 LITVINOF , supra note 234, § 1 .8, at 1 7 . 
These observations can help resolve some apparent confusion in the cases as to 
whether the standard o f  "good faith" in the Louisiana Civil Code is an ohjcc t i ve or 
subjective one. Compare National Safe Corp. v. Benedict & Myrick, Inc., 3 7 1  So. 2t.I 792. 
794-95 (La. 1 979) (holding that the standard is objective, and party held to have hreached 
contract by inducing away key employees of other party. even though nothing i n  the 
agreement specifically forbade such conduct) with Brill v. Catfish Shaks of Am .. Inc . .  727 F 
Supp. 1 035, 1 040-4 1 (E.D. La. 1 989) (upholding a subjective standard). The truth arrears 
to be that the requirement of "good fai th" can be violated either hy consciousness o f  
wrongdoing or by grossly inappropriate conduct. 
243 . As Professor Litvinoff has suggested: 
[The principle of good faith is] general and should be applicable to all kinds of 
obl igations, regardless of their origin. In the case of contracts, however. further 
elaboration of the principle is possible: they should be pcrfonned according to 
the parties ' intent and in  conformity with recognized standards of honesty anJ 
loyalty. 
The idea of good faith in conventional obligations may he concei ved in a 
l ivelier and more complex fashion . . . . In modem times. the emphasis once 
placed on the individual end pursued by each of the parties has been shifted to the 
end pursued in common by all the parties. as if every contract were a joint 
venture-almost a partnership-where the idea of opposed interests dividing the 
parties yields to the idea of a certain union of interests among them. Thus. insofar 
as the expected performance is concerned. the creditor is no longer a creditor 
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article 1770 of the Code elaborates on these principles, explaining that 
to be in good faith, a party exercising the power to terminate a c ontract 
at will "should consider not only his own advantage but also the 
hardship which the other party will be subjected to because of  the 
tennination," and that "tennination because of purely personal rather 
than business reasons could constitute bad faith."244 
The meaning o f  good faith can also be derived from an 
examination of its c onverse, "bad faith."245 Louisiana Civil Code 
articles 1996 and 1 997 distinguish good and bad faith for purposes of 
assessing damages for breach of contract. 246 Comment (b) to article 
1 997 defines "bad faith" narrowly as an "intentional[] and 
without more; he also becomes a debtor with a duty of collaboration, an 
obligation to cooperate in the attainment of mutual ends. 
7 SAUL LITVINOFF, LOUISIANA CrvIL LAW TREATISE: OBLIGATIONS, BOOK 2 § 4, at 6-7 
( 1 975). 
The concept of good faith has come to be i nterpreted similarly in common-law 
jurisdictions as requiring both honesty in fact and faithfulness to the parties' common 
purpose. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmts. (a) & (d) ( 1 98 1 ) . 
244. The revision comment to article 1770 states the following: 
In order to comply with the requirement of good faith, a party exercising his right 
to terminate a contract at-will should consider not only his own advantage, but 
also the hardship which the other party will be subjected to because of the 
termination. Thus, a party to a requirements contract that chooses to terminate it 
because he has an opportunity to sell the same things elsewhere at a higher profit 
could violate the good faith requirement if the other party cannot find an 
alternative source of supply. Likewise, termination because of purely personal 
rather than business reasons could constitute bad faith. 
LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 1 770, revision cmt. (f) (citations omitted). 
245. Louisiana courts have construed the terms "good faith" and "bad faith" as 
complementary terms. Any act which is not taken in good faith is necessarily in bad faith, 
and vice versa. See, e.g., Bond v. Broadway, 607 So. 2d 865, 866-67 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.) 
(adopting the definition of bad faith found in Black ' s  Law Dictionary as the "opposite of 
good faith generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud"), writ denied, 6 1 2  
So. 2d 88 (La. 1993). Defining one of these terms thus necessarily serves to define the 
other. 
246. Articles 1 996 and 1997 provide the following: 
Article 1996. Obligor in good faith. An obligor in good faith is liable only for the 
damages that were foreseeable at the time the contract was made. 
Article 1997. Obligor in bad faith. An obligor in bad faith is liable for all the 
damages, foreseeabl e  or not, that are a direct consequence of his failure to 
perform. 
LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 1 996, 1997. These articles are new but were not intended to make 
any substantive change to the Jaw. They reproduce the substance of article 1 934( 1 )  of the 
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, quoted at note 248, infra. 
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malicious[)" failure to perform an obligation.247 Similarly, former 
article 1934( 1)  of the 1870 Louisiana Civil Code, from which current 
articles 1996 and 1997 were derived, defines "bad faith" as "a 
designed breach of [the contract] from some motive of interest or ill  
will."248 However, case law interpreting these concepts has made it 
clear that a showing of bad faith does not necessarily require a 
showing that the defendant's conduct was intentional ; rather, other 
types of "gross fault" may suffice.249 
C. Applying the Duty of "Good Faith " to Termination of At- Will 
Employees 
This definitio n  of the obligation of "good faith" appli e s  with 
ful l  force to a party's exercise of contractual rights. Thi s  i ncludes 
situations where a contract allows one or both parties to exercise 
discretion with respect to particular terms, such as an at-will  
employment contract. It is,  in  other words, n o contradiction in terms 
to say that a party to a contract exercised a contractual right, but did 
so in bad faith . 
247. Comment (b) to article 1997 states the fol lowing: 
COMMENT (B). An obligor is i n  bad faith if  he i n tentionally and maliciously fa i l s  
Lo perform h is  obligation. 
LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 1 997, revision cmt. (h) (West 1 994) .  
248. Article 1 934 provided the following: 
Article 1 934. 
I .  when the debtor has been guilty of no fraud or had faith. he i s  l 1 ahk 
only for such damages as were contemphucd . or may reasonably he supposed In 
have entered into the contemplation of the parties at the t ime of the ro111r;1c1 By 
bad faith in this and the next rule. is not meant the mere breach of faith in  1101 
complying with the contract. hut ;1 designed breach of i t  from some motive nf 
interest or ill wi l l .  
LA. Clv. CooE ANN. art. 1 934 (West 1992). 
Though former article 1 934 was repealed. Louisiana courts co11111111c lo hold t h;11 ; 1 1 l 1L·k 
1 934 explains the meaning of current anicle 1 997. S1'<'. e.g . . AAA Bril·k \. City ol 
Carencro, 640 So. 2d 483 ( La. Ct. App. 3J Cir.) ( relying on the languai:e of formn a rt i c l e  
1 934 t o  interpret current article 1 997). 11"1"it dl'!licd. 642 S o .  2J S 7 0  ( La. 1 99.f l :  Wi l 1 1 ;1111.' \. 
Coe, 4 1 7  So. 2d 426 (La. Ct. App. ! st Cir. 1 982) (sarrn: l. 
249. As the Louisiana Supreme Cou rl has suggested: 
Although it is  clear that "bad faith" or "lack o f  good faith" 111 th is nH1lnl 
means something more reprehensible than ord111ary negligence. 1mprudt'rll"c or 
want of ski l l .  i t  is apparent that our courts have pcrccl \ ed the tenn I n  mc:lude 
some fonns of gross faul t  as well as intentional and mahrnius fai lures h>  perfnrrn 
Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co . . 557 So. 2<l 966. %9 ( Lt 1 990) 
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The point here is subtle but important. It is certainly true that the 
statutory duty to perform obligations in good faith generally cannot 
give parties rights inconsistent with the express terms of their 
contract.250 However, this does not mean that one must show a 
violation of a specific contract term in order to show a violatio n  of the 
duty of good faith. While certain language in article 1 997 and the 
Comments to that article could be read to imply such an 
interpretation,251 this view is too myopic. 
Several reasons support this conclusion. First, the articles which 
impose the obligation of good faith, articles 1 759 and 1 983, are 
located in sections of the Louisiana Civil Code which purport to 
establish general principles for the interpretation of all contracts.252 By 
contrast, article 1 997 is located in a section of the Code which is 
concerned solely with a single, limited issue-calculation of 
damages.253 This location strongly suggests that article 1 997 was not 
intended to operate as a general limit on the applicability of the 
principle of good faith established elsewhere in the Code. Second, any 
interpretation of "bad faith" which would require a breach of a specific 
250. See, e.g. , Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 485 
(5th Cir. 1984); Bonanza Int'!, Inc. v. Restaurant Management Consultants, Inc.,  625 F. 
Supp. 143 1 ,  1448 (E.D. La. 1 986). In exceptional circumstances, however, when one party 
attempts to make use of the terms of a contract in an obviously unfair way, courts have found 
a breach of the duty of good faith even though the contract purported to pennit the 
defendant to do what he did. See, e.g., Andrus v. Cajun Insulation Co., 524 S o .  2d 1 239 
(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988). In Andrus, leased mobile telephone equipment had from the 
beginning been so defective as to not serve the purposes for which it was purchased. Id. at 
1 240. The court denied the lessor's claim for delinquent rent even though the lease 
agreement contained express language disclaiming all warranties of fitness or 
merchantability. Id. at 1 245. The court held that, despite the language purporting to 
disclaim warranties, the duty to provide merchantable goods is correlative to the obligation 
to pay rent, and that it would amount to a violation of the duty of good faith imposed by the 
predecessor of current article 1983 to simultaneously demand rent and disclaim all 
warranties. Id. at 1239-45. Other Louisiana courts, h owever, have reached contrary results 
on similar facts. See, e.g., Louisiana Nat'! Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv. , Inc., 377 So. 2d 92 
(La. 1 979); First Continental Leasing Corp. v. Howard, 6 1 8  So. 2d 642, 645 (La. Ct.  App. 
2d Cir. 1993). 
25 1 .  Both article 1 997, quoted at nr>te 248, supra, and comment (c) to that article 
state that an obligor in bad faith is liable for all damages caused by his "failure to perform." 
That terminology could be interpreted to require a failure to perform some particular 
contractual obligation as a prerequisite to a finding of bad faith. 
252. Article 1759 is located in Book III, Title III, Chapter 1 of the Civil Code, a 
chapter entitled "General Principles" applicable to obligations in general. Article 1 983 is  
located in Book III, Title VI, Chapter 8,  Section I ,  a section devoted to explicating the 
"General Effects of Contracts." 
253. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. bk. III, tit. IV, ch. 8, § 4 (entitled "Damages".) 
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contractual term, or which would make the requirement of good faith 
inapplicable to exercises of discretion contemplated by a contract, 
would be inconsistent with Louisiana Civil Code article 1770. Article 
1 770 expressly makes resolutory conditions dependent on the will of 
the obliger subject to the requirements of good faith.254 Such an 
interpretation woul d also contradict a line of Louisiana authority which 
has found a violation of the duty of good faith, or its equivalent , even 
though the defendant's conduct did not violate any express term of the 
contract255 or involved an issue which the contract expressly left to the 
d efendant's discretion.256 Finally, such a crabbed interpretation of the 
254. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 770. 
255. See, e.g., National Safe Corp. v. Benedict & Myrick, Inc., 371 So. 2d 792 (La. 
1 979). In National Safe, the defendant had solicited the plaintiff to become the exclusive 
Louisiana distributor of the defendant's products. The defendant later termin ated the 
distributorship agreemen t  with the plaintiff, without cause, and gave the business to a new 
partnership formed by one of the defendant's officers and one of the plaintiff's employees. 
Although this course of conduct violated no express term of the distributorship agreement, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the defendant violated the underlying obligation of 
good faith imposed by the Civil Code on all contracts by offering inducements to key 
employees of its contract partner. Id. at 795; see also Azar v. Shilstone, 607 So. 2d 699, 70 I 
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1 992) (holding that individual who was both the majority shareholder 
and major creditor of a business violated the duty of good faith by, inter alia, structuring a 
sale of the business in a form that would unfairly benefit himself (by taking most of the 
purchase price in the form of payment for a personal covenant not to compete) rather than in 
a form that would equitably benefit minority shareholders). 
256. See, e.g., Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 344 So. 2d 1353 (La. 1 977).  In 
Morse, an employer sought to avoid payment of deferred compensation to an at-will 
employee by firing that employee before his entitlement to that deferred compensation could 
vest. id. at 1359. The court ordered compensation paid anyway, relying on former Civil 
Code article 2040, which provides that a "condition is considered as fulfilled, when 
fulfillment of it has been prevented by the party bound to perform it." The court noted that 
former article 2040 was subject to an exception when the party which prevents performance 
does so through the exercise of a legal right. Id. at 1 359-60. However, the court refused to 
apply that exception in the case before it on the ground that termination of an at-wi ll 
employee, without cause, solely to prevent vesting of such deferred compensation, 
constituted an abuse of right. Though the court did not explicitly analyze the case in terms 
of the requirement of good faith, the analogy between concepts of ''bad faith" and "abuse of 
rights" is evident. The Morse case is discussed, and its impl ications explored. in Note. 
Obligations-Deferred Compensation Supplemental Awards & Pension Plans. 52 Tut.. L. 
REV. 427 ( 1 978); see also Onorato v. Maestri, 1 73 La. 375, 1 37 So. 67 ( 1 93 1 ). The plaint i ff 
in Onorato was a broker who arranged a fifteen year commercial lease in return for a 
commission. The lease contained a clause which gave the owner the right to terminate that 
l ease if certain events occurred. The owner took advantage of that clause to rescind the 
original lease and then entered into replacement leases with the original lessee-a sequence 
which had the effect of reestablishing essentially the same relations between owner and 
lessee, while depriving the plaintiff of his commission. Id. at 378. 1 37 So.
_ 
at 68. As in 
Morse, the court held that the condition for the payment of the comrmss1on should be 
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applicability of the duty of good faith would have the perverse effect of 
reducing a fundamental principle of contract law to a virtual nullity. If 
violating a specific contract term were required, plaintiffs could in  all 
cases base their suit solely on the alleged breach of that term. 
Additional allegations that the breach was in bad faith would be 
deemed irrelevant to any issue on the merits. 
What then does the requirement of good faith mean, as applied in  
the specific context of terminating at-will employees? At the outset, it 
must be emphasized that a requirement of "good faith" in discharges 
of at-will employees is not the same as a requirement of "good c ause" 
for such a discharge. The absence of any requirement of good cause 
for termination of at-will employment is clearly implicit in Civil Code 
articles 2749 and 2750, which impose liability for discharge or 
cessation of work in the absence of "good cause" only for fixed-term 
employment.257 
The distinction between good faith and good cause may not be 
easy to pin down. For example, if an employer fired an employee 
because that employer sincerely but erroneously believed that an 
employee was disloyal, such a discharge would likely not constitute 
good cause. It might well, however, constitute good faith, at least if 
the employer was not reckless in believing and acting as he did. 
Termination on such facts would seem to satisfy both the "subjective" 
and the somewhat more "objective" tests for good faith. The 
employer's sincere belief satisfies the first criterion. The second prong 
is also met because society generally recognizes that termination on 
the basis of an employee's apparent disloyalty does not demonstrate 
lack of probity, honesty, or loyalty, and does not indicate self-interest 
or ill will. Likewise, the case law provides a number of examples in 
which terminations were not made for "good cause," but were 
nevertheless made in "good faith": termination of an engineer 
employed by the outgoing governing board of the harbor and terminal 
district in part so that the new board could hire their own engineer;258 a 
medical corporation's termination of a physician employee because 
considered satisfied, under the authority of former Civil Code article 2040. While the owner 
acted within his legal rights in rescinding the original lease, thus preventing the plaintiff 
from completing the conditions for payment of his commission, the court found, in effect, 
that his acts were in bad faith. Id. at 382, 137 So. 2d at 69. 
257. See text accompanying supra note 220. 
258. Andrepont v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist., 602 So. 2d 704 (La. 1992). 
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she failed to apply for staff privileges at a local hospital ;259 or an 
employee's act of leaving employment in part because of a personal 
desire to avoid travel.260 
Nonetheless, while the requirement of "good faith" is not the 
same as the requirement of "good cause," applying the general duty of 
good faith to termination of at-will employees would have important 
consequences for the l aw of Louisiana. In particular, the duty of good 
faith, if enforced as it should be in the context of employment at will ,  
would serve to eliminate many of the most egregious abuses spawned 
by the current absolutist view of the at-wil l  rule. For example, it was 
held in Gil v. Metal Service Corp. , that the Louisiana doctrine  of 
employment at will barred any cause of action on behalf of an at-will 
employee who was fired solely because he refused to actively 
participate in the employer's attempts to perpetrate fraud.261 If the case 
had instead been analyzed in accord with the duty of good faith that 
underlies all contracts, the employer 's act could readily be seen as 
motivated by a lack of "honesty" and "loyalty" toward the employee, 
as placing an unjustifiable hardship on that employee, and as 
motivated by an i l licit self-interest or i l l  will on the part of the 
employer. Such a violation of the duty of good faith then would-as it 
should have in Gil-give rise to a cause of action for damages in favor 
of the discharged employee. Similarly, recognition of a duty of good 
faith would have led to very different results in Walther v. National Tea 
Co. ,262 in which the Fifth Circuit relied on Louisiana's absolutist view 
of employment at wil l  to absolve an employer who tenninated an at­
will employee solely to prevent the vesting of the employee's pension 
benefits. In Portie v. Devall Towing & Boat Service, Inc. 261 and 
259. Prevosc v. Eye Care & Surgery Ctr . •  635 So. 2d 765 (La. Ct. App. I st Cir. ). 11.,./1 
dn1ied, 639 So. 2d 1 1 61! (La. 1 994). 
260. Sell v. Department of Employment Sec. , 499 So. 2d 1 285.  1 286-87 (I .a. Ct. App. 
4th Cir. 1 986). 
26 1 .  4 1 2  So. 2d 706. 708 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. ) ,  writ dl'llii'll, 4 1 4  So. 2d 37') ( La .  
1 982). 
262. 848 F.2d 5 1 8  ( 5th Cir. 1 988); see al.10 Hil l  v. Missouri Pac. Ry . .  8 F. Supp. 80. 
8 1  (W.D. La. 1 9.�3) (holding that a claim that an employer discharged an employee lo avoid 
payi ng pension hcnefits stated no cause of action, desp i te employer's promise to employ 
worker "until such time as he retired on a full pension'') ;  Williams v.  li.1uro Infirmary. 578 
So. 2d 1 006, 1009 (La. Ct. App. 41h Cir. 199 1 )  (same). 
263. 634 So. 2d I 324. I 321! (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1 994 ). 
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Woodson v. Alarm Protection Services, Inc. ,264 the courts found no 
viable claim could be asserted against an employer who punished an 
employee who filed claims for compensation for work-related injuries 
by firing that employee's relative and spouse. In Martinez v. Behring s 
Bearings Service, Inc. ,265 the court found no cause of action under state 
law for an at-will employee who was fired in retaliation for exercising 
the legal right to file a complaint to the Wage and Hour Division of the 
United States Department of Labor. 
In all of these cases, the employer's decision to terminate 
employment clearly failed to meet the minimal requirements of 
honesty and loyalty toward the employee that are the bedrock of "good 
faith." In each case, the employer did act out of illicit motives, 
attempting to secure an improper advantage in "bad faith." In each 
case, the law should have permitted, consistent with the requirement of 
good faith, appropriate relief for the wronged employee. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Louisiana courts ' virtually absolute interpretation of the rule of 
employment at will has let serious abuses by employers to go 
unrectified. The most egregious of these results are not, however, 
mandated by anything i n  the Louisiana Civil Code. On the contrary, 
the Code, properly interpreted, contemplates a cause of action in 
favor of a discharged at-wmcemployee whenever the termination was 
not carried out in "good faith ." 
Over the last thirty years, litigants and courts have justified the 
absolutist view of employment at will, and its attendant hardships, as 
mandated by the terms of Louisiana Civil Code article 2747. 
However, the derivation and history of article 2747 makes clear that 
the article was never intended to apply to the generality of employees. 
Rather, that article was written and intended as a very narrow 
exception to the ordinary rules applicable to employment, an exception 
which should properly be applied only to an extremely limited class of 
household and personal servants. 
Since article 2747 does not apply, the rights and duties of most at­
will employees should be determined according to the codal principles 
264. 53 1 So. 2d 542, 543-44 (La. Ct. App. Sth Cir.), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 358 (La. 
1 988). 
265. 501 F.2d 104, 1 05 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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applicable to all other contracts terminable at will. First among these 
general principles is the duty of "good faith," which the Code makes 
applicable to all contracts, including contracts tenninable at will ,  and 
to all exercises of contractual rights, including exercising an option to 
terminate a contract at will. If applied, as it should be, to at-will 
employment contracts, this duty of good faith would pennit Louisiana 
to retain the substance of the rule of employment at will, while ridding 
the system of its worst abuses. 
